Darshana Int.
Vol. 32 1992

130665

Stock Verification-2024

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

46

AN

INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

125

08/3/92

130665

MORADABAD
(India)

Vol. 32

VOL. XXXII JANUARY 1992 NUMBER 1

DEDICATION

This 125th issue of the **Darshana Internationa.**
is most respectfully **dedicated** *to*
PROF. JOHN SOMERVILLE

A great American Philosopher, who enriched the field of **philo-** [redacted]

as a philosophical issue. Much of the philosophical rubbish heaped upon knowledge by 'intuitive insights', are to be removed and kept in to the archaeological museum of the history of thoughts. In other words what happened is that various branches of thoughts have parted away from 'love of wisdom', and abstract speculations. The divine intuitions are no longer a method of enquiry of the truth. That is why Negel said " Philosophy on the other hand has to do, not with unessential determinations, but with a determination in so far as it is essential it's element and content is not the abstract or non actual, but that which posits itself and the essential is always within itself-existence within it's own notion"[3].

What is philosophy - A New Understanding

Patrick says, "Philosophy has been defined as an attempt to use of scientific methods to understand the world in which live"[4]. The main defect of this definition is that it can be replaced by any branch of science. Physics and Chemistry are also scientific methods to understand the world in which we live. However it do not acquires a status of philosophy.

Patrick is more clear when he said "Philosophy is critical analysis of concepts, and discovery of relation between them. It thus hopes to integrate our knowledge, to unify and interpret it, so it comes about that, logic is perhaps, the most essential part of the philosopher's equipment".[5]

Critical analysis of concepts are also done by other branches of knowledge. The mythical concepts which surrounds sun and moon were exploded by Astronomy. After Aristarcus of BC, Galileo who was a scientist rather than a philosopher, was the first to prove that it is not the sun, but the earth which is moving. Unification, interpretation and integration are the concerns, of philosophers, rather than that of the scientists or sociologists. Logic is surely an essential part of the philosopher's equipment. Logic is a subject matter of philosophy, but not of any other branches of knowledge. Frederick Engels correctly maintains that for Philosophy, which has been expelled from nature and history, there remains only the realm of pure thought so far as it is left; the theory of laws of the thought process itself, Logic and dialectics[6]. But this does not mean that philosophy has no more role. But there is a defect; This position can be counted as a subjective interpretation of logic since here logic is that concerns with realm of pure thought. Engels never conceived thinking process as having no connections with real existing world; but quite contrary he thinking is the process by which man understands external worlds and himself.

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[3] G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1977), p.27.

[4] G.T.W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy. (Delhi : Surjeet Publications, 1978), p.5.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected works. (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1970), 3, p.375.

Logic

What is Logic ? Popularly it is defined as the science which deals with the operations of human mind in its search for truth. Aristotelian Logic and Modern formal Logic are studied under this title. But many philosophers are unsatisfied with the formal nature of this approach. V.I. Lenin in is "Conspectus of Hegel's science of Logic"[7] remarks that Logic, is not a science of external forms of thought. Syllogism and symbolic logic treat logic in that manner. Those who tried to construct a perfect language are also treat it in the same manner. But Lenin thinks that Logic is the science of the laws of all material, natural and spiritual things, i.e. the sum total the definition is enough to deal, whole reality with all it's complexities. In this way, logic and philosophy become indential. Since it is the conclusion (theory) of the history of knowledge, it is nothing other than Theory of Knowledge itself.[8]

Logic and Dialectics

Dialectics is the logic which admits Universality of contradictions. Lenin further elaborates dialectics :

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) indentical, under what conditions they are indentical becoming transformed into one another - why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another" (Lenin, 1961). Thus for Marxism Dialectics itself is philosophy. If we consider, this objectively, then Dialectics is their philosophy.

Philosophy and Science

"Scientific knowledge .... is certain, exact and fully organised real knowledge. Well organised is scientific knowledge".

Person and many other scholars defined science in this way "Science is the complete, and consistent description of the facts of experience in the simplest".

V.I. Lenin, Collected works (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1961), 38, p. 92.

Zhong Wanzian, Ed. by Mao Ze Dong : Biography, Assessment. Reminiscences (Beijing : Foreign Language Press, 1986), p.209 quoting Zhou Peiyuan.

We have to analyse three problems. First, whether scientific knowledge is 'complete', 'exact', 'fully organised' and 'consistent description'. Let us take a scientific proposition. "Acceleration due to gravity g = 9.8m/sec2'. This is a *proposition in Physics. At first glance we may attribute all of the above mentioned qualities to this proposition.

First let us admit, for the sake of science, there are objective truths, objective in the sense of being independent of us, human beings.' If so, can human ideas, which give express it all at one time, as a whole, unconditionally, and absolutely, or only approximately, and relatively ?"[9]. The authors of the book 'Empirio-monism' answer that we can know objective truths only relatively and approximately.

Apart from Emperio monists, Nietzsche criticises science from a different angle. to him "Physics too is an interpretation of Universe an arrangement of it (to suit us, if I may be so bold:), rather than a clarification"[10].

Secondly, for philosophers like David Hume, there is no question of even causality. 'We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other......There is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection".[11] If this position is admitted then there is no question of law of gravitation.

Thirdly, this law itself is liable to many objective conditions. For example, "g" is slightly different in different places in earth.

The conclusion is that the nature of scientific truth is not complete, certain and exact as G.T.W. Patrick or Pearson claimed.

Secondly let us examine, whether science depends upon philosophy. Let us examine the French Physicist Louis de Broglie's matter wave principle. This principle suggests that matter, like ratiation, has dual nature; that is material particles like electrons, protons, atoms and the like might exhibit wave like (undulatory) characteristics in addition to corpuscular characteristics. Three considerations led De Broglie to introduce the concept of matter wave. They are: 1. Nature manifests herself in two fundamental forms, matter and radiation. De Broglie argued that these two forms must exhibit similar characteristics, that is, they must be mutually symmetrical. Since radiation has a dual nature - wave and particle nature - matter also might possess the same dual nature. (2) There is a close similarity between laws of Mechanics and Laws of optics. Maupertion principle of least action in mechanics and Fermat's principle of least time in optics prove this. Hence De Broglie argued that matter also might exhibit dual nature. (3) In Bohr's atom model, stationary orbits of the electrons are governed by integer rules. In physics integers arise only in cases where wave motion is involved. Hence electrons must possess some wave characteristics.

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[9] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1962), 14, p.123.

[10] W.T. Jones, kant and the Nineteenth Century :A History of Western Philosophy (New York : Har Court Brace Jovanovich. Inc.), p. 242.

[11] W.T. Jones, Hobbes to Hume. A History of Western Philosophy (New York : Har Court Brace Jovanovich, Inc), p.242.

I thus arrived the following of overall concept which guided my studies; for both matter and radiations, light in particular, it is necessary to introduce the corpuscle concept and the wave concept at the same time. In other words the existence of corpuscles accompanied by waves has to be assumed in all cases"[12].

De Broglie got this theory not from any laboratory or directly from any other theories of physics, but from logical assumptions. Let us take his first proof. Since nature is manifested in two fundamental forms, matter and radiation, he assumed that they must exhibit similar characteristic. After studying particular and general characteristics of matter and radiation, he inferred that matter must have some characteristics which radiation possesses. From Lenin's explanation of Dialectics we can see that De Brogile studied how matter and radiation can be and how they happen to be indentical - under what conditions they are indentical becoming transformed into one another.

When we considered 'law of gravitation', we found that one can admit the law of gravitation only if he maintains three philosophical positions - consciously or unconsciously; firstly he must admit the objectivity of truth or he must be an antiemperio-monist; Secondly he must he an anti-sceptic, thirdly he must admit conditional, temporary, transitory and relative nature of objective truths. A simple law in physics made a man three times philosophical. But in the case of 'g' everything was indirect. And in the case of Louis-de Broglie everything is clear.

Wittgenstein holds that[13] (in Tractatus Logico-philosophicus) without philosophy thoughts are cloudy and indistinct. Clarity and distinction of thoughts are not depended upon presence or absence of philosophy; but it's nature. It is said that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear and given them sharp boundaries. But also it must be admitted that different philosophers have their own clarity and their's boundaries.

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[12] James P. Hurley, Claude Garrod, Principles of Physics. (Boston : houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), p.659, quoting Niels H. Heathcote, Nobel Prize Winners in Physics, 1901-1950 (New York : Abelard Schuman, 1954), p. 291. In the case of Modern Physics, Werner Heisenberg's uncertainity principle is also highly relevant, see David Halliday, Robert Resnick. Physics Part II (New Delhi : Wiey Eastern Limited, 1960), p. 1211.

[13] Ludwing Wittgenstein, Iractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), p.25.

Philosophy without Science ?

There is no form which is not related with anything that actually exists. We know the form 'cow', which is, or was in someway related to cows actually existing or existed. Without the actual cow there is no cowness. In the same way, without the sensual world, and experiences a philosophy is absurd. An interpretation or an intuition or a logic must be the science of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of it's cognition. It must be the some total, the conclusion of the history of the knowledge of the world. All other interpretations and intuitions which failed to be the conclusion of the history of knowledge were thrown into archives of history of thought. That is how, now we encounter with Vedic revelations concerned with the origin of man, the nature of the universe, arguments for existence of God and rationalist theories of pre-established harmony[14]. We can distinguish philosophy from science but cannot separate it. They are dialectically interconnected.

Once a fact is assumed through logic, (it) is widely accepted through other means, then it becomes a scientific or a historical fact. When Copernicus and Galileo discovered the reality of the solar system, the Catholic authorities refuted both their logic and assumptions. Once the world accepted and verified those scientists' assumptions, the method used by them and the logic (philosophy) behind that method became a scientific fact. For getting the science of sciences, theory of knowledge, man has to depend upon his power of abstraction. Bergson argues that philosophy is basically an intuitive discipline, since reason falsifies reality. The truth is quite contrary. Reason and philosophy are closely interwoven and complementary, not contradictory.

History itself will value any philosophical position[15]. But it is not a simple process. It is very difficult for mankind to abandon past methods. It is a fact that scientists of Indian space research still consult some astrologers before launching satellites, even after repeated failures. This proves that superstitions which the space research rejected before centuries is still practiced among the spaces scientists.

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[14] In this aspect opinion of D.P. Chattopadyaya is relevant. He says "Philosophical interpretations of history adds to our intelligibility of it. If primacy is given to philosophy over history, and history itself is made to S.G. Shanker, Ed. by Philosophy of Britain Today. (London : Groom Helm, 1986), p.198.play the second fiddle to philosophy, the outcome is disappointing". (Chattopadhyaya - in previously cited article in Darshana international).

[15] In this regard Mao's view point is interesting. "From the long range view, future generations ought to be more knowledgeable than we are just as men of the bourgeois - democratic era were more knowledgeable than

'Common man' and Philosophy

Fritz Waisman and Antonio Gransci have quite different views regarding, the status of philosophers. According to Waisman[16] philosophers are a special kind of people, and philosophy can be looked upon as their peculiar activity. For Gramsci, this is a widespread prejudice which is to be destroyed, and spontaneous philosophy is proper to everybody. From our analysis of scientific proposition we found that Gransci's position is more correct.

If we want to avoid confusion, we must distinguish between philosophy and philosophical views of philosophers which are being discussed by us. While the first is a universal phenomenon, the second is not so. Why don't we learn the philosophical views of a common man or a Heisenberg while we did listen to a Wittgenstein ?. The reasons are many; some of these philosophies are yet to be properly studied, some others are not new, still some others are only applied in certain field's like science and history or economics, but not explained as philosophical views by their own authors. But the case of a well-known philosopher is quite different. He is never satisfied merely with the particular, but moves from the particular to the general.

Study of Philosophy

What is the role philosophy in the human life ? Like everything that is also related with human intellect, it also reacts with the man and his surroundings. Like any other branches of knowledge it helps him to move forward, whether the direction is good or bad.

Sidney Hook points out "The study of philosophy in other words, give us perspective upon our human history and our present day experience. It reveals in John Devey's words "The predicaments, the prospects and aspiration of man".

From a different point of view Wittgenstein also repeated this opinion. "Philosophy aims at logical clarification of thoughts.... Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions. "19 Both of them are correct, so far as they

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those of the feudal ages. Their judgment would prevail, not ours..... A thousand years from now all of us he said, even Marx, Engels and Lenin would probably appear rather ridiculous (Edgar snow, China's Long revolution (Oxford, 1971), p.187.

[16] S.G. Shanker, Ed. by Philosophy of Britain Today. (London : Groom Helm, 1986), p.198.

maintained that philosophy contributes positively to towards our understanding. But we should not forget that Fascism itself had its own philosophy. Philosophy can have a progressive or a retrogressive role. If any philosophy leads one to a wrong conclusion, no doubt it's role is retrogressive. But Wittgenstein is negative when he said that most of the propositions (that can be) found in philosophical works are nonsensical. Anyway, both Sidney Hook and Wittgenstein throw light on only one half of the truth. They do not elucidate (say) what our knowledge is intended for. That is why, Marx said "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

The Study of Philosophy

the study of philosophy should not be considered as an endeavour undertaken merely for the sake of interest. A man, who is engaged in his 'situations' will learn from and philosophize his experience. He does so because he wants to go forward. This is the real problematic of knowledge. If any person thinks the contrary, philosophy will turn out to be a mere tautology, or a futile verbal exercise or a passionate, interpretation alien to objective reality.

"The way they go about it in the universities at present is no good, going from book to book, from concept to concept. How can philosophy come from books ?

'If you read too many, we can move towards our opposites, become bookworms, dogmatists, revisionists. In the writings of confuscious, there is nothing about agriculture, Because of this, the limbs of his students were not accustomed to toil, and they could not distinguish between five grains.'

Mao's view is entirely correct. Philosophy cannot materialize merely (become from boodishness or erudition. It comes from knowledge, knowledge of hitherto existing facts, including books and research papers (Equating real) knowledge with knowledge contained in some journals or books is foolish.

If anyone wants to know the philosophy of the crisis of Marxism at present, he must observe and learn, the present history and political circumstances together with critical theories of Marxism and on Marxism. If we try to have this only from certain widely read philosophical writings, then it will lead us to mere abstractions and hence to lifeless conclusions.

Conclusion

A serious consideration of philosophy demands the three questions to be answered: What philosophy is ? what its intentions are and how a knowledge of philosophy can be attained (as a subject).

For the first question, philosophy is that branch of knowledge which deals with the minds method of summing up of its acquired experience and knowledge (and it's method of gaining new conclusions from this), the laws of development, and it's relation to the knowing mind. Freedom of man lies in his capacity for change his necessity. Philosophy is the most essential ingredient consciously or unconsciously. which helps to change himself and his surroundings. Thirdly, a knowledge of philosophy as a subject cannot be achieved if it is narrowed down to the study of some pre-existing philosophical theories; but it takes into purview everything that exists so as to reach a comprehensive undertaking.

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The Virgin Paradigm

Christopher Hills
Ayman Sawaf

A paradigm is a body of thoughts, theories, and conceptual knowledge which enables us to constructs reality out of the sensory signals from our environment.

1. A paradigm is also a way of showing a contrast between old ways of thinking by comparing thoughts side-by-side. However, it is impossible to compare an old paradigm with a new one that no one has ever seen before. Because a virgin paradigm of tomorrow could not be understood with the mind sets and logical tools of today, we are imprisoned in the dualistic thinking of our present language, the old paradigm which we use to try and explain it.

Therefore, new paradigms involve fundamental changes in perception of reality. The paradigm of democracy is a concept of self-government elected by the people, but in those countries where people have never actually experienced any democracy, they cannot fully appreciate it as a system. The scientific paradigm is a way to know and test knowledge through a validation process of theory, experiments, and objective proof called the scientific method. However, such a paradigm of dualistic thought ends up in theories of Black Holes and Big Bangs that do not account for the primeval soup that spawned them in the first place, and is virtually useless for talking about such absolutes as the origin of consciousness or God, the Goddess, and All That Is. A new paradigm is now emerging with new logic and new ways of creating and perceiving reality.

There are many paradigms which have changed over the last few thousands of years in the evolution of changing human thought processes. We can examine the old paradigm of studying how things came to be what they are. First of all, we must examine our fundamental beliefs in how things work and study why our human knowledge can explain things in opposite terms of spirit and matter, subjectivity and objectivity and other polarizations of human perception. Our present civilization validates everything through its opposite and compares right with wrong, inside with outside, high with low, etc., without realizing that these are relative concepts and are, therefore, meaningless to anyone rooted in absolute values with God, or Truth. In the scientific paradigm, Truth is only relative and temporary but in religion it is absolute and eternal. There are many paradigms for understanding the way we do business or govern ourselves. There are paradigms which we use every day without even thinking we are using certain basic assumptions about ourselves and our ways of thinking that need to be reinterpreted and relearned.

The old paradigm of human striving and insecurity brings us uncertain knowledge through measuring and comparing everything with everything else. Because humans think in parallel ways, they create dualistic realities like paradise and earth. Because a paradigm is a side-by-side comparison of old and new ways of thinking, the new way always looks so obvious that we wonder how we could ever have thought the old way.

THE PARADIGM SHIFT

The paradigm shift is happening everywhere. Old political systems such as communism, socialism, and dictatorships are falling apart rapidly. Our own definition of democracy is being redefined and fine-tuned. As we observed in our latest election, people started taking more responsibility for their reality. They realize that even the best and oldest democracy is not producing the results it used to.

The economical paradigm is shifting too. Old economic theories like socialism, common ownership, and communities have not and still are not working. They are discovering that the power is in the individual ! A free market system where the bottom line is all that counts at the expense of the motivation and the means is not producing results either. In education, we are realizing that the system we have may be good for learning, but it is in no way good for raising children. Child abuse and violence have increased dramatically. Punishment is not working as a deterrent. Values and beliefs that have long been thought to keep the family together are actually creating a massive collective denial of anger and resentment that is blowing up in violence everywhere.

In the health area, diseases are popping up like popcorn with names harder and harder to pronounce, leaving the medical community in confusion, draining our tax money in the billions with no results, and experimenting on people with drugs that do not seem to work even though they used to in the past.

Our own body systems are shifting too. The immune system, the nervous system, are failing us. They are not responding as they used to. Is it possible we are creating new systems ? and, new brains ?

The old paradigm of science as a way of validating our knowledge of the universe is rapidly changing around us. From the fixed determination of the physical world of Quantum physics. This last paradigm was trapped in the dualism of whether matter was a wave of energy or a particle. It was trapped in the theories of the Big Bang and lost in the theories of the Black Hole. Then along came the theories of Chaos and then Order out of Chaos and now fractals and the material disorder are bringing us all the beauty in the growth and design of natural forms. The old forms of thought, which saw no role for consciousness because it was indefinable, are almost gone and in its place are popular theories of what science calls a singularity. A singularity would mean something which exists totally independent of laws outside itself and therefore not dependent on any other authority or resources.

A Black Hole is a singularity because it sucks into its center all surrounding matter or energy including light. Nothing can withstand its concentrated gravitational intensity until all shapes of atoms are crushed into pure energy without shape or form. This is the image of nothingness, not in a passive form but intensely powerful, all consuming, a dynamic state of raw energy. This is the starting point of the new paradigm.

A lot of people will deny, diminish, discount, or distract themselves as a way of defending the past and history, which really never repeats itself and is of no value to us in the coming wonder years of magic and miracles.

RESISTANCE TO THE NEW PARADIGM

Fears and doubts.

1. Fear of the unknown, fear of failure, of letting go of the past; will the new one work ? Needing a guarantee. Fear of being looked at as gullible or a fool if it does not work, or even if it did ? (The devil you know...)
2. Being content and comfortable in mediocrity. It is easy to stay in the same rut that our thoughts are comfortable with. We are "normal" and "belong" in mediocrity, which is the average common denominator of humanity. Normality = Mediocrity. It is much better to go down to the bottom of the pit than stay in mediocrity, because then at least you will awaken to your reality and do something about it and hopefully turn around and go for excellence. Yes, it will be uncomfortable for those who will insist on staying with the past.
3. Arrogance / negative ego. One of the resistances to change is human arrogance. We do not want to admit the past. We will not admit that we

might not know everything, or that things can change anywhere and anytime.

4. Our shadow self. All the parts of ourself that are denied, suppressed, hurt, or in shame. The part of us that still believes we have to fix the past before we can go on, that we have to experience pain. The part that thinks it is unforgivable. It does not feel it deserves what it has now, so how about getting something better ? It is the self that insists on earning and proving its worth all the time, too busy to stop and consider a new and better way.

Our present paradigm is riddled with male chauvinism which depicts the ultimate authority as father or God. To this extent our present humanity fails to appreciate the expression of feminine energy in action as if, or she, were only part of the whole rather than being [also] All That Is. This idealistic, conceptual domination of the feminine energy in our self as well as the culture and nation cannot lead to the blending and surrender needed to create the third kind of energy where the divine magic begins. How can there be complete Trust if we do not appreciate what power we already have, but do not respect ? This power is available from the feminine energy in each of us if we can trust her love and intelligence. Only then do we feel the power of the Kingdom become real and its expression become inseparable from the creative force. Our past paradigm was to believe that the allure and beauty for the re-emergence of the feminine energy must be controlled by male-dominated institutions. We are in the midst of the transition between this old paradigm of domination over the spontaneous, the wild, the new and fresh, and a new magical supremacy of feeling over logic.

The new paradigm sparks the imagination and intuition represented by the feminine energy. as the feminine energy emerges from out of the limitations placed upon it, we will discover each individual's definition of Goddess. this feminine energy is available to every woman, but more importantly, in the new paradigm it, to appreciate it, to admire it in anyone would be the mark of someone who did not need to dominate that which is sheer loveliness, By giving freedom and dominion to this idealized feminine energy each individual could harness it and bind it to themselves only with the energy of love. The domination of others through competition and confrontation is not the way to the top of the Goddess list. It is the way in which there is no single hero or winner. In the new paradigm everyone wins because there is no domination at the expense of others.

For thousands of years business has been conducted on the basis of trust. Man's confidence in man is at the basis of all credit given in the banking and business world. In the new world this trust is no longer based on an intimate knowledge of the individual and his family background. It is based on your net worth or your job security as your ability to pay. With credit cards this is all changing into plastic money which no one ever sees.

The power of money to dominate the activities of business or governmental decisions is also changing. No longer can polluters bury vast mounts of toxic wastes for now governments impose costs and fines for carelessness and irresponsible behavior. The power of money to buy PR no longer works. Business organization now encourage employees to give individuals respect and self-esteem at the work place with time off for having children.

Boards of directors who used to look only at the bottom line are now getting high marks for putting "people value " as their greatest assets rather than placing a value on hard assets alone. Instead of regarding itself as a patriarchal provider who must be obeyed, the company today is going through a transition from being dominated by the male emphasis on bottom line results to the feminine emphasis on intuition and quality of life. Qualities are valued such as love, a stable family setting, and the value of feelings. We now have the freedom to work without coercion or harassment and the opportunity to pursue individual happiness without harming or exploiting others. Instead of regarding a business as a money machine or cash cow dominated by the profit motive, we can see it as an elegant energy system with leadership and planning and employee team skills being valuable qualities. Along with changing attitudes towards bosses and customers, which create a family feeling, we can transform our relationships between the owner of the business and the employees who work there. If people only work there for a living, then they are in the wrong job. Job satisfaction is important in the performance of employees and in the success of the enterprise.

VICTIMHOOD VS CREATING YOUR OWN REALITY

Most people think they are born with a certain destiny or fate dictated to them by God or a higher source and that is how and why things go this way or the other. In other cultures, they call it Karma, again wrongly accepted as fate or punishment. Others blame or credit realities to good luck or bad luck, to the stupidity or ignorance of people, governments, or God. People are awakening to the fact that they are not the victims they think they are and that they do have the power to create their own reality consciously and completely.

We create our reality by causing it or allowing it. To create our reality we need, like creating anything, raw materials, tools, and energy. The raw materials consist of our beliefs, attitudes, thoughts and feelings, choices and decisions.

The tools are our desire, our expectation, and our imagination. Nothing is created unless it is desired, expected, or imagined, and when it manifests better than that it is called a miracle. Faulty beliefs and thoughts would limit or stop what you really want.

You cannot win a race or land a contract if you do not believe it possible, or believe in yourself getting it. Wrong attitudes and past judgments related to certain areas in our life will definitely not manifest the desired reality. If you always cheered the underdog and put down the winner, do you think you would want to be the winner ?

Limited thinking and feeling bad with ourselves are most damaging too. Guilty feeling will surely sabotage success. With shame you will not allow yourself to get success because you feel undeserving, and if you do, the reality will surely snap back to its acceptable boundaries blamed on bad luck.

The final ingredients are choices and decisions. Most people give us one choice for doing things--- the right way ! Buying this consensus leads us to block all kinds of choices from which a potentially better decision would be made.

As for the tools, imagination is the most powerful. You cannot create something without having a certain image of it. You cannot manifest in your reality a red sports car if you have never heard of one, or seen one. Imagination triggers desire. We imagine a red sports car, and we desire it. The more we desire it, the more we start to expect it to happen or having it. The consensus warns us from having too many desires and religion makes us feel guilty, and urges us to get rid of them. The same with expectation. It is an important tool. They say have no expectation and you will not be disappointed. Of course ! Because there is nothing created to be disappointed with !

Once those raw materials and tools are enacted together, generating energies are required : trust, enthusiasm, joy, and happiness. Once the creation is in motion, it needs to be sustained by love, intimacy, ownership, and discipline.

We all create our reality with the same raw materials and tools, except some of us have higher quality materials and better sharpened tools. Successful people have much more expansive beliefs and less limited thoughts. They have a positive nonjudgmental attitude and feel good about themselves. They give themselves far more choices and make decisions based on self-esteem, not out of fear, control, or anger.

We create our reality by causing it or allowing it. What can we do about allowing all the things we do not like ?

Does everything happen for the best ? NO ! Things happen, and it is up to us to make the best or the worst of them. The more we clean up our raw material and sharpen our tools, the more we will allow ourselves the best, but there are not common denominators to all successful people. What is common among them is the clarity of their desire, their vivid imagination, and the intensity of their expectation, their healthy and unlimited thoughts.

In the old business paradigm, success and values are based on money and how hard we work to earn it. Unfortunately, most people who spend their life doing just this end up still not feeling really successful or fulfilled. The money, the diplomas, the awards, and achievements are still not good enough ! The way we evaluate success is not by money or rank anymore. It is what it adds up to, who we are, and what we are becoming. Do we feel our worth ? Is our self-esteem expanding ? Do we feel more love and respect ?

Not all of those values have to be earned. Self-worth is only realized and accepted. We all have the same worth, because we are all pieces of the Divine. We cannot earn God's love, it can only be received. We are equal in God's eyes, and we are loved completely and uniquely. Most of us spend our life trying to earn our worth with money, good deeds, sacrifices, or martyrhood, running around in circles and going nowhere, only to feel more of the shame and lack of worth.

Another value we try to earn and this is misunderstood is self-respect. Self-respect means honoring the emotion. Feelings do not have to be logical, and they have the right to be honored and expressed. Respect and honor your own emotions, and people will honor yours, and your business.

Self-esteem is a value we build, practice, and harness. It is the love we earn for ourselves with our achievement through the principles of honesty, integrity, trust, listening to the inner voices, never hurting others.

Self-confidence is a value we develop with our trust and hope, amplified by our courage.

When success is filled with self-esteem, worth, love, respect, confidence, it becomes valuable because it brings us closer and closer toward self-realization. The synergy of all other values and what could be the ultimate happiness we all are looking for.

Does all this value system mean that money is not important ? No, money is an energy-like electricity or any other. It can be used positively or negatively. It is an energy that is extremely useful. Money does not buy happiness, but happiness can generate money.

Money not only became symbolic of success but became all that counts for most of us. What counts is the bottom line --- what is the $ figure ?

In any process, there is the motivation, the why behind what we are creating, the how or the means of implementation and then the end result. In the new paradigm, the end result will take its rightful place as third in importance, after the motivation and the way, the means.

What is the real motivation ? Is it to vindicate ourself ? To compete for power ? To take revenge, to cover our shame ? Or, is it to satisfy our needs for survival, security, belongings, expression, spirituality, and our preferences of fun, joy, and pleasure. ?

The second most important part of the process is the means. Age we doing or implementing with self-esteem, with confidence, love, and respect, or did we have to lie, manipulate, and control to get the bottom line at any cost ? When we focus more on the clarity of our motivation and the means of expression form of the end result.

If we do, we are reducing the real value, thus risking a reduced end result. The higher the value infused in the implementation, the more guaranteed the end results and even more: miracles.

LOGIC AND REASON VS INTUITION

The faculty which separates humans from their fellow animals is the faculty of reason. Many animals have intuition beyond the senses which enable them to perceive what is real. All organisms in nature survive and know intuitively how to find their food. It was found that a human being is only 2.7% different in cellular structures, sensitivity of the senses, and metabolic functions to that of a chimpanzee. This 2.7% is a comparative measurement like all other relative knowledge. Animals also possess a similar nervous structure to handle pain and pleasure, hot and cold, matter and spirit, and can actually communicate more precisely and better than humans in many areas of perception. Animals build concepts, think and feel, just like humans, but they cannot reason with themselves or with each other. In order to reason we must adopt the mental levels of assumptions, axioms, deductive theory, induction of data, postulates, logical, sequential order, and experiments.

The coming of a new paradigm, or world philosophy, gives humans the power to create a unified thought form to eliminate the paralyzing effects of relativism in science and religion, which many modern thinkers feel forced to accept.

We live in a time of great transformation in traditional religious beliefs and scientific attitudes concerning the nature of what is real. The apparent slowness of physical evolution makes it difficult to see changes at the ending of life cycles. If we continue the present paradigm of dualistic ignorance, we are all doomed by the human gap in the perception of reality.

If we change our mental set and encompass the dualistic by rising above and blending opposites, we can dissolve the separations in human minds. This means solving the problem of human perception at every level. Humans have always tried to solve this problem of dualistic human perception at every level by logical confirmation of our own intellectual integrity . But, this can never work as long as we are stuck in the old paradigm of what is real.

The theory of relativity is a logical thesis written by a man who believes that Quantum Physics and the new nondeterministic physics was an escape from subjectivity. The formal logic of mathematics and philosophy does not explain the underlying intelligence which Einstein called God. Modern logic and philosophical thought, however revolutionary, cannot prove God with mathematics. Humans have always tried to measure the difference between right and wrong, spirit and matter. In fact, human consciousness has always tried to measure the differences between spirit and matter by describing an artificial split in our consciousness between the so-called objective physical universe out-side themselves and the subjective world inside our consciousness. This split is not real because it is merely the splitting off of the human ego we call the self-sense. The subjective split of the human ego is not real; although, it can be agreed to as real in words. The fact is everybody is part of the same universe, and, in fact, there is no separation because it is impossible to get out of the universe.

There are several kinds of logic which we use in order to arrive at a consensus reality. A world philosophy or paradigm has now emerged out of the chaos of subjective / objective thinking which could not understand the science of Being. It is the science of knowing how you came to be what you are. Ideas of how things get to be what is cannot be discussed in the relativist dualism of the human mind because all humans come to the planet with a certain gap in consciousness.

All cultures so far developed or evolved upon earth have been portrayed as a great struggle between good and evil. This logical polarizing of thought is common in all religions and philosophical thought even with those who speak of unity or yoga. Logically, yoga deals with the concept that humans are separate from the whole of All That Is (God) by reason of being a physical body which must be united with its source in order to be One. But, logic also says that you cannot unite something that is already united together since the separation is only a fiction in our minds. However, a new paradigm uses a more inclusive logic (note I did not say higher or lower) which rises above the dualities and blends them together as in male or female, God or Goddess. In God's world of Oneness, there would be no higher than or lower than because Oneness has no idea of up or down.

The logical difficulty of perfection and imperfection is dealt with in Buddhist reasoning as being a void or endless state of Nirvana (nonflowing) where consciousness becomes ultimately passive, peaceful, and knowledgeable about itself. However, the universe and its intelligence is active; dynamic energy is never still. This energy creates all those evolutionary changes which must happen in order to bring in new thought structures. These insights, or thought changes, are not logically perfect or truthful like we led to believe in religions. The concept of imperfection, such as original sin, is invalid if God is all there is because logically God would be everything, anywhere, anywhen.

The difficulty is that the very language by which we communicate ideas logically and grammatically obey rules for validating reality set forth by human thinkers.

The different kinds of dualistic logic by which humans validate their subjective experience will determine how you form the concepts in your mind. A discussion of this old paradigm logic at this depth is not necessary to understand the new paradigm because it is not based on any of the subjective and objective relative logics which create dualistic systems of thought. To live life without any limits seems impossible to most intellectual people because the operations in the mind create concepts. Concepts are definable and communicatable and can be logically manipulated in a sequential time line which computer people call real time.

This real time is not real but consists of events in time arranged logically. Real time is really the imaginary time of clocks sequentially starting at a point in the past and moving through the present and out into the future into prediction. In seems that events come into being and pass through certain stages from beginning to end. In fact, in reality these events only happen now because it is always now whatever time it is on your clock at this moment. This is the big jump to a new reality of the virgin paradigm which depends on "absolute logic" and makes the everyday logic of dualistic thought processes obsolete. Hence, all formal logic and mathematics are useless in discussing human perception unless we drop the relative and dualistic frame work of logic and substitute the wholistic frame work of "absolute logic."

Hence, to sum up briefly what might seem to many as an oversimplification, we can say that the real study of the subjective state of humans is intelligence. Matter, spirit, life, time, and space can only be studied objectively by human intelligence by understanding how things come to be what they really are. Such study can only be done by the intelligence of someone who is able to perceive that our self-consciousness is nondualistic. In absolute logic, we think from the viewpoint of oneness before we split off our consciousness into subjective and objective dualisms.

The fact is that consciousness cannot be known directly as long as we are trying to find out its contents. This is like trying to find out how the hardware of a computer is built by looking at its software which makes it work. The human brain has many kinds of software but what drives them all is the intelligence of the operator and an instruction book. Unfortunately, for humans the current instruction books and those handed down from the past are incomplete or just don't work. The bugs are not out of the thinking system even though the human brain has taken millions of years to get its present computing power. The answer is that we never had absolute logic before now to illuminate the mind with its own light rather than accepting hand-me-downs.

Self-consciousness which has become nondualistic automatically discovers the five processes is human personality. These are :1. Whatever we feel, so we think.

2. Whatever we think, so we plan and speak.

3. Whatever we plan and speak, that we do.

4. Whatever we do, so we become.

5. Whatever we become, that is our personality.

Our ways of knowing which we call supposition, induction, deduction, theory, dreams, logical operations, scientific validation of knowledge, philosophic thought, religion, freedom, and anything else fundamental that you can think of are all products of our divine or earthly imagination which is only limited by self. Therefore, to take all limits off self-consciousness is the first step in the new paradigm. How we image ourself as limitless beings and how we program our thoughts to produce our feelings is key to the new virgin paradigms.

IMAGINATION VS LOGIC AND REASON

The term "imagination" has several meanings in our culture. If you are a philosopher dealing with the nature of fundamental thoughts, then imagination be comes the free play of the intuition or inspiration. If you are an artist or writer or a dreamer, then we would use the creative imagination to express emotional experiences. In science, images and diagrams which represent reality in models and systems can be mathematical images like fractals, which are at the base of nature's primal forms. Or, these images are defined as secondary imagination which appears in various context such as supposition, idealistic assumptions fantasy, etc., meaning that the imagination spawns images which are not real but worked up in the mind as a formal pattern or mental image.

There is no right way to deal with the imagination because the term may be used in loose way with such a variety of meanings that it is useless for philosophical discussion.

We can use imagination to clarify these different meanings to analyze what are the differences or to show a family connection between the different meanings of this word imagination on which faculty the power of vision, a thinkings in the mind, or sense perception is totally dependent.

Logic and reason have always been a part of, and created by, imagination which invented mathematics and numbers as a way of validating reality. In physics, we construct the theories of matter with our imagination. In our study of imagination and work of the imagination, we can use logic and reason and make basic assumptions about life, all of which springs out of the human imagination.

We use our fundamental power of imagination to form our self-image as humans, both physically and mentally, and we use it to determine our place in the universe and to create the illusions of time and space. Images also define their own space and time as in dreams and real life. The image of a gold bar and a real physical gold ingot both have little value on a desert island where there is little scarce water to drink. The water would become more valuable than the precious gold. To know the difference in values and meanings we use logic in order to discipline our mind and its power to imagine anything and everything. Even the concept of God/Goddess is worked up in our mind to imagine a Supreme Being which cannot e proved by the dualistic and relativistic logic. We use ordinary logic to define "sense perception" or "mind" but we must use transcendental logic in order to talk about God, Spirit, intelligence, beauty, loveliness, Truth, or Consciousness because none of these qualities are definable by relative logic.

Logic and reason have been so elevated out of imagination, what's left has killed the faculty of imagination. Breakthroughs in science came from people who had the most highly skilled power of the creative imagination.

People often think that logic and reason are cold hard-nosed faculties that rule out the imaginative functions of the mind and become sterile. This has been true in the past when mathematics and logic were taught by poor teachers who did not understand that logic and reason is part of the imagination. Logic, mathematics and philosophy are tools invented by the human imagination to explore reality. All these operate entirely in the imagination.

However our western culture has elevated the role of logic and reason above the creative power of imagination and almost killed direct intuition. Yet all the greatest scientific break throughs have been born out of the fertile imagination of the brightest human beings.

In spite of this there have been many attempts to kill the imagination in the name of the imaginary. Because society did not value imagination and was disturbed by its power to bring rapid change, its geniuses were put down as dangerous individuals. Dangerous to the status quo !

Nevertheless we all inherit the total sum of all the efforts, all the imaging, all the thinkers, artists, and designers who contributed their energy over thousands of years in the evolutionary patterns and images coded into the DNA of our body cells.

The new paradigm puts our knowing faculties in balance to bring imagination back into its rightful place in our reality. Instead of trying to rule it out of our experiments we can now recognize it as the precious source of all knowledge. Imagination is the foundation from the divine knowing springs. Intuition and imagination work together to create feelings. Feelings and emotions create biochemical hormones which create pain or pleasure in plants and animals. Certainly our present civilization is run on hormones, like adrenalin. Whether this same hormone used by us to enjoy high excitement in sports, or crate fear, panic, anger, or stay to fight or flight, depends on what our thoughts are imaging in the moment. Held clearly in our mind these intensely created images have the power to imagine a virgin paradigm.

EARNING VS RECEIVING

At a very early age, we get the message that we do not deserve. We're taught at home, at school, or at church that we're not good enough and that earning is the only way to prove our deservability and our realness ! We had to earn our father's approval, our teacher's respect, and even God's love. The more we struggled and martyred ourselves, the more society applauded.

It's not that earning is not important, that earning as the only validation for self-esteem is self-destructive. There are things we can't earn. You can't earn God's love or your self-worth. You can only receive it.

Earning must be balanced with receiving. You can't sit down and do the receiving along. It's a dance. Receiving is not a passive energy. It is very active. It's the higher octave of doing and earning. You don't just open your arms with a smile and receive !

Being a feminine energy, receiving has been reduced to a wimpy state of charity. We are warned and feared into not receiving.

To some, receiving is unexpectable because they fear strings attached to it. Most kids feel controlled by their parents when they're given something. Some of us don't want to feel grateful, or accept that somebody can do it better or quicker, or that we have to rely, or cocreate, with someone else at all !

Most of us feel a certain level of guilt and shame that makes us feel we don't deserve to receive. More than that, receiving threatens the paradigm of logic and reason. Receiving and miracles do not fit in there. The values of performance, competition, and comparison are threatened, and so are the hidden agendas of control, vindication, approval, punishment.

WHAT STOPS US FROM RECEIVING

The conditioning of parents and society that says receiving is charity control, weakness, or that life is a debit and credit accounting book, "there is no such thing as a free lunch" and other similar beliefs.

1. Lack of trust.
2. There is no guarantee in receiving; we have to expect receiving with flexibility. We don't always really know what's best for us or where and when. This lack of guarantee makes trust in receiving harder.
3. Judgments.

Our parents and society conditioning led us to our own judgments about receiving and those who received abundance or grace without earning and struggling. We judge them as less than, as lucky, as fake, as people without self-esteem. We put them down for having inherited wealth, won the lottery, were there in the right time or place, the family connection....What are your judgments about receiving ? Judgments freeze our reality, slow it down and even sabotage it.

Judgments are not good or bad, they just hurt.

It's important to review our past judgments about success and receiving, forgive ourselves, and replace judgments with opinions and discernment.

4. Lack of intensity.

Intensity is the tool of the alchemist. Emotional intensity is essential in receiving. Emotional intensity is not a big, loud performance. It is a genuine, intense expression of our feeling. Intensity has been discouraged by everyone, including therapists, Receiving is not a weak and wimpy energy. It is our birthright. We can obtain it with respect and love.

A PATTERN FOR RECEIVING

1. Decide on what you want to receive.
2. What are the resistances to receiving. Is it shame or guilt ? Is it the fear to be controlled ? Is it the lack of deservability ? Lack of trust in others ? What are the judgments behind receiving or those who receive without earning. Feel all these energies with intensity crushing them into raw energy.
3. How will you feel once you receive what you want ? Imagine the love, the joy, the happiness, and feel them with intensity.
4. Fusion. Blend these two energies together in your body and put them out as a feeling or in a visualization form as a ball of light and give them to higher sources or God, and demand with respect and harm to no one.

5. Feel, imagine, visualize receiving what you want.
6. Ask to receive the new paradigm.

MAGIC AND MIRACLES

hat is Magic ? What are Miracles ?

To the uninitiated, neither magic nor miracles are reality. They are omething way out there that only happen to other people, usually "weirdos."

Magic is when we create things in our reality with excellence and legance that stretches beyond the conscious reality's acceptance or definition of hat is.

It is the by product of thinking we deserve and feeling good enough. sing minimum energy, things seem to happen with ease and much, such uicker. It is rooted in the depths and in the intensity of our thoughts and elings. Negative thoughts and feelings crate negative realities.

Get rid of thoughts and beliefs that magic is casting spells and that it is o good to be true and start believing and thinking that everything is possible d things can get better all the time (though never perfect).

Miracles are when something happens better than expected or imagined ssible. Miracles come from a state of consciousness rooted in good feelings. hey will not happen if you are still controlled by your negative ego. You annot earn a miracle; it can only be received with gratitude and appreciation.

Magic and Miracles happen outside time and space and the consensus. e must relinquish the hold of past experiences and history on us to allow em in.

Magic is achieved by the blending of power and grace. It creates onders, fun, curiosity, and joy. Miracles produce feeling of love, deserving, rgiveness, and healing added to the magic.

Self a
Upan

By **Dr. V**
M.A., M.A
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Self and Ontology in Descartes and Upanishads

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In this·paper an attempt has been made to study the view of Descartes and Upanishads on self and ontology. Rene Descartes was regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His philosophical method was called as mathematical method. In the first instance he wanted to find out a fundamental principle. With the help of this principle he wanted to construct a philosophical edifice. His philosophical method was also called as doubting method. He doubted every thing in the universe except his existence. There is no idea of which one can be entirely certain. To quote Descartes : "I suppose accordingly, that all the things which I see are false; I believe that none of those things which my deceptive memory presents to me are true. I suppose that I have no senses; I beleve that body, figure, extension, motion and place are nothing but fictions of my mind what is there then that can be thought true ? Perhaps only that nothing in the world is certain".

But one thing is certain and that is that I doubt or think of that there can be no doubt. It is indeed a contradiction to suppose that which thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Descartes does not appeal to an empirical psychical fact, the mind's awareness of itself; but reasons logically that doubt implies a doubter, thinking a thinker, a thinking thing or spiritual substance, thus he reaches a rational or self evident proposition. To doubt, means to think, to think means to be, cogite ergo sum - I think, therefore I am. It is the first and most certain knowledge that occurs to one who philosophizes in an orderly manner. Here is the principle we have been seeking a certain, self evident starting-point for our metaphysics. This proposition also furnishes us useful a ceiterion or test of truth. This one proposition is absolutely certain, true clearly and distinctly perceived; This Descartes believes in the existence of self. His philosophical ediface is based upon this principle. Basing upon this principle he constructs his philosophy.

We now have a fundamental principle and a criterion of true knowledge. What else can we know ? It is doubtful whether anything can be certain, as long as we are confronted with the possibility of a deceiving God, we do not know as yet whether there is a God, if there is that he is not a deceiver. This difficulty must be removed. Some of our ideas appear to be innate, some are our own inventions, some of them seem to have been received from without. But all this may end in illusion. Descartes tells about the idea of God. Now nothing whatever exists must have a cause for existence, this too is a self-evident proposition. Moreover, the cause must be atleast as great as the effect, there must be atleast as much reality in it. That which contains greater reality in itself and which is the more perfect cannot be consequence of and dependent on the less perfect. Descartes tells as follows : Hence I myself cannot being, while the idea of God is the idea of God is the idea of perfect infinite being. It must have been placed in me by an infinite being, of God, and hence God must exist. This proof for the existence of God is not the ontological proof of Anselm, but a causal proof which begins with the idea of a perfect being existing in my mind. It is not agreed that such a being exists merely because we have a concept of him, but rather from the such a being as the cause of the idea imprinted on his work. If God did not exist, we could not possibly be what we are nor could we have an idea of God.

We know more of God himself and of the human mind than we know of corporal objects reflecting upon the idea of God that we perceive that he is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, the source of all goodness and truth; the creator of all things is not corporeal and does not perceive by means of senses as we do. He has intellect and will but not like ours, he does not will evil or sin, for sin is negation of being. Descartes believed in the existence of God, Moreover he believed in innate ideas. From the idea of God he comes to the existence of God. Descartes is a rationalist. From rational understanding reflection and speculation he tells about great truths.

There is Ontology in the Upanishads. Upanishads are the ending portions of Vedas. There are 150 Upanishads according to the opinion of Scholars. Out of these 13 Upanishads are significant ones. There are Chandogya Brihadaranyaka, katha, Kathe Upanishad, Prasna Upanishad, Iso Upanishad etc., According to these Upanishads there is Brahman and they believe in Atman also. In the opinion of Vedic seers Atman is Brahman. Brahman and Atman are identical in the Taittiriya Upanishad. It is said that there are five sheaths for Atman. These are Annamaya Kosa, Pranamaya Kosa, Manomaya Kosa, Vijnanamaya Kosa and Anandamaya Kosa. According to the Vedic and Upanishadic seers the whole universe is evolved out of Brahman. The deities such as Iswara, Vishnu, Brahma, Parvati, Lakshmi and Saraswati etc are evolved from Brahman. Besides the mountains, Seas, stars, planets, rivers and all living beings are evolved from Brahman. At dissolution all the above mentioned things go to Brahman.

Rene Descartes also believed in self, soul, God, body and mind, He started from self and proceeded to other things. According to him soul lives in the head of human being. Human body is regarded by him as a machine. There is a rationalist with the help of reason he has arrived into this understanding.

His philosophical method is called as mathematical method. He started from a self-evident principle cogite ergo sum and proceeded to other axioms for building the edifice of philosophy. In the Upanishads also there are Mahavakayas like Tatvam Asi (that thou art). From these Mahavakaya the great system of philosophy can be built up. There is every comparison between Descartes and Upanishads. Our Upanishads seers pray as follows :

"From the unreal lead me to the real
From darkness lead me to light
From death lead me to immortality".

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A debate on African Philosophy

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The need to debate over the problem of the existence and nature of African philosophy is felt, because of the dilemma in which most of the contemporary African philosophers- Professional as well as non-academic - find themselves. This dilemma is due to the fact that on the one hand they accept western philosophic tradition as the paradigm for their philosophy and on the other hand, they feel that Africa hand, they feel that Africa has always had a popular, mythical, unconscious and lived philosophy, and that such a philosophy needs to be peeled off from the African tradition, proverbs, linguistic structures of the past. For example Paulin Hountondji, one of the well-known critics of African philosophy, wants "at all costs to destroy this pervading myth" of an already existing African philosophy, while N. Otakpor, a Professor of Philosophy, is an advocate of "Folk thought-system". The problem deepens because African thinker's themselves are not very certain about the meanings of the terms "Philosophy" and "African".

In this paper I would like to attract your attention towards some of the arguments, presented in support of their views, by Paulin Hountondji, E.A. Ruch and N. Otakpor.

If we review the arguments given by Hountondji in his famous book "African Philosophy : Myth and reality"[1], we find that he is very careful in qualifying philosophy as African, since he is of the opinion that the term "Philosophy" refers to "Universality" which has to be preserved not because

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The french version was published in 1976, and that was translated by Henri Evans and published by Hutchinson, London 1983.

philosophy has some universal themes, but essentially because "the differences of content are meaningful only and precisely as differences of content, which as such refer back to the essential unity of a single discipline; of a single style of 69Inquiry"[2]. Then he tries to define this discipline. According to him philosophy in the strict sense must be scientific, theoretical[3] and individual discipline. Hountondgi strongly opposes the tendency to confuse the popular or ideological usage with the rigorous or theoretical usage of the term "Philosophy". Ruch condemns such assumption as nothing but a pre-philosophical belief of the rationalist school of philosophy[4]. But Huntondji believes that the term usually philosophy is a misnomer mainly because what is usually taken as such is "African Pseudo Philosophy"[5], since he assumes that it has no explicit formulation except the total reliance on the ethnographic works. Thus Hountondji declares that "there are no philosophers in Africa, because what is generally referred to an African Philosophy is not essentially different from ethno-philosophy[6]. He blames placid Temples[7], a missionary for mistaking ethno-philosophy for philosophy without "terminological scruples". Hountondji maintains that African thinkers in various tones and modes "Struck up the Tempelsian theme, whereas they should have mindful of this blinding fact that Tempels, by his own admission, was addressing not them, but the European public[8]. So he is of the opinion that African thinkers must re-define their mission and reorient themselves. He, therefore, frequently demands a painstaking evaluation of all that which is so far taken as African Philosophy and which has its roots in ethnography. Hence he classified such works as those of Alexis Kagame, who attempted to extract" a complete philosophy from the grammatical analysis of Bantu languages" as "ethnographic works with philosophical pretensions"[9]. Hountondji strongly believes that until African thinkers do not abandon their reliance on ethnographic and cultural anthropological works and adopt rational procedures they can not" discover the adventure of a single and same humanity"[10].

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[2] P.J. Hountondji, African philosophy : Myth and Reality, p.56.

[3] Some of these theoretical usages in the context of Western Philosophic tradition are classified in the Encylopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6 p.216-225.

[4] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy,p.14.

[5] P. Hountondji, African Philosophy : Myth and Reality p.55.

[6] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy : P.J. Hountondji, His Dilemma and Contributions, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No.2, April 1990, p.174.

[7] Placid Tempels, Bantu Philosophy, Presence Africaine, Paris, 1959.

[8] P.H. Hountondji, African Philosophy : Myth and Reality, p. 49.

[9] P.J. Hountondji, The pit falls of Being Different, pp.51-54.

Thus Hountondji defines philosophy as theoretical scientific or rational and universal while Anyanwu affirms that the idea of a universal world philosophy does not make sense. From the assertion that every philosophy has a universal appeal, it does not follow that there is a "neutral world philosophy applicable to all cultures at all times and in all places"[11].

Nevertheless Ruch assumes that to the extent that a philosophy expresses ideas of a timeless and universal value, it is scientific and therefore of International relevance for mankind, and to the extent that a philosophy expresses a value - system or an ideology, it is an art a form of wisdom, and as such is time and culture bound[12]. Yet Such tries to prove that even such a culture bound philosophy can be a contribution to the universal and common patrinomy of mankind in as much as it contributes to the mutual understanding between peoples, and to the unity of men in their cultural diversity.

Hountondji defines philosophy as an individual discipline just like Algebra and physics. Accordingly he feels that the so-called" African thought-systems are still located at the pre-scientific and pre-philosophical periods, and progress is not possible without the evolution of "critical consciousness". He exphasizes the role of critical activity in philosophy by informing that the critical activity is the beginning of philosophy in the only acceptable sense of the word.

Hountondji feels that the whole project of constituting or discovering an African philosophy has been an European project, the aim of which has been to kill the African's creative power to produce philosophical ideas. He says that "African philosophers were expected to be Archivists of their cultural traditions rather than original thinkers"[13]. So he announces that the true problem lies in "liberating the theoretical creativity of Africans". As we all know that there are two types of creativity - theoretical and practical. Under the class of theoretical creativity come scientific theory building and critical discussion. Under the category of Practical creativity we include Artistic creation and technological devices. Hountondji informs that the theoretical creativity in philosophy is possible if we have freedom of expression and discussion on the basis of unlimited information. Defining African philosophy he writes, "the creative philosophical activity must be the work of Africans themselves, because "the

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[10] Ibid, pp.52-54.

[11] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.78.

[12] Ibid, p.18.

[13] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.12.

Africanity of our philosophy will not consist.... in its themes, but above all the geographical appurtenance of those who produce it and in their intellectu inter-relation"[14]. This shows that philosophy according to his is an intellect enterprise.

Hountondji also refers to the popular attitude of accepting that t creation of African philosophy can not be possible ex nihilo; that it compris necessarily a whole cultural heritage"[15].

Otakpor criticises Hountondji for repudiating or cultural dimension African philosophy, since according to Otakpor this dimension forms a provides the true reference point. Further he says that "accounting for t relative and cultural dimension is in no way obliterates the essence of t philosophy, because the fundamental issues and questions remain univers irrespective of this dimension and the "geographical variable"[16].

Undoubtedly "Africanity can properly be defined as "the totality cultural features" common to all Africans, because African identifies himself his cultural personality. Such clarification of the term "African" seems m adequate in defining African philosophy, since it neither refers to t Geographical boundaries of the continent known as Africa nor it gi importance to the racialistic interpretation of the term. I believe that philosopher's thoughts, however objective they may appear in their comp form, are rooted in the soil of his culture. This can easily be proved by paral development of the Indian and the Western philosophical thoughts. In fa philosophical ideas are not spontaneous products of our reason in isolation b from our surroundings and from our culture. Here I would like to remind t scientific activity must not be identified with philosophical activity. objective the scientific thinking, because of the cultural and subjective factors that aff it. Unhesitatingly we may accept that a philosophy belongs to a particul tradition and shares its cultural climate and mental background. It has be proved by different styles of philosophizing. For example England genera prefers empirical and logical methods, while American philosophers genera adopts pragmatic method. German philosophers have been more speculat than other Europeans, whereas Indians generally give importance to intuiti and authority.

Here I wish to quote Professor Jecques Maquet, who tries to show h analogues existential experience of life in an isolated and difficult environm have showily produced a "Unified African World", distinct from a comparable to the Western as well as to the Asian world". The unity of Afric therefore, is not racial but cultural[17] C. B. Okolo also reminds us that "Culture is also a key to the understanding of and definition of the African"[18]. But as K. C. Anyanwu admits by subordinating African cultural facts to the assumptions, concepts, theories and world-view suggested by Western culture and developed by Western thinkers, confusion ensues"[19]. According to Otakpor also "the essence of the debate lies in the conflict between" two systems of Intelligibility"[20]. So he says that Western - European philosophy should not be accepted as paradigm for defining African Philosophy. He condemns African philosophers for being victims of cultural invasion from West, while Indians, Chinese Arabs etc. are extremely cautious about this invasion. He writes "African peoples, interestingly her intellectuals, but embarrassingly her philosophers are in the forefront chanting the virtues of this invasion and arguing for it"[21] Ruch also indicates this situation of "cultural colonialism". In his view, there is nothing wrong in sharing in the universal wisdom of mankind and in studying the works of geniuses, but African thinkers and teachers of philosophy must restore and re-create a respectable body of African wisdom and express it in a language which is universally intelligible[22]. Only thus African can contribute to the common heritage of mankind. Here it is not extravagant to mention that Ruch assumes two levels or stages of culture. He conceives that "besides local or regional cultures, there is a patrimony of Universal Human Culture, whether scientific, artistic or humanistic, which has a universal and eternal value"[23].

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[14] P. Hountondji, Histories d'un mythe, in "Presence Africaine", p.12.

[15] Ibit, p.12.

[16] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy, p.187.

Ruch writes on page 15 of his book that "a philosophy which reflects over the African culture is a truly African philosophy". He believes that a philosophy built upon African cultural values and ideals is much closer to the people than the more universal and scientific mode of philosophizing. But here he is mistaking African cultural philosophy for African Philosophy.

Besides, beliefs in Gods, spirits, and occult forces have often been suggested as constituting the parameters of African philosophy. Yet according to Hountondji such beliefs could not be classified as philosophy, since philosophy is an intelligent (rational) and reflective inquiry. Thus affirms conclusively that unless we identify such moment of departure from myth a magic etc., we can not define philosophy. In his opinion, the proponents African philosophy generally neglect the obvious difference between scien myth and magic. Here Otakpor asks, "but does it follow that t non-identification of this moment of rupture; of departure, ultimately rend all philosophic systems of the non-western type implausible"[24]. And he hims answers - "certainly not". He criticise Hountondji that like Wiredu, he thi that the absence of transcription the lack of rupture between myth, magic a science in African traditional thought renders all such thought system unphilosophical[25].

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[17] J. Maquet, Africanity : The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Jr. Joan, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.4.

[18] C.B. Okolo, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.XV No.1, Jan'88, p.100.

[19] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.117.

[20] N Otakpor, African Philosophy, p.185.

[21] Ibid, p.187.

[22] E.A. Ruch, African Philosophy, p.17.

[23] Ibid, p.17.

I do not agree with Otakpor's criticism, since I myself believe that t activity of Reflection or review and criticism are essential constituents o philosophizing and such identification or differentiation is not possible witho them. Accordingly the lack of identification implies the lack of philosophic activity and consequently the lack of philosophy. As Otakpor himself accep that when man became able to think, to question, to reflect, to argue, he bega to philosophise. E.A. Ruch also admits that "a lived world-view" only becom a philosophy, when it is consciously and critically reflected [26].

Ruch classifies the activity of an ethno-philosopher as a philosophical. I his view, "the ethno-philosopher who makes a critical analysis of a mythic African system is a genuine African philosopher, independently of his countr of origin, provided he does not reduce his study to a mere ethnologica description, but studies the mythical culture as a comprehensive world - view i a critical and objective way. Here again Ruch insists that an ethno-philosophe must distinguish those elements of African culture which are of universal valu from those which are culture -conditioned. Ruch assumes tha ethno-philosopher tries to give to the non-African access to an unwritten world - view. Thus making an African contribution to the universal wisdom of mankind. On the other hand, Hountondji rejects myth and "so-called" ethno-philosophy as unphilosophical by defining philosophy as scientific discourse. He assumes that only reason can give objective truth, while Ruch believes that "pure rationality and objectivity of western science and philosophy is to a large extent a myth"[27]. Man requires wisdom, which satisfies his whole being, not only his reason or will or emotion. Ruch assumes that "all wisdom is, in the final analysis, prerational "[28], hence it satisfies the whole being.

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[24] N. Otakpor African Philosophy : Hountondji - His dilemma and contributions, p.180.

[25] Ibid, p.178.

[26] E.A. Ruch, African Philosophy, p.18.

[27] E.A. Ruch, K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.22.

Perhaps, because of this attitude Ruch enlists the Mytho-poet - the anonymous author of some aspect or other of the mythical world-view in an African culture- as doing an African philosophy, but of a primitive, intimitive and uncritical kind[29]. He confesses that this mytho-philosophy or mythology is not scientific. He openly admits that such type of philosophy remains below "Critical philosophy, since it lacks the verification of his intimitive insights in terms of "logical consistency" and empirical objectivity", but he replaces this scientific verification by equally important consistency of life.

Ruch rejects theoretical thinking as the only criterion of philosophy, so he tells us that a mytho-poet goes further than the purely theoretical concerns of the classical philosophy. His intuitive insights, his explanations and devised rituals contribute to the harmony of his people's value-system.

Ruch also enlists those thinkers as African philosophers who provide a critical study of the contemporary philosophical discussions in

Africa[30]. Here Ruch is giving importance to critical activity as an philosophical activity.

It follows from the foregoing description and analysis that Ruch differentiates between two types of philosophy i.e. Intuitive and critical.

Referring to the present predicament, Ruch informs that unfortunately there exists a constant temptation among African intellectuals, either to fall under the spell of Western rationalism and consequently to reject myths and traditions as either antiquated or unscientifics, or to reject, including its scientific thinking. Ruch suggests that we do not have to choose between rejecting rationalism and accepting myth, or accepting rationalism and accepting myth, or accepting rationalism and rejecting myth, since there is a third alternative i.e. to introduce reason into the myth or to restore mythical dimension to reason. Could we accept this third alternative? If Ruch himself accepts it, then his explanation of myth philosophy becomes absurd, because he explains it without any reference to any rational activity, such as reflection, theorisation, criticism etc.

Next point to be discussed is related to the anonymity of the author of a philosophy. Sometimes an anonymous philosophy is suspected. It is admitted that a philosophy must have a recognizable author. Hence Wiredu argues that "If you want to know the philosophy of a given people you do not go to the aged peasant or priest, but to the individual thinker in person or print[31]. Therefore

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[28] Ibid, p.22

[29] ibid, p.19

[30] Ibid, p.21

[31] Kwasi Wredu, Philosophy and African Culture, Cambridge University

Hountondji defines African philosophy "as a literature produced by Africans and dealing with philosophical problems" or "as a set of tests, specifically the set of test written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors"[32]. It seems that according to African thinkers this objection against is levelled because of the individualistic attitude of the West, which considers individual person as the measure of all things. Yet such objection can be erased by presenting the examples of Vedic and Upanishadic philosophies of India.

N. Otakpor believes that Hountondji and Wredu are misled by their own philosophical orientations, so they take philosophy as a critical, theoretical and analytic discipline. Otakpor defines African philosophy in terms of African Traditional Folk thought systems[33] Accordingly his position is approximately same as Ruch, when Ruch accepts Ethno-philosophy and mythophilosophy as African philosophies. To support his view, he quotes Omoregbe, who informs that these folk systems "are not" gratuitous assertions, since the original authors of these ideas and views obviously had their reasons for holding and advancing them. They are "fruits of reflection" and the conclusions of a reasoning process"[34].

Otakpor criticises Hountondji for his preoccupation with critical philosophy as dogmatic. He affirms that "critical and analytic philosophy is just one way of doing philosophy, but all other ways cannot be reduced to it without cultural harm[35]. Here Otakpor is confusing the types of philosophy with philosophizing. Analysis and criticism are the essential characteristic of the way of doing philosophy.

Again, Otakpor quotes, this time Bewaji according to whom :the general intellectual temper of a culture - its characteristic mode of thought, its pervasive world outlook, its unquestioned assumptions constitute its philosophy[36]. Otakpor did not bother to explain the characteristic of such mode of thought. Secondly , Otakpor overlooks that the phrase "unquestioned

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Press, 1980, pp.47-49.

[32] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy, p.188.

[33] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy, p.181.

[34] Joseph I. Omoregbe; "African Philosophy : Yesterday and Today" in "Philosophy in Africa : Trends and Perspectives (Ife - Nigeria : University Press, 1985) p.9.

[35] N. Otakpor, African, Philosophy,. I.P.Q. Vol. VXII, No.2, April 1990, p.181.

[36] J.A.I. Bewaji, African Philosophy : Some comments; The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.3, No.2 1983, p.74.

assumptions" is a contradiction in terms, since assumptions generally means unproved or questionable beliefs.

Otakpor also accepts that the assumptions, beliefs and sentiments, which constitute a folk thought system, may not be systematically formulated or expressed[37], but they do have considerable influence on the society. Here one may question Otakpor, that if they are not systematically formulated and expressed, how could he name their totality "a thought system". Secondly, the so-called folk thought - system are "systems of beliefs" instead of "systems of thought".

It is clear that Otakpor emphasises the practical aspect of these folk thought-systems. Consequently he advocates the concept of a "living philosophy" instead of "philosophy as a discipline". I also know that for its salvation Africans need more than theories. Nevertheless theories have always been useful as guide to action and life.

Sometimes Otakpor identifies folk thought-systems with myths, and maintains that "folk thought-systemsare essentially logical, and myths are not devoid of logos"[38]. Besides, he defines "myth" as a peculiarity. These convictions of Otakpor show that he himself approves logos or reason and rational procedures and logic i.e. logical consistency to be the characteristics of philosophical thinking. It means that he accepts some universal or common features in philosophy.

Another point to be noted is that Otakpor distinguishes between the subject-matter and the method. So he writes that "the essence of folk thought-systems should not be confused with the inadequacy of its method"[39]. Thus he confesses the methodological inadequacy of folk thought-system. Now, if he concentrates on the peculiar way of philosophizing, he will be convinced of the distinction between philosophizing, he will be convinced of the distinction between philosophy and the so-called folk thought-systems. Here it is enough to mention that we must distinguish between philosophy as a system and as a way of philosophizing.

Once again the question before us is could we accept that a philosophy can only be African, if it is performed by an African? It is obvious that we cannot approve this definition, since an African Professor may propound or perform some European philosophy. Suppose an African professor is teaching Kant's philosophy or writing a book on Kant's philosophy. But "when an African or indeed a non-African philosopher writes about African wisdom,

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[37] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy, I.P.Q. Vol.XVII, No.2 1990, p.182.

[38] Ibid., p.183

[39] Ibid, p.183

African philosophy"[40]. In this context Ruch[41] refers to Okere who makes an important distinction between "an African philosopher" and "an African who is a philosopher".

Ruch also classifies the activities of those African thinkers as philosophical who are doing existential analyses of African existence[42]. Hence the works on works on Negritude[43] and African Identity are considered the works of African philosophy.

Ruch also refers to that ideological dimension[44] as African philosophy which projects a socio-political future for Africa. Under this class come L.S. Senghor's African Socialism or Humanistic Socialism[45], K. Kaunda's African Humanism[46] and K. Nkrumah's "consciencism". These contemporary systems are generally known as African salvation philosophy[47].

To end this debate, I would like to suggest that the interpreters of African philosophy must differentiate the various usages of the term "philosophy" i.e. philosophy as a discipline, as a living philosophy, as a system or as philosophizing etc. Simultaneously, they should accept that it is basically philosophizing or the peculiar way of thinking. This way of thinking is peculiar, because it essentially comprises Intuitive insights, contemplation and speculation, rational procedures such as criticism and reflection speculation or creative imagination is needed because philosophy is that aspect of human being which strives to extend the boundaries of understanding beyond its established limits. In fact, philosophy is also a survey of possibilities, yet it submits its speculation to comprehensive criticism. Criticism is needed to remove ambiguities and inconsistencies in thought and linguistic expression.

philosophizing demands an attitude of inquiry. It may be an inquiry about the ultimate problems of mankind or meta-inquiry i.e. inquiry about a previous inquiry. Thus there is sample scope for a variety of investigation. It has already been proved by the emergence of such dimension of philosophy as philosophy of culture, philosophy of science etc.

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[40] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.16.

[41] Ibid, p.14.

[42] Ibid, p.20.

[43] N. Otakpor, "Negritute : A Philosophy of Withdrawal of Protest"? Africa, Revista do Centro de Estudes Africnos, 1985.

[44] Ibid., p.21.

[45] Ibid, pp.225-236.

[46] Ibid, pp.236-242

[47] Ibid, pp. 223-225

Of course, we can compare philosophical activity "with designing and building our own house than with buying a dwelling already made". Undoubtedly such an activity needs creativity, which is essential for philosophizing.

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Human Values For Sustainable Society

Dr. M.L. Dewan**

Human values play a great role in effective people's participation and any work in the field of soil conservation and watershed management, environmental control and in rural development (and also urban development) so much hinge on the under standing and practices of the human values. The author considers sustainable development, plus human values and sustainable society and the description of human values as such.

The definition of sustainable development is to allow for future generations that we preserve our remaining resources and rehabilitate the sources that have been treated carelessly in the past. To do these things systematically is to follow a path of environmentally sustainable development. The principles of sustainable development are -

1. Consult with villagers, farmers and all other participants. Reach agreements on both problems and solutions there of before taking action.
2. Plan small-scale flexible projects. A plan should be a blue-print. It should be able to incorporate new information that emerges during the execution of the project.
3. Let the people benefiting from the project make the decision. The expert's job is to share their knowledge, not impose it.
4. Look for solutions that can be duplicated in hundreds of thousands for the greatest impact on development. But the solution must still be tailored to fit local needs.

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5. Provide education and training particularly for young people and women who remain the most effective agents of change because they are bound to the realities of the family's survival.
6. Keep external inputs to a minimum to reduce dependency and increase stability Subsidies, supplements and inappropriate technology are unsustainable.
7. Build on what people are doing right. New ideas will be adopted only if they do not run contrary to local practice. New technologies must support existing ones, not replace them.
8. Assess impacts of proposed changes. A multi-disciplinary team, ideally including specialists from the same culture, should look at economic, social cultural and environmental aspects.
9. Consider both inputs and outcomes of outputs. The failure of projects focussing on a single output such as agricultural productivity has proved that more is not always better.
10. Maintain or improve the participants' standard of living. Long-term environmental improvement.

The requirements of Sustainable Development are -

1. Access and Controls,;
2. Community Resource Management;
3. Adding Value to the Product;
4. Investment and Economic situation.

Unfortunately, both moral and economic situation of the people not only in India but around the globe is going down-hill because of dilution of values and consequent depletion of resources. Thus, the linkage between Human Values and Sustainable Society is clear and can be summarised as follows :

Human Values -

"Value is all that which makes life worthy to be lived"

"The human values" are by definition, the following -

- Truth
- Right Action or
- the Moral Code
- Peace

Love

Non-violence.

These are the corner-stones of the entire philosophy of life and give us the basis for the concept of education that we wish to express. What are these values? Let us look at them.

Truth

There are two ways of talking about truth. There exists a truth founded on science, on the intellect and upon reason which is an objective truth based on matter and the sensory perceptions. When we say that "All men are mortal" we indicate a truth verified by experience, established by science and supported by reason. When, on the other hand, we say that "All men are immortal" then we say a truth that goes beyond the intellect and beyond reason to trespass on the transcendental.

We can experiment this truth through our intuition, understood as our faculty of making our own the concept of immortality. This is a faculty which springs from love. The truth about anything whatsoever reveals itself intuitively when we love it profoundly enough. Such truth presents itself to us as a 'flash' that springs from the soul. This is the truth which is an integral part of the system of values. It is thus necessary to activate intuition in the child by an exercise of introspection and by a cognitive investigation of that which is right and that which is wrong, between good and evil. Good is good even if no one does it. Evil is evil even if every one does it.

The Moral Code: The Right Action

This refers to behaviour and hence the exercise of the will comes to play. When this exercise is carried out correctly then the action is right and moral.

"Will" is different from desire. If we want something very much and feel we must have it and act under this impulse, this is desire but not will. Will is part of intuition which is a reflex coming from the depths of us; this manifests itself in the right action when this is not invalidated by desire. The truth in action is moral behaviour.

Peace

The centre of peace is the heart when it is not agitated by emotional conflicts and by passions. On the surface of the ocean we find stormy waves, t if we go deeper we find complete calm. This value forms an essential part education. A man can be intellectually developed but if he does not control emotions he will have an unbalanced personality.

Love and Non-violence

Love and non-violence are the fireside of the soul and the psyche of man. Love is an energy working in one direction only and not a desire that leads only to its satisfaction. If is not a give and take operation but it is a giving without asking anything in exchange because it includes this in itself. This love, whose characteristic is expansion, that is a projection towards when it succeeds in embracing the entire creation becomes non-violence, the apex of all human attainments in this life.

By the practice of the values, thorough a right vision of the truth, by the understanding and practice of the will, with the peace obtained through the balance of emotions we begin to experience universal love, the result of non-violence. This universal love flows spontaneously in personality which is pure and uncontaminated by undesirable impulses.

Education in human values means to educate in these five values-the truth, the right action, peace, love, non-violence, by means of which are trained and developed in a balanced manner the body, the intellect, the mind and the heart. It is useless to saturate the minds of the students with notions that they forget. Only by educating them and all to know their deepest and innate qualities will give them the capacity to give to their lives the right meaning and the just measure.

The Environment Core for all living matter, to consider trees as holy and forests as sanctuaries, rivers and streams into values, we can save them, protect them from pollution and thus lead to Sustainable Development for a Sustainable Society. It is, therefore, suggested and recommended to promote eco-philosophy and human values in all aspects of conservation and development. For the Himalayan conservation and development the author advocates that we must be conscious that we have not done any justice to Mother Earth. We have ravaged, pillaged, destroyed and slowly drained it of vitality. We have to make peace with it now, else there will be nothing left to sustain life on this earth. This greedy parasitic and materialistic mindset has to be returned to a caring, compassionate and participatory wave-length. Unless we change our conscious thoughts and behaviour annihilation is our only fate.

The earth is a sanctuary, so are the Himalayas not only for India but entire mankind. It is not an endless storehouse of materials to satiate human hunger for temporal consumption. We have to feel our earth and for the Himalayas. We have to cultivate human values. What are these values? These human values will make us all realise that trees are holy, forests are sanctuaries, Himalayas are sacred as also the Mother Earth which must be conserved and developed.

All, people, individuals, societies, organisations are invited to join in these endeavours howsoever feeble they are at present; because through such human values and not only through technical measures or economic considerations do we march towards a sustainable society.

Mother Earth will not improve unless people have in themselves a 'spark' which says from within "We are part of this ecology, our trees, our forests our watersheds, our water resources, our streams like the Ganga, preserve them for posterity. This in essence is "Eco-Philosophy".

Finally. Human Values are the key to sustainable society. We, in India, have to revive such values which are fast eroding. We have to learn a lot and unlearn a different lot. I would like to share with the people the highlights of two centres of enquiry which brought out two publications -

1. Envisioning a Sustainable Society.

2. Human Values - A Voyage from 'I' to 'We'

To meet the increasing challenges in India, like the rest of the world, we have to give predominant place. not only to problems, techniques and methodologies of watershed management and development as bricks of the structure of our society but we have to go much beyond to the principles and practices of eco-philosophy and to Human Values as a voyage from 'I' to 'We'. These will bring in real terms physical, mental, moral, psychological and spiritual sense to people's participation in meeting these challenges.

Human values for Sustainable Society

All, people, individuals, societies, organisations are invited to join in the endeavours howsoever feeble they are at present because through such [illegible] values and not only through technical, economic or [illegible] can we march towards a sustainable society.

[illegible] will not improve unless people have to themselves a space [illegible] says from within. We are part of this ecology, our work, our rivers our [illegible] our streams like the Ganga [illegible] This [illegible] is "Eco-Philosophy".

Finally, Human Values are the key to sustainable society. We, in fact, [illegible] to revive such [illegible] which are lost gradually. We have to keep [illegible] and [illegible] would like to share with the people the highlights of [illegible] centres of [illegible] brought out two publications:

1. Envisioning [illegible] Sustainable Society

2. Human [illegible] Voyage from I to We

Whereas the [illegible] challenges in India, like the rest of the world, we [illegible] is given [illegible] place not only to problems, techniques and [illegible] management and [illegible] but we have to go much beyond to the principles and [illegible] of eco-philosophy and to Human Values as a voyage from 'I' to 'We' [illegible] will bring in real terms physical, mental, moral, psychological and [illegible] sense to people's participation in meeting these challenges.

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Review

Book Title : VEDIC PHILOSOPHY FOR HIMALAYAN ECO-SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Editors : Dr M.L. Dewan
and
Prof. B.D. Joshi
Release Date : February 17. 1984
Venue : India International Centre,
New Delhi
To be released by
(Chief Guest) Dr. Karan Singh
To be presided by Pro. Sher Singh
Ex- Minister of State, Education and Defence
Member Planning commission and Presently,
Chancellor, Gurukula Kangri University, Hardwar
unction Hosted by Indian Association for Advancement of Science.
President -Dr. K.P.A. Menon
Secretary General - Shri Pradeep Chaturvedi
Publishers : Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, as part of
Concept Discovering Himalaya Series, No.3.

The above titled book is a compilation of research papers presented at the National Seminar on "Vedic Philosophy and Himalayan Eco-system Development held at the Gurukula Kangri University, Hardwar, during ebruary 14-16, 1991, in association with peoples commission on Environment nd Development (PCED), India, Presided by Dr. Karan Singh as its Chairman, and the Indian Academy of Environmental Sciences, Hardwar.

The book contains 25 chapters (write-ups) on various aspects of Vedic Philosophy and Himalayan Eco-system-scenario, Management, problems, rospects and sustainable development. The 25 chapters are divided into two arts. Part I contains 15 articles in English while Part II contains 10 articles in iiHindi, besides English and Hindi versions of II PCED Meet. The book is unique in the sense, that it was perhaps, for the first time that Vedic Scholars highly proficient in Sanskrit literature with deep interest in our ecological and environmental ethos and knowing the state of art of Himalayan system have contributed to the book along with environmental scientists and promoters, N.G.Os and scholars. The list of contributors includes eminent persons like Dr. Karan Singh, ex Ministry for Tourism, Health, etc. Government of India, and well-known scholar of Indian culture and philosophy, Shri Sunderlal Bahuguna (Leader of Chipko Movement), Prof. Krishna Kumar, retired professor of Sanskrit, Garhwal University, Srinagar, Acharya Ramnath Vedalankar, ex-Pro Vice-Chancellor Gurukula Kangri University, Dr. M.L. Dewan a retired Scientist from F.A.O., Prof. B.D.J. Joshi, Dean Faculty of life Sciences, Gurukula University Hardwar, Dr. Rama P. Coomarswami, a Medical Practitioner from U.S.A., Prof. Henryk Skolimowski, Professor of Eco-Philosophy from U.S.A. and Poland, Prof. Mulk Raj Chilana from N.C.E.R.T. and many others.

The book vividly describes the Vedic concepts of ecology and environmental aspects of Himalayan system in particular and how the environmental values were imbued in our routine cultural ethos - as described in ancient vedic and Sanskrit literature. Articles like Paryavaran Ved Ki Drishti Mein by Pt. Ramnath, Ved mein Paryavaran pradershan tatha use door karne ke upaya by Pt. Manohar Vidyalankar, Vaidic Vdranganaya avam Ramayan Mahabharat mein Himalaya Evam Paryavaran by Dr. Mahaveer Agarwal, Vedic Samhitaon mein Paryavaran by Dr. Bharat Bhushan, come under this category.

The articles like Traditional Values and Ecology, by Rama P. Coomaraswami, Ecological Spirituality and Reverential Development by Prof. Henryk Skolimowski, Vedanta in Nuclear Age by Dr Karan Singh and Vedic Philosophy of Education and Himalaya by Prof. M.R. Chilana present spiritual aspects of Himalayan Ecology, Indian educational ethos and Aryan concepts of environment. And then, articles like A strategy for Himalayan Eco-System Development by Dr. M.L. Dewan, Eco-System Development in Himalayan foothills : An integrated approach by Prof. B.D. Joshi - A System approach to Himalayan Eco-Development by Shri Ashwani Kumar, Present their views based on their decades of field work on how best the Himalayan Eco-system can be managed - in all its perspectives. The very important aspect of social awakening on environmental issues are described in the articles like Himalaya Prasna Phuchhta hai by Pt. Sunderlal Bahuguna, Samajik Vamikee Aur Rashtriya Vam neeti by Shri B.P. Nautiyal, Himalaya Ka Van Aushdhiya Parxyavaran - Vedonse Vartman tak by Dr. Vinoda Upadhyaya and Ecological Impact Assessment of Religio touristic activities in Himalayas pose challenging questions before us all.

In the book, each chapter begins with a Vedic Hymn-which itself in two to four lines, speaks volumes about Vedic concepts of ecology and environment, Creator and the creation, nature and its inhabitants.

The editor duo of this book Dr. M.L. Dewan and Prof. B.D. Joshi are working on various aspects of Ecology and Environment in particular. Each one of them has made a niche for himself among the most active environmentalists and scholars of this country. A number of books and hundreds of articles on myriad aspects of ecological issues have been published by the two.

Editorial

The Discontinuity of Space and Time

Miodrag Cekic

In the short article "The graininess of space and time" *New Scientist*, 4 May 1978, P. 291) we are informed that Dr. Robert Ehrlich from George Mason University in North Virginia is going to provide evidence that space and time are not continuous but discontinuous and that they can only be measured in multiples of finite units. Prof. Ehrlich also maintains that space and time may only be defined at points in a four-dimensional "lattice".

In connection with this I would like to remind that the Serbian scientist and philosopher Branislav Petronijevic (1875-1954) had the same conceptions of space and time. Petronijevic was not an experimental physicist; he built his conceptions of the discontinuous nature of space and time logically and mathematically and on the basis of this concept he produced a new discrete geometry system.

Petronijevic exhibited his conceptions in the following publications : (1) *Principien der Metaphysik*, *I*, *II*, Heidelberg 190[illegible], 1912; (2) Uber die GroBe der unmittelbaren Beruhrung zweier Punkte, *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1905, IV, 2, S. 239-268; (3) *Die typischen Geometrien und das Unendliche*, Heidelberg 1907; (4) A multi-dimensional space conception, *The Monist*, Chicago, 1907, Vol. XVII, No 4 (October), p. 630-631; (5) L'espace dsscret et la geometrie non-euclidienne, *Archlv fur systematische Philosophie und Soziologie*, Berliu, 1928, XXXI, 3-4, S. 297-305; (6) Elementare Ableitung der nichteuklidischen Geometrien, *Publications mathematiques de l'Universite de Belgrade*, Belgrade, 1937, VI, p. 89-112 and in other papers in Serbo-Croatian.

The following scientists and philosophers are among those who have written about his conceptions : (1) Anonymous (*Nature*, London, 1905, Vol. LXXII, No 1856 (25 May), 75-76); (2) B. Russell (*Mind*, London-Edinburgh, 1905, Vol. XIV, No 53, 128-129); (3) Paul Carus (*The Monist*, Chicago, 1907, Vol. XVII, No 2, 316-317); (4) J. Laird (*Mind*, London, 1913, Vol. XXII, No 87, 421-422); (5) L. Couturat (*Bulletin des Sciences mathematiques*, Paris, 1905, XXIX, mars, 58-60); (6) G. Milhaud (*Revue philosophiques de la France et de l'Etranger*, Paris, 1905, LX, No 12, 648-650); (7) N. Popovich (*Die Lehre vom discreten Raum in der neneren Philosophie*, Wien und Leipzig 1922, S. 77-89).

I should recommend that modern experimental physicists and mathematicians read the very useful books and articles of Petronijevic, in which his new conceptions of space and time are expounded.

If Petronijevic's conception of the discontinuity of space and time were experimentally verified, it would not be the first time that any theoretical anticipation was afterwards empirically or experimentally verified. The theoretical anticipacion of the Italian Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) about the infinite multitude of worlds is already verified. The anticipacion of the Serbian Rudjer Boskovic (1711-1787) about atoms as centers of forces has also been verified and is accepted nowadays.

I

Chronic Ego is Curable

(Sikh Religion Perspective)

Samsher Singh

The dictionary meaning of word 'chronic' is 'lasting a long time'. The word 'ego' is from the Latin root which means a conscious thinking subject. It stands for the self. It is subject consciousness stands for 'I' and 'me'. *Haumai* and *Ahankara* two synonymous words for ego are available popularly used in ***qurubani*** (Divine poetry of Guru Granth Sahib). *Ahankara* is a Sanskrit word stands for 'I maker' or 'I doer'. *Haumai* is ***prakrit*** and Panjabi from of Ahankara. Haumai is compound of two words hau+mai both indicate the meaning 'I' 'I'. Haumai creates the sense of I-ness and my-ness. The elimination of egocentricity is the only way to see the God.

> When ego is stills one destroys the sense of other.
> (Adi Granth, p. 943)

Ego is a subtle mental phenomena, a sense of individuality and create separate identity. It is a ignorance of spiritual kind makes the man self-seeking, self-assertive and selfish. The sense of I-am-ness is a mixture of price and self-centeredness: It is a subtle curtain of ignorance causes a great hindrance between man and God. Ego-centric man neither understands himself nor has good views for others. In Gurbani ego is taken as serious mental disease It is more serious and fatal for man than any other physical suffering. Most of the outer sufferings are the results of mental disharmony and tension. Where mental cure is more necessary on the otherside it is more difficult to cure also. Most of it is caused by ego.

In Guru Granth Sahib different shades of ego are mentioned by Guru-poets. Guru Angad Dev said it a 'chronic malady', Guru Amar Das named it 'great malady' and Guru Arjan Dev used word 'deep malady' for it and said that ego is the root cause of all evils. It stands for thick wall between man and God. Fourth Guru, Guru Ram Das says :

The both (jiva) and groom (Lord) hide together. But between
the two the stonewall of I-am-ness. (A. G., p. 1263)

At many places in Gurbani ego is mentioned a disastrous incurable disease. It was mentioned to make the worldly man conscious about its bad effects. Guru's teachings are always have the positive and optimistic attitude towards the aim of human life. In Asa di Var it is mentioned, ego is a serious malady yet its cure is with in ;

Ego is a chronic malady
Its remedy with in (the man) that is
The graceful Lord gives the Divine word.
(A. G., p. 466)

In most of the cases in the aim of human life Guru-poets first raises the question and then answered in a positive way. Take the case of Japuji : The problem raised before man i. e. How to become a *sachiara*' and the solution is given in the same stanza, "to follow the will of God". What is that Will ? Answer is there given :

Whosoever realises the significance of Hukam (Will)
He never takes in ego.
(A. G., p. 1)
To remember the Name of God
With body and soul
It is predestined.
(A. G., p. 199)

Ego is the creation of God. Guru Nanak says that the whole play of the Universe is caused by the sense of ego.

The whole world came into being
Through the sense of individuation.
(A. G., p. 943)

Man's body is a temple of living God. Ego is existing too in the body which makes the man unable to see God in his own self. It is called spiritual ignorance. Ego is subtle curtain between man and God.

I hear He (God) is near too near
But seeming Him not
I consider Him far.
(A. G., p. 624)

Source and Means to Cure Ego

As mentioned earlier *Nam* is the cure of ego. What is Nam ? It is continuous remembrance of God's presence in every creature. It is self-realization. Nam is a dynamic power of God prevailing everywhere as current of electricity is available in every wire. It is not solid matter realizable from outside. It is realizable from inside of mans self.

The word of Guru sheds the ego.
When ego is stilled evil is turned into good.
(A. G., p. 18)

Nam of God is not a mere word or group of letters: Nam is a vital force. When the light of Nam is lit in the mind it becomes pure and stainless. Nam and ego are two opposite forces cannot stay at one place. Both are in the same body of man. When the dynamic power of Nam dominates then ego is eliminated.

Ego-centricity and Lord's Name are inimical
Both cannot stay at one place.
(A. G., p. 560)

Nam is the exiler of life, the cure of all ills. Nam from the absolute point of view is the aim of man's life, and from the instrumental point of it is a mean to achieve that aim.

God blesses the man with Nam through the Guru. Guru in Sikhism is representative of God on this earth. He comes with the command from the Almighty to set the righteousness in the world. Guru an enlighted soul is a torchbearer to guide the man in the spiritual darkness. The torch of Nam destroys the spiritual ignorance. In Guru Granth Sahib Nam, 'Hukam' and 'word' are synonymously used. The Sabad of Guru is dispeller of duality of mind. Guru says :

The wisdom of Guru is like a mighty sword
That cleaves the fortress of one's sense of duality.
(A. G., p. 1887)

The Guru bestows the Nam for spiritual awakening of his disciple. It leads ultimately to achieve the goal of life i. e. the salvation. Nam is the essence of Truth. In Sikhism man by birth is not sinful. He was born with godly qualities. Under the effect of ego he has become the victim of lower animal passions. Nam assures the devotee to overcome the passions. The vices turns into virtues through the Nam and man becomes able to control his outgoing senses.

Nam eradicates the dirt of ego, washes the sins of the sinner. The realisation of Nam makes the man submissive and God-fearing. He surrenders to the Will of God with body and miud. With this act of humality his self becomes pure. He becomes able to discriminate between right and wrong, true and false. He surrenders all his activities in the name of God. His ego is stills and outgoing mind turns inside, I-ness and my-ness is eliminated. All sinful acts are washed.

Name is dispeller of spiritual darkness
And enlightens the dark mind.
The dirtness of ages is washable only with Name.

Sabad (Word) of Guru is Divine knowledge gives immortality to the devotee. It shows the spiritual path. It is sharper than the double edged razer which cuts all kinds of barriers like ignorance, attchment and duality. Sabad is penancea for all ills. The intoxicated ego mind is disciplined with goad of Sabad. The man who dwells upon Sabad conquers the five passions (lust, wrath, deceit, pride and attachment) and acquires five virtues (truth, contentment, compassion, righteousness and fortitude.) Sabad is a ocean of serenity that destroys all kinds of ego. The soul with the help of sabd frees itself from the prison house of finite body.

> The Lord created the world and also infected it with malady of
> ego
> And purged only if one enshrines the word (sabad) in the mind.
> (A. G., p. 1109-10)

Another effectful step to eradicate the sense of ego is to attend the congregation of holy men. It is not mere gathering of men of a community. It is a society of those dedicated souls who have surrender themselves before the enlighted (Soul) Guru with body and mind and recite only the Nam of Almighty God. The congregation of pious people is like a tank of nectar in which all kinds of sins are washes. The concept of congregation in Sikhism is unique in the sense that it realises the presence of Guru in the holy society.

> The dirt of egoism of ages which soiled the soul
> Will be removed only in the society of the holy
> (A. G., p.)

The concept of holy society is unique in Sikhism in the other sense too. The altruistic devotee where free himself from ego there he makes the whole generation to get rid of the ego malady.

> The lover of truth and holy society not purged one's inner ego
> But also emancipate one's whole generation.
> (A. G.; p. 1087)

The idea of servic (seva) in Sikhism is also an important factor for the eradication of ego. Seva is an act to do good for others without any reward. To be useful for others is one of the funamentals of Sikhism: Religion is an inspiration of love. To render free service to the mankind is a tree service of God. It is a unique point of Sikh religion that makes love and labour both the part of life.

Unselfish service to the people silences the ego of man and brought him to quintessence of Divine knowledge. Divine knowledge is an inner voice which keeps the devotee always awake on the right path of life. The act of selfless service is helpful for man to shed his ego With continuous service to others the goodness conquers the evil and evil habits and activities are replaced to good one. Bounds of all kinds are loosen. The mind get rid off all afflictions and works in disciplined manner.

The act of prayer also played an important role to overcome the bad effects of ego. In Sikhism prayer is a yearning of soul to merge in the Divine essence. It is an act of communication between man and God. Sikhism is a religion of prayer and prayer minded people. Guru says :

> O God rid me of the poison of ego and attachment.

The fundamental principles of Sikh Religion mentioned here were all practised by Guru poets during their lifetime. Their practical way of life with full devotion was a good example for disciples to follow. Guru-poets blest their devotees with Nam: With the realization of Nam ego dies in mind, sins are dispelled and the sinner becomes free. Guru's personality free from ego is always pure like gold. Meeting with the Guru the sinner too becomes pure. This thought repeatedly stressed in Gurubani :

> Meeting with the saint (Guru) my sins are dispelled.
> Yea, this wise all the sinner are made pure.
> (A. G., p. 624)

The image of redeemed man from ego is like a swan who pick the pearls. He gets the union with God. He swims across the ocean of life and save all the kindreds. He seases to rely on his own efforts always leaning on the Almighty God. He sees God everywhere. Ego redeemed man render all his services in the name of God. He remains detached in all his dealings of life.

> The God conscious beings have saved a myraid
> Through the word, thus they overpower their
> I-ness and mine-ness and see the light of God
> Permeating all the three worlds.
> (A. G., p. 907)

2

Survival or Super-Psi ?

Stephen E. Braude

Introduction

Two questions have dominated parapsychology since the founding of the Society for Psychical Research. The first is : "Do human beings have psychic (psi) abilities (ESP or PK) ?". The second is : "Does human consciousness survive bodily death ?" The first question, in my opinion, has been answered satisfactorily in the affirmative, and although the road to that answer has been bumpy and somewhat circuitous, the issues are relatively staightforward—at least as compared to the second question. But the question about survival is almost transcendentally recalcitrant; it may, in fact, be impossible to rule out alternative hypotheses. Unfortunately, however, most writers on survivll have failed to appreciate the point. Indeed, even the most sophisticated authors tend to underestimate the enormity of the theoretical challenges facing them. The goal of this paper is to bring some of their more serious shortcomings into sharper focus.

Any satisfactory discussion of survival must proceed along two fronts, one of which is empirical and the other of which is philosophical. In this respect, the study of survival is no different from any scientific investigation, except that in most areas of science fundamental philosophical assumptions usually from part of the received conceptual background. But in the case of survival research, deep philosophical issues dominate the foreground. For example, many have wondered whether the very *concept* of survival is intelligible. And as the reader may realize, some have decided that it is not, and have therefore argued that we should reject the survival hypothesis *a priori* (see, e. g., Flew, 1976).

Now I am by no means opposed to *a priori* arguments against scientific claims. In many cases, ostensibly empirical claims rest on thoroughly indefensible philosophical presuppositions, and those presuppositions often blind researchers to alternative ways of interpreting the data. That is perhaps most conspicuously the case in the so called cognitive sciences, a great deal of which is no more than bad philosophy couched in (and obscured by) the imposing technical vocabulary of the electrical engineer. Nevertheless, some *a priori* arguments are more persuasive and profound than others. And I consider the usual arguments against the intelligibility of survival to be quite shallow. Flew's arguments, for example, trade on superficial features of language use and suspicious thought-experiments whose plausibility rests on our meager imaginative capacities. In my view it is irrelevant how much difficulty we have imagining what survival might be like. Similarly, it is hardly surprising that we have trouble describing an after-life in terms designed for dealing with an ordinary embodied existence. What really matters is that it is relatively easy to construct hypothetically ideal cases so coercive that we would have no choice but to admit (or at least to entertain seriously) that survival of some sort is a fact, no matter how much of a challenge that poses for our familiar conceptual framework. Our ability to formulate such ideal cases shows that the evidence for survival cannot be rejected for the sorts of facile reasons provided by Flew. The more pressing question is to what extent actual cases approach the theoretical ideal.

But even the best real cases—and possibly also the best ideal cases—face certain purely conceptual obstacles. These have to do with the challenge from an alternative psi-hypothesis, usually called the "super-psi" hypothesis. As I see it, the most serious obstacle to taking even the best evidence for survival at face value is the possibility that the data can be explained in terms of highly-refined psi among the living. What I shall argue below is that no case so far investigated resists explanation along these lines, and that the usual arguments against super-psi explanations are seriously inadequate.

Super-Psi and the Ideal Case for Survival

Parapsychologists and others tend to approach the study of psi with a standard set of indefensible tacit assumptions. First, they often assume that if psi occurs, it occurs only to a very modest degree. Second, they usually assume that when observable (and not merely statistically demonstrable) psi effects occur, those effects will be sufficiently overt or unusual to be identified as psi events.

Both assumptions, however, are intolerably naive. Indeed, the former is methodologically egregious. Given our current degree of ignorance concerning psychic functioning, we simply have no grounds for placing antecedent limits of any kind on its scope or refinement.

To accept this point, it does not matter whether we believe that psychic functioning occurs or whether we are simply open, minded skeptics entertaining the mere hypothesis that psi occurs If psi can occur at all, then until we have evidence to the contrary, we must assume that it can occur at any level of magnitude or sophistication. In fact, not only do we have no evidence against the possibility of unlimited psi, certain bodies of data actually support it I have argued elsewhere that probably the best evidence for psi of any kind is the evidence of physical mediumship (Braude, 1986). But the best of those cases shows that psi occurs in froms far more subtle, complex and extensive than would be suggested by any of the results reported from laboratory experiments. A sober appraisal of the mediumistic evidence can only make us more open to the possibility of even more elaborate or sweeping effects.

The second uuwarranted assumption usually appears in attempts to argue that there is simply no evidence for super-psi. Many protest that if super-psi occurred, it would make itself known to us; but (they would argue), we have no evidence that people are able to do such things as psychokinetically affect the weather or make planes crash, or carry out sophisticated and detailed psychic spying. The assumptiou lurking beneath this argument is that occurrences of super-psi in everyday life will generally be conspicuous or easily identifiable as such, and that they will not simply blend in with or be masked by the extensive network of surrounding normal events. But that assumption is clearly defective (for a detailed discussion of the issues, see Braude, 1989). As far as physical phenomena are concerned, there need be no observable difference between (say) a normal heart attack or car crash and one caused by PK. The only difference may be in their unobservable causal histories. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that information gathered by ESP has to hit us over the head with its obviousness. It needn't carry some marker—a phenomenological analogue to a flourish of trumpets—which identifies it as paranormally derived rather than random or internally generated normally.

When we think about the possible operation of super-psi, we must be careful not to suppose that it functions in total isolation from the full range of human needs and organic capacities. Quite the contrary: it is more reasonable to suppose that psi plays some role in life, that it may be driven by our deepest needs and fears (rather than those of which we are immediately or consciously aware) and that it does not occur only when parapsychologists set out to look for it. Moreover, if psychic functioning may be a component of everyday life, we must be open to the possibility that, like manifestations of other organic capacities, occurrences of psi will range from the dramatic and conspicuous to the mundane and inconspicuous.

In fact, it may be in our psychological interest for most psi manifestations to be covert. In the case of PK, that would help to preserve the useful illusion that we are not responsible for events we might have brought about. And in fact, most of us are acutely uncomfortable about accepting the possibility that we might play an active (but covert) role in the misery and calamities that occur around us (Braude, 1986, 1989; Eisenbud, 1982). That concession would force us to accept a magical world view we somewhat condescendingly associate only with so-called "primitive" societies, a world view in which we need to take seriously the possibility of hexing (or the "evil eye') and other uses of psychic funtioning for malevolent and lethal purposes. Equally terrifying for most people is the fear that super-ESP might confer something like near-omniscience, or at the very least a far greater range of knowledge than we would be able to handle emotionally.

Let us suppose, then (if only to see where it leads), that we are not justified in ruling out the possibility of large scale or extremely refined psychic functioning. And let us consider how that complicates our assessment of the evidence for survival.

The Survival Hypothesis : Some Preliminaries

Before we can get to the heart of the issues before us, we must make some rather elementary, but very important, observations. First, we must resolve an important ambiguity in the claim that consciousness may survive bodily death. This concerns the distinction between *survival* of bodily death and mere *life* after death. To be a case of survival, properly speaking,t here would have to be a relation of *identity* between a post-mortem individual and an ante-mortem individual. In some sense, the two deserve to be considered the *same*. No doubt it will be difficult to state precise or generalizable criteria in virtue of which that sort of identity holds. Nevertheless, one might think that this sort of identity is not too different from the relatively familiar aspects in which other sorts of things remain the same through change. My body now, for example, is quite different from the body I had as an infant. Millions of cells have been lost and only some of them have been replaced; others have appeared for the first time as part of the normal growth process, and many of them have likewise been lost and occasionally replaced. Moreover, my thoughts and other mental states have evolved and changed deeply over time. In short, a person may remain the same in some important sense, despite undergoing a vast number of physical and mental changes Similarly there is a sense in which an acorn is the same as the oak into which it evolves. But even if we grant that two things can be identical without being *strictly* identical—that is, without satisfying Leibniz's Law that every property of one is a property of the other, we must be open to the possibility that after bodily death there is life without survival. Suppose, for instance, that after death one's consciousness gets absorbed in a great universal soup of consciousness (or something of the sort) I'm not sure I understand that hypothesis; but I encounter claims like it all the time. In that case, we would say that although no ante-mortem individual is even loosely identical to (or survives as) a post-mortem individual, nevertheless there is some sort of post-mortem existence.

Another vital preliminary distinction concerns two different sorts of knowledge. Generally speaking, a case suggestive of survival is one in which one or more living persons display knowledge closly (if not uniquely) associated with a deceased person, and which we have good reason to believe could not have been obtained by ordinary means. But that knowledge tends to fall into two broad categories : knowledge *that* (information or propositional knowledge) and knowledge how (abilities or skills). For example, some cases hinge on pieces of information displayed by a living person, which could not have been obtained normally, but which would have been known to a deceased person now ostensibly communicating that information. In other cases, however, a living person (say, a professional medium or a child) displays an ability or skill she never displayed before (say, the ability to speak a certain language, or write music), or perhaps an ability or skill quite idiosyncratic to a deceased person (say, a certain distinctive style of humor or musical composition). And of course, in an impressive case of this type, we would have good reason to believe either that these abilities could not have been acquired by normal means at all (say, if they are likely to be organic endowments which only a few enjoy) or that they could only be acquired normally after a period of practice which we are quite certain never occurred.

Many would say that the cases most strongly suggestive of survival are those of the latter sort, displaying the persistence of knowledge how I tend to agree. But many mistakenly think that cases of both sorts eastly resist alternative explanations in terms of super-psi. Let us therefore, consider the issues surrounding each type of knowledge. This should help us to appreciate, first, why the apparent persistence of abilities or skills is more impressive than the mere disploy of propositional knowlege, and second, why not even the manifestation of abilities is as coercive as it might first appear.

Super-Psi and Propositional Knowledge

To simplify matters, let us assume that the cases under discussion are always well-authenticated. In other words let us assume first, that the hypothesis of fraud is highly improbable, and second, that we have good reason to believe that events occurred as reported. By assuming that testimony is honest and that observation and testimony are reliable, we may therefore concentate on *explaining* the phenomena observed and reported. And let us assume, further, that there is good reason to believe that no explanation in terms of currently understood processes is wholly satisfactory. In that case, we may jump immediately to the question of which alternative account, in terms of presumably paranormal processes, we shonld embrace.

Now in a number of cases of ostensible mediumship and reincarnation, persons exhibit unusual and surprising pieces of propositional knowledge. Some of the best examples of this sort are cases featuring what Stevenson has dubbed "drop-in" communicators. As the name suggests, "drop-in" communicators appear without inviation, and are usually unknown to both medium and sitters. In the best of these cases, the "drop-in" communicators make various statements about themselves which are later verified and which nobody present at the sitting knew to be true through any normal means.

As Gauld (1982, Pp. 58ff) has properly observed, such cases would seem to discourage super-psi explanations for two main reasons. The first concerns the identity and apparent purpose of the communicator. One would have to explain why the medium (or someone else present at the sitting) used their ESP to obtain information about an individual unknown to those present and at best only tangentially connected to one of them. One would also have to explain why the communicator supplies information of no apparent inters but of understandably serious concern to the communicator. (A good example is the case of Runki's leg, reported in Haraldsson and Stevenson, 1975.) By contrast, the survival hypothesis seems rather straight forward. To put it simply, a deceased individual needs to deal with a matter of importance to him (e.g., to console a grieving relative or take care of some unfinished business), and so he seizes the apportunity of the sitting to get his message across.

The second obstacle for super-ps*i* explanations concerns the obscurity and diffuseness of the information which the medium (or someone else) would have to acquire paranormally. To begin with, in many cases that information is quite arcane and apparently irrelevant to sitiers' concerns—for example, the fact that the ostensible communicator was buried without one of his legs, which he lost in the accident that killed him. And although in most of those cases the information would need to come from only a single source (such as a written record, or one living person's memory), in others the information would have to be assembled from separate and equally obscure sources (e.g., different written records and memories). By contrast, on the survival hypothesis, the necessary information may all be reasonably attributed to the communicator.

Both of these alleged problems strike me as overrated. In fact, the second may be dispensed with rather quickly. Since we presently have no grounps for imposing any antecedent limits on the scope or refinement of psychic functioning, we are simply in no position to assert that accessing multiple sources of obscure information is any more imposing than accessing one. In evaluating the super-psi hypothesis, we must be careful not to treal the processes involved as if they were simply a collection of really good psi, of the kind we apparently see in limited forms in some lab experiments. When we do that, it is all too easy to think that psi functioning involves an *effort* of some kind, and that if one psi prrformance is difficult, several ought to be out of the question. But in fact, in all its intimidating richness, the super-psi hypothesis should perhaps be called the *magic wand* hypothesis. It asserts that (as far as we know) anything at all can happen, given the relevant need for it to happen. For example, we needn't suppose that refined PK must be accompanied by constant ESP vigilance of the results of one's activities, in the way that driving a car requires sensory feed-back. It may be enough simply to wish for something to happen, and then it does. Task complexity is simply not an issue. (Ironically, the irrelevance of task complexity has been emphasized even in laboratory experiments on random number generators; see Braude, 1979; Schmidt, 1975, 1976).

The first problem, that of explaining the identity of the communicator, raises a rather different set of issues. Gauld notes correctly that the survival hypothesis has obvious advantages when it comes to explaining why the medium selects one unknown deceased person rather than another unknown deceased person as the subject for her extrasensory researches. The deceased person selects himself. (1982, p. 61) Indeed, as Stevenson once remarked, "Some 'drop-in' communicators have explained their presence very well" (1970, p. 63). But according to Gauld, on the super-psi hypothesis 'we seem reduced... to supposing that selection of communicator depends upon the random operation of wholly unknown factors. (1982, p. 59). Stevenson concurs, and his way of stating the point brings its weakness squarely into the open. He writes, since the [super-psi] theory assumes that discarnate personalities do *not* exist, it has to attribute motive for a particular mediumistic communication or apparitional experience to the subject. But evidence of such a motive is not always available, and we should not assume that one exists in the absence of such evidence. (1984, p 159)

The proper reply to this has two parts : first, that we should not assume such evidence is absent unless we look for it, and second, that hardly anyone looks for it, except in the naive way we expect questionnaires or causal conversations to reveal the deepest secrets of one's soul, or the half-hearted or superficial way searches are usually conducted by the lazy or frightened. If the motives in question exist, they are unlikely to reveal themselves to the sorts of surface investigations Stevenson and others conduct. Without an extensive and penetrating examination into the lives of clearly relevant (and perhaps even seemingly peripheral) personnel, we are simply in no position to reject explanations in terms of motivated super-psi.

Some might feel that this criticism is unfair. After all, our goals and interests are often unconscious and difficult to discern, and in actual case investigations we may have no real prospect of ferreting out potentially relevant deep needs and concerns. That is especially true for the older cases, where we are no longer able to interrogate medium and sitters. Now I grant that in many (if not most) cases, we may never get a clear feel for the pertinent underlying psychodynamics, no matter how hard we try. But that is no reason for not trying, and often we do not have to probe very far to glimpse some of the significant psychological activity simmering beneath the surface. Indeed, some case studies reveal clearly how muah we stand to learn from depth-psychological detective work. Probably the best example is Eisenbud's brilllant analysis of Mrs. Chenoweth's Cagliostro persona (1983). The case is complex and deserves to be read in its entirety. But in a ntshell, here is what it is about.

In 1914 James Hyslop held a series of sittings with one of his favorite mediums, Mrs. Chenoweth. Also present was Doris Fischer, whom W.F. Prince described exhaustively in his monumental study of her multiple personalities (W. F. Prince, 1915/16) and in Hyslop was interested because of his suspicion that multiple personality might be a disguised form of mediumship (Hyslop 1917). One of the most interesting of Mrs Chenoweth's trance personalities was a "drop-in" who emerged on several occasions over the series of sittings. He claimed to be Count Alessandro Cagliostro, the notorious eighteenth-century mystic, healer, and (as some have alleged) con-artist. His behavior at the sittings was vivid and flamboyantly salacious, but nevertheless rather one-dimensional. Cagliostro came through as a vigorousdefender of sexual freedom, including that of women, and as a severe critic of Christianity--indeed, "as a reckless blasphemer who wouldn't have lasted forty-eight hours in the Bhurch-nominated Europe of the time" (. 230). More importantly; however, the behavior of this trance personality corresponded to nothing in any of the accounts of his life published up to the time of the sittings.

The real Cagliostro was arrested in Rome in 1789 and brought to trial by the Holy Inquisition. Charged with freemasonry, heresy, and promulgating magic and superstition, he was condemned to death. That sentence was later reduced to life imprisonment. But it was not until 1972 that an account of Cagliostro appeared which presented the Vatican's version of the trial (the account was translated into English in 1974). That characterization was based on a digest of charges obtained in 1955 by the National Victor Emmanuel Library of Rome. The original was still held in secret by the Vatican. For various reasons surveyed by Eisenbud, it is highly unlikely that any of the sitters had normal access to the mat rial in the National Library, and Eisenbud's sleuthing turned up no publications citing the Vatican's version prior to 1972.

But again, perhaps the most striking feature of the trance persona was that it did not correspond to the picture of Cagliostro painted by all the reliable sources available not only at the time of the sittings but until the precent time as well. Not even critical accounts of Cagliostro accused him of being lascivious or religiously cynical. Indeed, there is reason to think that Cagliostro's trial was rigged, and that it was simply expedient for the Vatican to charge him with blasphemy and rampaging licentiousness.

Hence, there is no good reason to regard this case as presenting evidence for the survival of Cagliostro. But in that case, what was the function, psychodynamically speaking, of the Cagliostro persona ? Why should a colorful but historically inaccurate trance personality emerge who was so flagrantly sexual and religiously cynical ? Eisenbud offers numerous intriguing reasons for thinking that the Cagliostro persona had a great deal to do with, among other things, the sitters' sexual repressions and religious upbringing.

For example, Hyslop, who "apparently devoted much of his life to spiritual and moral development" (Pp. 233—4), predictably found the Count to be a deplorable figure. Hence, it seems both interesting and significant that, by his own admission, Hyslop repeatedly encountered non-spiritual "sensuous" characters in sittings he conducted. Moreover, Mrs. Chenoweth displayed a surprisingly intense attachment to the Count when it looked as if other communicators might banish him from the scene. Crying to the other ostensible communicators who tried to exercise him, she said, "You give him back [Pause] You give him back......Give the Count back to me." Hyslop asked who wanted the Count, and Mrs. Chenoweth replied, "We all do. We are lost. We are lost, we are lost, we are lost [Pause] Oh, Devils, to take him aways from us. [Distress and crying]... I won't stand it [Pause] I don't want your old God.I want the Count." Furthermore, Doris (like Hyslop) was a model of moral propriety. In fact, she seemed almost to be a caricature of naive virtue. According to W. F. Prince, "A purer, more guileless soul it was never the writer's good fortune to know". Prince also notes that Doris had a "notable lack of sex-instinct."

Now it apparently never occurred to Prince (or, apparently, Hyslop) that Doris' lack of sexuality may have indicated an inhibition of powerful sexual desires. And in 1914 nobody considered seriously the possibility of experimenter-influence, or more generally the possibility that persons other than the medium might play an active role in shaping the material presented by a medium. Eisenbud proposes, for these and many other reasons, that the Cagliostro persona might have been a composite "dream figure omnibus for the repressed unconscious hankerings of all the principals at the sittings" (pp. 237-8). And considering some of the startlingly close correspondences between the trance personality and the behavior attributed to Cagliostro by the Church, it appears as if one or more of Mrs. Chenoweth, Hyslop, and Doris Fischer psychically raided an extremely obscure portrayal of Count Cagliostro to provide some material for the sitting.

For present purposes, it does not matter particularly whether Eisenbud's psychoanalytic conjectures are correct. What matters is the level at which he attempts to evaluate the data. Still, Eisenbud's proposals do make very good sense of the evidence, including peculiar and otherwise unexplained bits of behavior on the part of the sitters. Hence, his analysis demonstrates clearly the potential benefits of depth-psychological probings. And, of course, since the Cagliostro persona corresponds only to a false characterization of the Count apparently cooked up by Vatican officials, the case is not even a remotely plausible candidate for the survival hypothesis. On the contrary, it strongly suggests the operation of a high level of dramatic creativity and some pretty dandy psychic functioning. But with this sort of evidence staring us in the face, it is both presumptuous and naive to rule out super-psi conjectures in cases where no comparable depth-psychological study has been conducted. Regrettably, however, by comparison to Eisenbud's standard of analysis, most other case investigations are unacceptably superficial.

Consider, for example, Stevenson's treatment of the Sharada case of ostensible reincarnation (Stevenson, 1984). Since the most striking feature of this case is the evidence it offers for responsive xenoglossy—hence, the persistence of an ability or from of knowledge *how*, it does not exemplify the sort of case we are currently considering. On the other hand, since we are presently focusing on the need for depth-psychological investigation in connection with the evidence for survival, discussion of the Sharada case is quite apt. The subject, a woman named Uttara, began to have apparent memories of an earlier life when she was in her thirties. These memoris occurred during dramatic changes in Uttara's personality, at which time she spoke a language (Bengali) which she apparently neither spoke nor understood in her normal state, and which she apparently never had an opportunity to learn.

Stevenson and his associates did a great deal of valuable and careful investigative work to rule out explanations in terms of normal processes. Most of that investigation was devoted to uncovering the extent to which Uttara might have learned normally about Bengali history and customs, and whether she was ever exposed to the Bengali language in a way that would explain her apparent facility in speaking it. But despite all the detail Stevenson provides, the reader gets no feel whatever for Uttara and other relevant individuals as persons. We have no idea what moved them or what their needs and desires were. We get no sense of the profound personal issues that shaped their lives and actions. In fact, it is quite remarkable how little effort Stevenson apparently made to dig beneath the surface of their concerns, either in the actual course of investigation or in his subsequent evaluation of the case material.

A couple of examples should make this clear. One of the most glaring concerns Uttara'g relationship with a homeopathic physician which began prior to Sharada's first appearance. The physician, Dr. Joshi (a pseudonym), had been treating Uttara for a variety of physical ailments. For several years he treated her as an outpatient, and then (since her condition was not improving) he admitted Uttara to his private hospital. Uttara clearly felt strongly attracted to Dr. Joshi, and at times she behaved toward him like a jealous spouse rather than a patient. Eventually, Uttara's behavior became to annoying that Dr. Joshi had her removed from the hospital. Moreover, when Sharada finally appeared she claimed that the doctor was her bhusand from her "previous" life in Bengal.

Although Stevenson notes that Uttara's relationship with Dr. Joshi may have contribted to the appearance of Sharada, he has strikingly little to say about the nature of Uttara's interest in the doctor, or in the doctor's reaction to her affection. This is especially regrettable, since there are good reasons to think that there is more to their relationship than meets the eye. For example, Stevenson claims that Uttara had been "strangely moved" (1984, p. 105) when she first met Dr. Joshi, Now to put it bluntly, Stevenson offers no reason to think that there was anything strange about it, and in the absence of serious probing into Sharada's feelings toward the doctor in particular and toward men in general, that is a surprising choice of words. Indeed, it is out of character in a prose style that otherwise aims at being quite neutral (it may effectively reveal Stevenson's antecedent inclination to treat the case as indicative of reincarnation). Perhaps Uttara's feelings could justifiably be termed strange if they were really those of a deceased individual who had not yet clearly manifested in Uttara's behavior. But. Stevenson has given us no reason to think they were anything more than the common sort of attraction one feels suddenly for another, which we often later learn has quite pedestrian origins in our various hidden needs and agendas

Perhaps most notably, Stevenson tells us that despite Uttara's annoying displays of affection, Dr. Joshi visited her at home "a few times" (p. 105) after she had been discharged from his hospital. Stevenson attributes these visits to Dr. Joshi's "interest and perhaps compassion", but he says the doctor "indicated no deeper attachment to either Uttara or Sharada" (p 105). But Stevenson also notes that Dr. Joshi was evasive and unrevealing during attempts to examine the nature of his relationship with Uttara. The only explanation Stevenson offers for that evasiveness was that the doctor found Sharada's attentions embarrassing

But that explanation is hardl compelling, and Stevenson offers nothing to support it in the face of rather obvious sorts of doubts. To begin with, why should Uttara's affection and attention toward the doctor be embarrassing ? Patients often fall in love with their doctors. Why would Dr, Joshi not simply take Uttara's interest in stride ? And if Uttara's behavior was so embarrassing and her attention "discomfiting and potentially compromising" (p. 105), why did the doctor visit her several times at home ? That could not have helped to quell the affections of his former patient, and it could only have offered further opportunity for embarrassing confrontations. If Stevenson is correct that the doctor's motive was interest or compassion, then one would think that either the embarrassment was not all *that* acute or else the doctor's interest and compassion were strong enough to overcome it. But if the latter, why would he have been evasive in an interview ? If he was feeling ordinary human compassion and a strong (but merely professional) interest in the case, might he not have been more cooperative and forthcoming in his interview ? Moreover, it is not particularly helpful to learn simply *that* Dr. Joshi denied feeling attracted toward Uttara (or Sharada). *How* did he deny those feelings ? What were his tone and his manner ? Might they have indicated that he had something to hide ? Stevenson tells us only that the doctor "practiced masterly evasion" (p. 106) during their interview.

Stevenson sheds equally little light on the subject of Uttara's feelings for men. He note that there may be some significance in the fact that Uttara never married and that Sharada claimed to be married. He concedes that "frustrated aspirations for an independent domestic life may have found fantasied satisfaction in the role of Sharada" (1984, p. 144). But since Sharada "hardly satisfies all the criteria of the idealized, fulfilled, married woman," (p. 144), Stevenson dismisses that possibility with the rhetorical question, "why did she not complete the fantasy with a happy ending ?"

The proper reply to that question should be, "You tell me !" Certainly, Stevenson reveals nothing about Uttara's fantasy life to help us make those conjectures for ourselves. But in any case there is no reason to think that we generally express our fantasies in the straight forward and flagrant way Stevenson apparently expects. If a person were living out a fantasy in too obvious a manner, it loses much of its psychological utility. Moreover, our fantasies may simultaneously represent our feelings on a number of different issues. How, exactly, did Uttara feel about men, children, or marriage, or her parents' marriage in particular ? And how might that *constellation* of feelings have expressed itself in fantasy ?

Stevenson is equally unhelpful in his examination of Uttara's long standing interest in Bengal and her preference for Bengali culture over her own Marathi culture. But we needn't consider those issues here. I must also emphasize that the doubts I have been raising may come to nothing, and that Stevenson has actually interpreted the facts correctly. But on the basis of what little he has given us or has attempted to uncover, how is one to know ? One would think that the individuals interrogated in case investigations are, like the rest of us, teeming cauldrons of issues, hopes, and fears under the surface. But since there are many reasons for thinking that psi functioning is deeply need-determined, Stevenson's perfunctory peek into the heads of his subjects simply will not do. And unfortunately, that sort of skimming of the psychological surface is not limited to Stevenson's work. It is characteristic of virtually every treatment of the evidence suggesting survival.

Super-Psi and Knowledge How

Some writers on survival (including Stevenson) grant that we cannot rule out, *a priori*, explanations in terms of super-ESP. Even so (they would say), such explanations can only handle cases of apparent knowledge *that*. Hence, they would still fail to accommodate certain forms of knowledge *how*—in particular, the apparent persistence of a deceased person's abilities or skills. The general line of reasoning behind this position is as follows. Mere information or propostional knowledge is the sort of thing which can be acquired simply through a process of communication (normal or paranormal). But skills, such as playing a musical instrument or speaking a language, cannot be accounted for so easily. Granted, obtaining information is often a necessary part of skill development; but it is hardly sufficient. That is because skills are the sort of things which persons develop only after a period of *practice*. But since the subjects in survival cases who display anomalous skills have had no opportunity to practice them first, it is reasonable to reject explanations in terms of super-ESP and resort to survivalist explanations instead.

Although this familiar argument is superficially rather appealing, it is defective nevertheless. To see why, consider first how the argument has been applied to the evidence for responsive xenoglossy. Many have felt that if a person can carry on a conversation in a language never learned through normal means, and if that is the language of an ostensible communicator expressing himself through that person, then this would constitute good *prima facie* evidence for survival (see Gauld, 1982; Stevenson, 1974, 1984). Now as Stevenson has observed, this bit of reasoning rests on a crucial and usually tacit principle—namely, that "if skills are incommunicable normally, it follows that they are also incommunicable paranormally" (1984, p. 160). According to Stevenson, it was Ducasse (1962) who first applied this principle to the evidence for survival, and Stevenson apparently considers it to be self-evident, or at least not worthy of a defense. But in fact, Ducasse's principle is not nearly as obvious as Stevenson suggests.

Consider : if Ducasse's principle is true, that is not because it is an instance of the more general principle, "if any bit of knowledge *x* is incommunicable normally, then x is incommunicable paranormally. That general principle, in fact, seems quite clearly to be false.

Indeed, if we accepted it, we could conclude *a priori* that ESP is impossible. It is reasonable to assume, then, that Stevenson (and others) do not accept this more general principle.

Hence, if Ducasse's principle is true, it would presumably be true only of skills. But why ? Every time we learn a new skill we must do considerable bit of unlearning, if only of acquired motor and cognitive habits which would interfere with manifesting that skill. Moreover, learning of any kind (whether of skills or information) is often highly resistance-laden; it can be hampered by an endless number of interfering belief, insecurities, and other fears. But these sorts of physical, cognitive, and emotional obstacles are often overcome relatively easily in hypnotic or other profoundly altered states. But in that case, learning a skill might even be *facilitated* if the process bypasses the normal states in which our resistances to learning are strongest.

Actually, there are two crucial sets of issues here. The first concerns the possibility of expressing and acquiring skills by sidestepping our customary resistance-laden modes of cognition. And the second concerns the difficulty in generalizing about skills or abilities, including the ability to speak a language. These two sets of issues overlap somewhat, but I will try to keep them distinct.

To begin with, in order to decide whether skills can be communicated or acquired paranormally, one must first evaluate the rich and suggestive literature on dissociation.[1] For example, cases of multiple personality suggest that dissociation facilitates the development or acquisition of personality traits and skills which might never be developed or displayed under normal conditions. Alternate personalities exhibit wide varieties of behavioral and cognitive styles which are not explainable simply in terms of propositional knowledge (Braude, 1991). Those cognitive styles encompass various sorts of abilities and skills, such as artistic and literary ability, and the skills of drawing, sculpting, and writing poetry. Differences also manifest commonly as changes in handedness and handwriting. (And of course these abilities and skills, like those of a normal person, might occur in quite distinctive or idiosyncratic forms.) But since alternate personalities appear quite suddenly and sometimes evolve rather quickly, their distinctive traits might emerge without any practice. (I realize we are very close here to the second set of issues—namely, whether Ducasse's principle applies to *every* skill, or just certain kinds of skills, and whether there are, accordingly, relevant differences between kinds of skills, I shall return to these issues shortly).

Moreover, until one decides what to make of the case of Patience Worth (Cory, 1919; Litvag, 1972; W.F. Prince, 1927/1964; Braude, 1910), it is premature to dismiss super-psi—or simply non-survivalist–explanations of responsive xenoglossy. The medium in this case, Pearl Curran, with only an eigth-grade education, no apparent literary ability, and no apparent interest either in literature or in arcane areas of scholarship, suddenly began producing a steady stream of poetry, novels, and remarkably pithy and witty conversation through a ouija board. The material purportedly came from a personality named Patience Worth, who claimed to be a seventeenth century English woman. But there is little reason to think that the evidence supports the hypothesis of survival. Although Patience offered various clues regarding her origin and identitity, subsequent investigation revealed nothing to indicate that a Patience Worth ever existed.

A more reasonable interpretation of the case is that it demonstrates; even more dramatically than the usual good cases of hypnosis, the power of dissociation to liberate otherwise hidden or latent abilities. Although all the Patience Worth communications exhibit a distinctive and consistent personality as well as common verbal traits, Patienee expressed herself in several different linguistic styles. In fact, one of her works was a Victorian novel, despite the fact that (as the book's dust jacket wryly noted) Patience was a pre-Victorian author. Most of the time, however, Patience communicated in a quite unprecedented style rooted in archaic Anglo Saxon idioms. Much of her uocabulary was appropriate to the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, but some seemed to belong to a period several centuries earlier. Moreover, certain of the words she used on those occasions were tracked down by scholars only *after* they appeared in the Patience Worth scripts.

Many view Patience's literary works as being of exceptional quality, quite probably the best literature ever produced in a case of mediumship· But quite apart from issues of literary criticism, what matters here is that Patience Worth's poems and novels—and, indeed, her entire vivid personality—betray an intelligence and psychological style profoundly different from that displayed by Mrs. Curran. Furthermore, Patience's abilities and skills go well beyond anything Mrs. Curran (and, arguably, anyone else) ever exhibited. Patience was able to compose (often exquisite) poems on the spot, in response to requests to write poems on particular topics. She could compose several works (sometimes in distinct literory styles) on the same occasion, alternating passages of one wfth those of another. She could write part of a novel for a while, leave off in mid sentence to converse or work on something else, and then return to the novel the next day exactly where she had left off. More impressively still, with the exception of a beautiful child's prayer written haltingly and with a few revisions, Patience produced her entire corpus of thousands of poems and several novels without ever making a correction. She also performed astonishing compositional stunts. On one occasion she was asked to compose a poem, each line of which would begin with a different letter of the alphabet, from A to Z (omitting X). After a pause of a few seconds, the poem came through the ouija board as fast as the scribe could take it down.

The literature on dissociation, then, indicates that a person may apparently acquire, develop, or manifest novel abilities and skills under various kinds of abnormal circumstances. We are hardly in a position, then, to assert that the sudden appearance of new abilities and skills is impossible under even more extraordinary (i.e., paranormal) conditions. In fact, it seems we must plead ignorance here for reasons similar to those mentioned in connection with ostensibly paranormal propositional knowledge. We simply do not know what human beings are capable of under conditions we can scarcely comprehend.

Another (possibly deeper) set of problems concerns the way even sophisticated writers on survival (such as Stevenson and Gauld) generalize about skills. For example Stevenson asserts, "Practice does not just make perfect; it is indispensable for the acquisition of any skill" (1984. p. 160). There are at least two related problems with that claim The first is that skills can differ dramatically from one another in many respects, one of which is the importance of practice in skill development. I shall return to this point shortly. The second problem is that the *acquisition* of skills is not clearly the issue. All one is entitled to discuss, strictly speaking, is the *manifestation* of skills. We have no idea whether or to what extent new skills have been acquired by mediums or by the subjects of reincarnation investigations. This is not a trivial distinction, because practice is clearly not always needed to manifest skills for the first time.

To see this, one needs only to consider child prodigies and cases of savantism. In fact, typical musical prodigies such as Mozart, Mendelssohn, and Schubert, and mathematical prodigies such as Gauss, manifest exceptional skills *prior* to their being perfected or developed through practice. Moreover, it is of no use to protest that those prodigious skills were quite rudimentary when they first appeared, and that they simply evolved with amazing rapidity. For one thing, that seems simply to be false. For example, Mozart was able to write down a complex piece of music while composing another one in his head; but to my knowledge there is no evidence that he first had to practice that skill. But more importantly, we have no reason to think that the subjects in survival cases demonstrate levels of expertise more impressive than (say) Mendelssohn's initial displays of musicianship. Quite the contrary: the suddenly emerging skills of child prodigies often far exceed anything displayed by the subjects investigated in xenoglossy cases or other cases suggesting survival. But then, how do we know to what extent certain conditions (e.g., dissociation) may unleash prodigious capacities latent in many (or all) of us ?

Of course, we do not need to consider prodigies and savants to appreciate this point. Ordinary folk demonstrate it all the time. Consider; for example, the skill of playing tennis. Many people are naturally athletic, even though they may not be prodigiously gifted. And to the occasional consternation of those who are less precocious athletically, natural athlets can, on their first try, play a game of tennis reasonably well--at least without looking hopelessly foolish. In fact, on their first try they might even play as well or better than others who have played for years, taken lessons, etc. More importantly, however, the initial tennis-playing skills of natural athletes would—at the very least –match the rather unimpressive linguistic skills displayed in the best cases of responsive xenoglossy. (There is even an interesting parallel between conversing in a language and playing tennis. Responsive xenoglossy involves more than the ability to form sentences in a new language; it also involves understanding and responding appropriately to sentences in that language. Similarly, the skill of playing tennis goes beyond being able to get the ball over the net and in bounds. It also requires being able to return shots.)

To complicate matters further, when Stevenson argues that skills cannot be communicated or manifested without practice, he mentions riding a bicycle, dancing, and speaking a foreign language as examples. Similarly, Gauld writes,

> Th ability to play bridge will is not simply a matter of learning (whether normally or by ESP) the rules (considered as a set of facts together with the precepts given a some manual). It can only be acquired by practising intelligently until things fall into place. And it is the same with learning a language (1982, p, 102)

It appears, however, that there may be serious disanalogies between linguistic competence and these other skills. In fact, it is unclear whether one can even generalize about how difficult it is to learn a new language.

Let us take second things first and consider some aspacts of language learning: To begin with, learning a second language may be a significantly different process from learning a lauguage for the first time. And if the new language is not radically different from one's own, the sort of minimal linguistic competence displayed in cases of xenoglossy may require little more than some knowledge (that) of vocabulary and grammar, possibly paranormally acquired. After all, once one already speaks a language, a major part of learning a new language is exposure to it, whether that is through listening to actual conversations, or by watching movies, or listening to audio tapes in one's sleep (or while falling asleep). And of course, since we are entertaining paranormal hypotheses, we cannot rule out the possibility that subjects might have had the requisite exposure unconsciously and psychically. Sharada's mastery of Bengali, T. E.'s command of Swedish (or Norwegian), and certainly Gretchen's German (Stevenson, 1974, 1984) does not seem outlandish for an adult who might have been exposed to those languages extensively, but unconsciously (and even psychically), especially if we leave open the possibility that one's linguistic skills may be enhanced under dissociative or other unusual conditions. Moreover, the linguistic competence of Sharada, Jensen, and Gretchen is not as much of a feat as demonstrating a similar competence in a language *radically* different from one's own.

(I should note that there are cases in which mediums speak in languages (e. g , Hungarian, Chinese) which are quite different from their own and to which they presumably had no normal exposure. But quite apart from serious questions concerning the reliability of the data in those cases, in every case I'm familiar with some sitter present knew the language, and either they or someone else benefitted psychologically in rather obvious ways from receiving communtcations in those languages. At best, then, the possibility of sitter-influence (including sitter-PK) and unconscious sitter-collaboration in these cases would be so strong that we are not justified in making much of the medium's apparently surprising linguistic competence.)

At any rate, if my earlier suggestions about language use are on the right track, then linguistic competence may differ significantly from other sorts of skills—for example, riding a bicycle, dancing, or playing the piano, expertise in which may be rather more independent of one'e other abilities and skills. Of course; if one who can already dance performs a kind of dance he never learned before, that is considerably less impressive than a dance performed by someone previously lacking in muscular coordination and rhythmic finesse. That is why the musical compositions of Rosemary Brown are less than compelling. They are clearly continuous with musical abilities she had already displayed, just as Uttara's command of Bengali is clearly continuous with her already well-developed linguistic skills in another Indian dialect.

Apparently then, what would be impressive *prima facie* evidence for survival is not merely the manifestaion of a novel ability or skill, but rather an ability or skill substantially different from and discontinuous with those one has already displayed. But in that case, it is irrelevant to point out how difficult it might be to acquire (or manifest) such skills as playing the piano or dancing without practice (ignoring, for the moment, the problem posed by child prodigies). The evidence for the persistence of skills suggesting survival contains nothing better than the evidence for responsive xenoglossy, and the best of those cases do not demonstrate the manifestation of skills radically discontinuous from the subject's other abilities. Hence, until someone does something comparable to playing piano, never before having played a musical instrument or exhibited any musical ability, I think we must conclude that this portion of the evidence for survival is considerably less impressive than its proponents have claimed.

Notes

1 Both Stevenson (1974) and Gauld (1982) do this to some extent. But both authors are saddled with an impoverished picture of multiple personality disorder (see Braude, 1991). Moreover, they both fail to discuss some of the more impressive cases of dissociation, such as Patience Worth.

Acknowledgments.

The final section of this paper is adapted from my Presidential Address at the 34th Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association, Heidelberg, Germany, Aug. 9, 1991.

This study was supported by a grant from the John Bjorkhem Memorial fund.

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Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 127-144, 1992.

3

The Philosophy of Samuel Fredrick Hahnemann—A Perspective

Shyam Deo Kumar Sinha

Hahnemann was very curiously anxious because no scientist or thinker had understood as Kant wanted them to do within the boundries of experience. Hahnemann said: "My fight to-day with the reform in Medical science would have been easier one" from the inspiration he got from Kant's critique of pure reason.

Dr. Hahnemann like Aristotle has a study of man's life in relation to his environmental situation, may they be sociological, ecnonomical, psychological etc.

The great anxiety for Hahnemann in the study of man's life and prospect was very much physiological which gradually entails his spiritual existence because Hahnemann had got this intution that man is essentially divine. But owing to its association with the physical body, it has many fold suffering.

Since philosopher both from East and West, have elaborately dealt upon the principles of good and evil, so Dr. Hahnemann cannot keep himself in exception. Like the great thinkers, he also dialated upon the prollem of evil and nature's abnormal and accidental situations which sometimes promote disease, pain and suffering in various ways.

Hehnemann was born at the time when there was a great upsurp of different philosophical and scientific thoughts which seem to dominate the European mind by turns. Idealism and materialism were the two schools of thoughts, each of which drew a large number of people under its respective fold. With this growth of human thought, socialism became inevitable and each scientific specialist was busy with his own particular sphere of knowledge and activity, but he was neverthe less, influenced by the general ideas of different philosophical schools which happened to capture the mind of the people for the time being the erudite scholar, the double headed prodigy of philosophy and learning was conversant with all these currents and cross currents of ideas and ideological conflicts. But as a man, imbued with true scienctific spirit, be kept himself free from being observed with any of those one sided theories—and vague concepts. On the other hand, he never committed the philosophical crime of "confusion of categories" of different orders of existence; What particular philosophical system he supported can be asscertained from his writings. It seems probable that he did not support any system 'in toto'. He accepted the reality of mind, life and matter, whereby. he supported name of the idealistic the materialistic the vitalistic schools-each exclusively to the rejection of other. But he seems to be learning towards vitalism Theoretical speculation for the sake of mentally constructing a consistent world negative the paradoxical nature of the actual perceptible universe had no charm for him. He was not prepared to assume anything which was not justified by sense. experience. Matter he could not deny as it was perceptible to him. Life and mind he could not reject as their working phenomena were perceptible to him. To him, it was a fact that man, possessing a material body, is nevertheless a living conscious being. He never bothered to discern how mind, life and matter each belonging to different orders of existence, got mixed-up in the consciously living organism. He did not bother his head to speculate on the metaphysical nature of life and mind. He was satisfied with observation that the material organism without the vital force is capable of no sensation, no function and no self-preservation. To him, organism is the fact and all that he needed is the correct and complete observation of all the phenomena manifested in and through the organism. Health is a condition of EASE and disease is a condition of suffering DISE-ASE) of the living organism. He does not go an inch beyond this factual observation. Sense-experience is the bed-rock of which he takes his firm stand. Philosophically speaking, he may be classed under the school of empricism with certain reservation. In fact, he was a vitalist too. In the words of Hahnemann . "Life can only be known empirically from its phenomena and manifestations...Human Life, in short, is in no respect regulated by purely physical laws which obtain among inorganic substances. They are definitely regulated by the laws peculiar to vitality alone."

Hahnemann is not basically a theoretical mataphysician, rather he applies his mataphysical ideas to the diagnosis and cure of human diseases. The system that developed for this purpose based on his philosophical ideas is known as Homoeopathy. He has depicted his philosophy of homoeopathy in his monumental work Organon. and 'Lessers-Writing'.

Organon as well an 'Lessens-Writing' is a Homeopathic philosophy in which Hahnemann mean to eradicate the total human suffering. In fact, he serves as a balm to the suffering humanity. All the aphorism contained in its the message as conveyed by Hahnemenn toward the homoeopathic discipline in order to enunciate his fundamental philosophical idea which entail the idea of EASE from DISEASE. As such the aphorisms so enunciated therein are just like the sayings of the Bible. There is neither the descriptions of a medicine even, nor the talk of a particular disease. It is mere the description of laws which allow us to follow the "Laws of Nature". Laws of Organon, which are philosophical laws are the explanation of the laws of Nature. It describes the relations between matter and consciousness and the ways of complete cessation of sufferings. It introduces the cardinal principles of Homoeopathy confining to life force or the vital force, the dynamic action of diseased force, dynamization i e. potentization of a substance and its action upon the plain of dynamic force (life force). Every substance of Nature can be used as a remedy for a sick one and Hahnemann finds that the substence into which Nature had packed the vibration corresponding to the vibration of the disease and the former wins over the latter. Such types of different attributes, known as symptoms are found in every substance of Nature which correspond with the different morbid actions. The certain substance and a diseased man—both inherit similar characters of Dynamic force corresponding to each other, the Dynamic force of a potentized substance eradicates the morbid action of de-arranging the Dynamic force (vital force) of man.

Materia Medica is a book in which the total signs and symptoms of each well proved substance in different orders known as medicines, has been incorporated therein. The symptoms of a medicine will be the character of an individual substance which is mentioned in Materia Medico, not in philosophy of Homeopathic i.e. "Organon". A philosopoical approach stuck him in order to root out the cause of disease through the process of studying a man individually. He had the only mission to do some good to mankind through evolving a new theory of diagnosis i.e. Homoeopathy which he has depicted in his epoch-making book "Organon". He has left a foot print on the sands of time through the philosophy of his work organon, the law of "Similiar Similinus Curenter" i.e. like cures like totality of symptoms and the Invisible Nature of Disease in the context of the study of a whole. He gave the law of minimum and the law of potentizattion of medicines to act as Dynamic power, which is dealt within Organon.

Disease is an invisible thing in Hahnemann's concepetion. It is a de-arrangement of the invisible vital force. To use a modern Simiia (similar) the symptoms constitute a moving picture like the figures on the screen of a cinema The vital and tangible part of the human body is the screen, the appearances and sensations of the diseased vital force are "Syptoms" and are analogous to the moving figures; but the operators producing the appearances are hidden from the audience. All the same, it is by locking on the screen that one can be able to defect the changes in the invisible life force in a way without going behind the screen. Hence the totality of symptoms' constitutes the disease as our sensus apprehend it. The academic name we give to it is a 'secondary matter'. As Hahnemann once said to a patient who asked him what disease was, and what he was going to give him, The name of your disease is no concern of mine and the name of the medicine I give is no concern of yours. The totality of the sign; paives and sensations as if, is for practical purposes, the concrete problem and less we trouble about the film and the light, the more clearly shall we able to follow the story discern our actual task.

We don't observe life but anly living beings. We can study the properties of a living organism and can, at best, differentiate them from those of non-living entities speculation about the essential nature of life belongs to the domain of metaphysics, whereas observation and systematisation of knowledge regarding the perceptible phenomena of life come under the field of science. We should not make confusion science of life with metaphysics of life. Hahnemann contends that as practical physicians, we are more concerned with the scientifica aspect of life; and that this condition of categories is the cause of failure in the are of the treatment. The chif source of complxity and difficulties in observing life-phenomena are due to the fact that life, though imgerceptible to our senses as life, always expresses itself through a material body. The result is that physicochemical phenomena are inseperahly mixed up with the vital noumena. All that it means is that both sets of phenomena and noumena exist together.

Hahnemann expressed in his work 'Organon', thus :

"In the healthy condition of man, the spiritual vital force (autocracy). the dynamic that animaterial body (organism), the rules with unbounded sway, and retains all the part of the organism in admirable harmonious, vital operation, as regards both sensations and functions, so that our indwelling, reason-gifted mind can freely employ this living, healthy instrument for the higher purposes of our existence."[10] "The material, organism, without the vital force, is capable of no sensation, no function, no self preservation, it derives all sensation and performs all the functions of life solely by means of the immaterial being (the vital force) which animates the material organism in health and in disease."[11]

Hahnemann observe one fundamental difference between a living and non-living body. The living body is endowed with sensations and functions and power of self-preservation (within certain limits) and reproduction.

Science is very much akin to materialism and its actions and reactions causes and effects and their impact on the environment; but if pondering with sufficient acumen and penetration, matter seems to be nothing but the experssion of spirit itself. It no longer remain a matter as ordinarily perceive by us. Here we want to make it more clear by taking recourse to the Vedantic conception of existence, consciousness (Satchidananda) in that spirit Matter loses its superficial meaning and it becomes as good as consciousness rather Matter, life, and mind are but different formations of that basic stuff of Satchidanada i.e. Existence. Existence is bliss in that respect the Universe is not a simple creation but a triple formulation of one Supreme Reality as Matter, Life and Mind. Each is as real as the other. The laws of nature and phenomenon of each category are as relatively valid as the other. Each plane of creating lends itself to the same method of scientific investigation. But there is a system of hierarchy in the scale of existence. Mind comes first, Life second, and the Matter lowest in the order.

He observed keenly that material substances used as medicine, which seems to be lifeless and spiritless; but it has the Dynamic spirit similar to the spirit of human being thrives into which has ascertained by Hahnemann by taking purin bark which produced Ague like fever. Again and again it has been proved by him in a healthy body, and found the same manifestation produced unnatural malady, and he (Hahnamann) came to the conclusion, the bark erradicates the suffering of the man, who would the symptoms or natural diseased manifestation similar to that. Material substance is the lowest order of Existence, has the dynamic spirit which cures the suffering virtually and dynamically. In this connection Hahnemann said—medicines could never care disease if they did not possess the power of altering man's state of health which depends on sensations and functions, indeed, that their curative power must be owing solely to this power they possess of altering man's state of health." "The spirit like power to alter man's state of health (and to cure diseases) which lies hidden in the inner nature of medicines can never be discovered by us a mere effort of reason, it is only by experience of the phenomena it plays when acting on the state of health of man that we can become clearly cognizent of it."

Hence it is obvious that the diseases excited by the dynamic and special influence of morbific injurious agents can originally be only dynamical (caused almost solely by a spiritual process) derangements of the vital character (principle) of our organism.

"We readily perceive that these dynamic derangements of vital character (vital principles) of our organism which we term diseases, since they are nothing also than altered sensations and functions; can also express themselves by nothing but by an aggregate of symptoms (totality of symptoms) and only as such are they cognizable to our observing power."[14] But Kant propogates that the noumena or the thing-in-itself is unknown and unknowable.

Hahnemann uses the word, 'spiritual' to qualify the phrase vital force', meaning thereby that the vital force is not perceptible to our senses and is therefore immaterial as opposed to sense perceptible matter. Hahnemann also said that it is only a metaphor and it is cognizable only by action which is actuated by intellectual energy. Hahnemann termed intellectual energy as 'soul' or vital-force. He said that it is the ignorance of a philosopher and scientist who have prided themselves on the cultivation of philosophy and medical science, not single step has been made towards an a—priori knowledge of the vitality of the bodily frame or of the intellactual energy (the soul) which actuate it. In this regard Hahnemann advised the wise teacher (Thinker or philosopher) to aware of this speculative ideas. Many medical thinkers are such who only value the conclusion based upon a-priori knowledge. One can understand the existence of supersensual realm but cannot perceive as matter. Disease force (except mechanical injury) is as spiritual as life force (vital-force), thus it could not be eradicated as material things. It should be eradicated dynamically by the process of phenomenal study (study of mental and physical symptoms) of noumenal existence (vital force) in the human organism, on the principle of 'Similia Similibus Curentur' [(drug which is already proved in healthy human body) and disease similarity]. Disease force is also noumena. It cannot be studied as Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics (because they are within the boundries of a-priori reasoning). Its (an a-priori) method is not psychophysical but on purely physical.

Hahnemann was a theist as well as scientist. For him God is not only the creator but does repair works whenever needed. Only tho e spiritualist physician can be the real healers who like God have real love for humanity thus Hahnemann was a spiritualist and a philospher of a eminence. He has given the philosophy of life of man kind.

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* Purvin is a plant. It is known as Cinchona (China) in the botany or in medical field. p. 478 (Lesser writings : S. F. Hahnemann).

** Ague fever—It is known as Malarial fever. It appears with chilliness and shivering (Bhargawa's Dictionary p. 23 & Lessers-writing's : S. F. Hahnemann, p, 523.

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4

Sprigge's Argument For Absolute Idealism

A. D. Naik

In his book *The Vindication of Absolute Idealism* Sprigge argues that reality is one mind-body complex which experiences itself as one all-inclusive whole. The argument is highly original and referishingly, brilliant. Sprigge in a novel manner combines his view with panpsychism. I am in great sympathy with his sort of absolute idealism. But here I shall be concerned with some possible objections to his argument for what he takes to be absolute idealism. At the end I shall briefly comment on panpsychism as it relates to his argument. 1. The main points on which the whole argument seems to rest is that (i) probably all actual relations are holistic, and (ii) probably all holistic relations are strongly holistic. A relation is holistic if it unites the terms into a greater whole. It is strongly holistic if the unity of the greater whole is such that the character of the whole suffuses every part such that no part could wholly retain the same character without that whole. (1983, p. 218)

It would follow then, as the main conclusion, that all physical things relate to form a larger whole and all psychic things relate to form a larger whole. It would also follow as part of the main conclusion that the physical whole would relate to the psychic whole to form a comprehensive whole. It could then be said that the psychic whole forms the inner filling of the physical whole so that reality is one mind-body complex which experiences itself as one all-inclusive whole.

The argument for relations being strongly holistic seems to rely on three examples, namely (i) spatial (ii) temporal an! (iii) experiential. (1983, p. 220) The former two are basic to all physical objects. The latter two are basic to psychic objects. The physical and the psychic are the only kinds of concrete objects. Thus since all physical objects possess spatio-temporal properties they will be strongly holistically related. Since all psychic objects will be temporally and psychically related they will be strongly holistically related. All relations then will be strongly holistic. The psychic whole will then form the inner filling of the physical whole since the two wholes will be strongly holistically related. Consider my reconstruction of Sprigge's examples.

(i) If a cup is placed on a saucer it forms a relational whole of the sort called cup-on-saucer. The cup-on-top is one aspect of the relation and saucer-beneath another. A change in the spatial relation will result in a different relational whole. If the saucer is placed on top of the cup a relational whole of the sort saucer on-cup is formed. (1983, p. 194) In each case the character of the whole suffuses the parts. For they are part of a differently shaped object. But the shape of the cup or the saucer does not change. In the first case, so we might suggest in an effort to clarify Sprigge's idea, the shape is a sort of flower, the cup being the bud and the saucer the leaves, in the second case it is a sort of face with a hat, the cup being the face and the saucer a hat. The parts do not seem to undergo any physical change. The parts do not change their essence. The change of position does not change the possibility of arranging cup and saucer so that the cup can be used to drink tea and the saucer to hold the cup in. But in the two cases each part makes up a different spatial part as determined by the shape of the differing whole.

(ii) Several musical notes succeeding each other in time result in a melody. If the temporal order of the notes is changed a different melody results. Do re-me-fa-so-la-ti-do, the simple one we all begin with for example is a different melody from do-ti-la-so-fa-me-re do. The notes in both cases are the same. But the notes themselves in the two cases will be suffused with different melodies. The melody is a temporal whole. Note however it is the different temporal order of the notes that gives a different melody.

(iii) One is basically a continuous consciousness, experienced as such, which is full of phases which are suffused with the consciousness which one is. If the phases of the flow of experience were not suffused with a single consciousness as an experiential whole they would be outside the flow of experience and so not experienced at all.

If the predecessor to an experienced consciousness and its successor were numerically different experiences than even though a given experience of consciousness emerges from its predecessor and merges into its successor, there would be no continuity in the experience of consciousness. For all three will be numerically different rather than numerically identical. But than each succeeding experience would have no consciousness of its emergences from the previous one nor would it be conscious of its merger into the next. We thus have to conceive of a larger whole of which the predecessor and successor to a given experience of consciousness are integral phases, which the whole, a numerically continuous but cumulatively expanding experience of consciousness, suffuses. This must be a numerically identical consciousness. (1983, pp. 6-9, p. 217)

(iv) It can than be concluded that if all relations are strongly holistic, as the above three examples suggest, then not only do the totality of physical things form a whole but the totality of psychic things also form a whole. For the most important strongly holistic relation is that of belonging together in a single experiential whole. (1983, p. 198) The whole of physical things then unites with the whole of physical things than unites with the whole of psychic things, and the psychic whole forms the inner filling of the physical whole. Together they become one all inclusive whole. (1983, pp. 215-216, pp. 223-224)

2. (i) If there is a general argument apart from the use of the three examples above showing that a relation by its nature is strongly holistic it is not to be found in the book. Such an argument must show that a relation as a matter of logical truth is strongly holistic. Perhaps such an argument would have to utilize the relations of difference and identity and show that since these basic relations are strongly holistic, all relations necessarily are since all others are logically dependent on them. Or one may perhaps argue that there is a basic conceptual contrast which forms a whole from which all conceptual contrasts are derivable. Or one might try and find a necessarily self-referring strongly holistic truth from which all truths are derivable as only being strongly holistic.

(ii) To say that what is meant by a relation is something which connects the terms and thereby unites them into a larger existent is, it seems to me, no argument. For the logical relations of difference and negation, and the ontological relation of separatjon seem not of this kind, for they seem to disconnect the terms or objects. It could be said that difference is always in terms of qualities, and these whether affinities or contrasts may be holistic. A room decorated with shades of blue will form an aesthetic whole and so will a room full of shades of black and white. But as already stated the logical relations of negation and difference do not seem to be holistic. Nor does the ontological relation of separation. Even the basic relation of conjunction in logic is conceived non-holistically. It might even be argued that since logical relations hold between all objects and form the basic structure of the world all objects in the world are non-holistically related.

3. All relations do not seem to be holistic nor strongly holistic, and they do not seem to generate a larger whole of the same kind (in this case a self-conscious kind), as Sprigge's argument requires. Consider the following example.

The members of the Aristotlelian Society form a larger existent, a whole of interacting parts for the society is not an aggregate or collection. (1983, p. 145) In my pocket is an aggregate of things, a knife a comb, keys, coins bubble gums and a pen. They do not from a larger whole in virtue of being in my pocket. The relation here is non-holistic.

The parts of the Aristotlelian Society are self-conscious beings but the whole, which is not an aggregate of things as the contents of my pocket are, is not a self conscious being nor therefore is there a self-consciousness which suffuses the parts. Whereas if the relation were to be strongly holistic the whole would itself be a self-consciousness suffusing the parts.

In so far as the members imbibe the values of the society the value-whole suffuses the parts. But this is a matter of degree and some may be members without imbibing most of the values. Yet the society is not an aggregate, despite the possibility of Britain having been occupied by the Nazis had the Aristotlelian Society been infilterated by members with opposite values during the second world war. Moreover the values would not turn the whole into a self-conscious one.

If the whole is not necessarily self-conscious but suffuses the parts then how do different finite centres of experience form a greater centre of experience ? The whole even in the case of strongly holistic relations need not be of the same kind as the parts.

It may not only be not of the same kind it may be larger and qualitatively superior For isn't the whole that is of the sort formed by the Aristotlelian Society of a superior quality because it is itself non-psychic ? For it is a society in which all are freely bound by the same strong rules which allows maximum freedom of thought generrating greater quantity of superior quality work. The Aristotlelian Society is a better philosopher than God. Perhaps it is the essence of holistic relations that in some cases it generates larger existents of the same kind while in others it generates wholes of a different generic kind.

4. There are possible counter examples to the three examples in 1. All (i) spatial, (ii) temporal and (iii) experiential relations do not seem to be holistic and consequently strongly holistic.

(i) If three cubic objects x, y and z are placed a few inches apart in a straight line on a table they are related by the spatial relation 'next to'. But the relation is neither holistic nor strongly holistic. For the three objects do not from a larger existent nor therefore one which suffuses the parts. y is between x and z. The three termed relation between does not unite the three objects into a larger whole. They form a single spatial whole with the table but not with each other. If they are placed side by side touching each other they seem to form one perceptible thing. In this case 'next to' generates a whole but in the former it does not. The same spatial relation is in one case holistic and in the other not. If one is put on top of another then the three form a tower. A whole is generated by the spatial relation 'on top'. The relation in this case is holistic but not in the case where they are separate and next to each other.

If every relation is strongly holistic then any two stars must form a larger whole. It is hard to see how a star millions of light years away forms a larger existent with the star that is our sun. They do not form one star or any other kind of larger physical object though both may be part of the same galaxy.

(ii) World War II was an event which can be thought of as a whole comprised of inumerable smaller part-events such as the Battle of Britain and the Normandy invasion. But it is difficult to see how events further off in time from each other can form a whole even if they are parts of a chain of possible necessary events. Without the Greek triumph in the Greco-Persian wars the future of the world perhaps would have been considerably different. But these wars and World War II do not form a larger war-event. We might think of them as contributing to a larger non-war event. But if the relation between all actual things is holistic then any two objects must form a larger whole apart from other much larger wholes that the two may be part of It does not help to say that all wars are phases of one perpetual war for the survival of civilization. For it is these two wars, World War II and the Greco-Persian wars, that must form a larger war or some other kind of particular larger event by themselves aside from being phases of a perpetual war for the survival of civilization.

(iii) Experiences of mine from the distant past do not form a whole along with present experiences though they determine present ones and though there is a continuity of consciousness from the past to the present. Memories are contingent present occurrences and come to us haphazardly. At a given moment consciousness is not always a smooth transition from the past to the future but sometimes it is a groping forward with a lot of halts and backward steps. Each moment consciousness is not a larger cumulatively comprehensive coherent growth as the argument requires since each relation is supposed to be holistic. The truth is that the contents of consciuousness gather and dispel haphazardly at each stage.

To these counter examples it is possible for Sprigge to claim that holistic relations have unnoticed features or that our ordinary ways of thinking about them are defective. However Sprigge cannot claim that such features are beyond human perception. To any perceptive individual who makes the effort the features must be visible. The counter examples show that even for the perceptive individual the holistic features are not visible. If the holistic features are in principle beyond human perception they are of no value to us. They may as well not be. If they suffuse the parts they should be perceptible.

5. Sprigge's argument is based either on the premiss that all relations are holistic or that only some are holistic. If the former then the counter examples in 4 and the consideration of logical relations may refute the argument. If the argument is not based on this premiss then a specific argument is required to the effect that finite centres of experience add up to a greater single centre. But in either case my first example in 3 shows that finite self-conscious beings do not seem to add up to a greater self-conscious being.

6. One may object that the whole formed between any two objects does not have to be of the same generic sort. Thus the whole that unites two physical objects is not necessarily a perceptible physical object. What unites any two physical objects into a larger existent may simply be that some mind is experiencing them as a unit, but this may have no bearing on their status as genuine units in the visible world. This leaves room for objects very unlike each other and even contradictories to be holistically related. (1983, p. 145) But on the same grounds then the finite psychic centres may form a generically different larger whole, which is superlative but non-psychic.

Further if the all-inclusive whole is really the central experience alone which suffuses all things, then the totality of physical things may not form a single physical whole. But then the world may be constituted of a multiplicity of independent physical things each of which individually may have its own psychic centre. But this is an atomistic form of panpsychism. How can the all-consummating experience suffuse them all without turning them into one physical whole ? If it is transcendent to them then it my not turn them into a larger visible whole, but as immanent it presumably must.

7. Sprigge seems to argue for the possibility of a comprehensive experience rather than its actuality or even necessary actuality. For he does not argue that all relations are actually holistic but are probably so. If all relations are not necessarily holistic then they are contingently holistic. But then the relation between finite centres of experience and the centre which includes all finite centres in one is contingent. In that case either it may not exist or if it does it could cease to be. How is it then possible to argue that only some relations are necessarily holistic ? What argument can there be then that finite centres necessarily unite into one centre of experience ?

8. Sprigge's argument is from an emprirical standpoint. It is from an inductive standpoint. But arguments from an empirical-inductive standpoint are in principle incapable of showing that an experiential whole necessarily exists. It may show that it is possible. But then since the idea of a comprehensive experience is not self-contradictory it is a possibility anyway. Infaet any such procedure could add up finite centres only into a larger finite centre never an infinite or comprehensive centre.

Nor does Sprigge argue that more than one comprehensive experience is impossible. It may be that there is one self-existent material substance containing an infinity of comprehensive experiential centres each with a non-trivial unique perspective such that they all complement each other and influence each other but do not form a single most comprehensive centre.

9. Cannot there be two sorts of strongly holistic relations, contingent and necessary ? In the case of contingent ones the whole suffuses the parts but the parts could have formed a different whole and still that different whole would have suffused those very parts. In the case of necessary ones not only is it that the whole suffuses the parts but the parts could not have formed another whole than the one it did.

10. Why is it not possible for any one part to suffuse every other part and the whole ? Why is it that only the whole suffuses the parts ? The character of one of the proper parts of a whole can suffuse the whole while still remaining just one of several parts without being or becoming the whole it is a part of. At a given moment the state of my consciousness is determined by the part that dominates it. What may be a peripheral content of consciousnes may become focal and permeate the entire consciousness as when background emotion

may suddenly permeate one's entire consciousness. But in this case the part does not become that whole nor another whole nor does the whole become the part. Similarly the finite consciousness may suffuse and experience the comprehensive consciousness without becoming it or the comprehensive consciousness becoming the finite consciousness If so defining a strongly holistic relation as one in which the whole generated permeates the parts is insufficient to distinguish whole from part. It does not give us a necessary or unique characteristic of a whole.

11. There seem to be purely destructive relations in the world, and perhaps there has to be if the world of empiricisty and contingency has to be at all. There are relational activities and processes which destroy wholes rather than sustaining or building them. If all relations were stronly holistic there wouldn't be purely destructive relations. Even if actual destructive relations contribute to the formation of larger wholes by allowing new stronger foundations in place of unsound ones they are not in themselves part of larger wholes.

Still while dividing and separating are cases of destroying a given whole they perhaps involve reducing wholes to their constituents parts as wholes- There is reduction to lesser wholes, more dependent wholes. So paradoxically all relations may form wholes but not necessarily be holistic and form larger wholes. By holistic we must then perhaps mean the formation of wholes larger or smaller. Perhaps every relation though not actually holistic has then a tendency or impulse towards holism, including perhaps even the relations of difference and separation.

12. (i) In chapter 6 it is stated that the argument for a monism which unites the totality of physical things and the totality of psychic things based on the argument that all relations are strongly holistic is independent of the argument for panpsychism. (1983, p. 252) But the totality of physical things may unite with the totality of psychic things to form one physical thing in such a way that not all physical things have a psychic centre, only some do which form a whole that is locatable in some one region. For without a sort of brain no psychic existence is possible. Thus the argument based on strongly holistic relations requires the argument establishing panpsychism if the whole is supposed to be such that within each physical thing is a phychic centre no matter how primitive.

(ii) All physical things form a spatial whole. All experiential wholes form a psychic whole. Both are also temporal wholes. But the temporal whole is common to both. It is the temporal whole which then unites both into one all-inclusive whole. This premiss seems to be missing from Sprigge's argument. The temporal whole need not be intepreted as being constituted of successive phases, it may be taken as a comprehensive present, though I do not think this is intelligible in the end. For it implies that the totality of events, including contradictory ones are actual simultaneously in the same present. (1983, pp. 30-33, pp. 238-239)

13. In defense of strongly holistic relations we may however perhaps use the following general argument. A relation between more than one term inheres in each of the terms and beyond them as well. For if it inhered only in its terms it would not connect the terms. Take a pictorial analogy. Let two poles standing apart stand for terms. Let a rope tied between the two stand for a relation. The rope has part of its being around each pole and part between and beyond both. Similarly a relation has part of its being in each term and part beyond them. If a relation had its being only in the terms it would be like the two poles having a rope tied around each but not connected together. And if the being of the relation were wholly beyond the terms it would be like a rope not tied to either pole hanging in mid air between the poles. But does the rope turn the two poles as tied together into a third object ? Perhaps it does. For now we have possibly what functions as a net over which we can volly our tennis ball or badminton shuttle, or perhaps it is a construction for high jumps. But the rope then is an instrument of creation in which it is part of a larger existent itself and shares in the characteristic of the whole i. e. the net-like thing. It has generated a whole of which it is itself a part and shares in the character of the whole. A relation by nature seems strongly holistic.

Still as some of my considerations to Sprigge's argument indicate, it is hard to see how one can claim to have established that all relations are strongly holistic. It may simply be that while some are strongly holistic the rest only have a tendency towards holism.

Sprigge, T. 1983 : *The Vindication of Absolute Idealism.* Edinburgh : University of Edinburgh Press.

5

The Place of Morality in Karma Yoga

P. Srinivasa Rao

Karma means action. Yoga means the union with the divine or evenness of mind of skilfull action. On the whole karmayoga means the skilfull performance of action or the actions performed with the evenness of mind. Almost all Indian philosophers observe that ignorance is the root cause for bondage and to overcome such ignorance is the ultimate aim of the individual. Jnana and Bhakti yogas are suggested as the means for liberation or to overcome ignorance. But a common aspirant can not follow Bhakti and Jnana yogas at the very instance. He has to train his mind to be able to receive both Bhakti and Jnana yogas.

Karma which generally means action is of four types viz. obligatory deeds, voluntary, deeds optional deeds and prohibited deeds. Obligatory deeds are the actions to be performed daily and they are determined by the inner self of the being. Voluntary deeds are the actions performed voluntarily without the interference of mind or will. For example the reactions of the physical organisms to the natural impulses. Some philosophers feel that even in voluntary actions the agent entertains the freedom of choice. Actions performed to get any desired result or the actions having desire as an end are called optional deeds. Prohibitary deeds are the actions which are abandoned in view of the well-being of the beings.

Whatever action may be, entertains a motive either the motive may be egoistic or non-egoistic. So also every action gives rise to certain consequences desired or not desired. The quality of action from the point of moral values is to be judged on the basis of the observance of both means and ends. The motive arises in the mind. The mind through the sense organs collects the sensations, analyses them and passes the judgements which motivate the actions. The quality of the motive depends upon the quality of mind. The mental structure differs from man to man. Indian philosophers believe that the mind is constituted of three gunas viz. Sattva, rajas and tamas. One of the three gunas dominates the other two and determines the quality of the mind. The quality of the action depends upon the quality of the mind from which it receives instruction. The value of action depends upon the consequences produced by that particular action besides its quality.

Any action whatever it may be in general develops attachment in the mind obscuring its discriminative power. The obscuration of the discriminative power results in ignorance and develops ego sense and the actions become egoistic. The egoistic actions cause much misery because when an action is egoistic the agent or the performer of the action with over-confidence expects more and when his expection or desire fails to be fulfilled he becomes disappointed and feels as if he were in bondage. Metaphysically the self is pure and non doer. But its associalion with the physical body is often misunderstood by the individual due to ignorance and drags the soul into bondage whose nature is free. Either in metaphysical or in emperical fields ignorance is the root cause for all miseries. Removal of the ignorance liberates one from all miseries. Jnana Yoga and Bhakti yoga are believed to be the best means for liberation and a common aspirant cannot follow these paths at the very instance. For both Jnana and Bhakti yogas, a disciplined mind is necessary.

A common man in day-to-day life cannot remain silent without performing actions in order to avoid attachment, the root cause for ignorance and egosense. His very nature tempts him to act. To make an aspirant fit for the spiritual development karma-yoga is suggested by philosophers. Here the aspirant while performing the actions purifies his mind and develops his spirituality.

Here we have to observe the moral significance of the karma-yoga. The fundamental problem is, is man free to choose his actions from the ethical point. He is free to choose his actions, other wise he cannot be held responsible for his actions and at the same time he becomes an escapist. But he is not completely free, all his actions are determined by his own innerself. He is answerable to his innate nature or svabhava. Besides the free choice man should possess the knowledge of good and evil and this depends upon the motives and consequences.

When life is full of activity none can perform all actions and thus needed the observance of certain codes of conduct and also division of labour. Ancient philosophers as a first step divided society into four social orders viz. Brahmana, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra. Each class thus classified was prescribed to observe certain moral principles and duties. This classification is not final. Again the life of the individual is classified into four groups viz. Brahmacharya, Grihasta, Vanaprasta and Sanyasa. The individual has to observe the duties of that particular stage.

At the brahmacharya stage individual has to observe certain moral disciplines and equip himself with knowledge in order to become qualified for further leap. Grihasta is the next stage. Here the individual marries a girl and leads the life of householder. At this stage he has to serve his parents, hold all the responsibilities of family, show reverence to elders and become a good host to the guests. This stage is a critical stage and it is the stage of karma yoga; The individual should not relinquish his duties. It is a chance for him to build up his moral character. He has to help the dependents viz. brahmacharis and sanyasis. The next stage is vanaprasta. Here after fulfilling the duties of the householder and enjoying all sorts of pleasures, the individual develops urge for liberation. He becomes somewhat detaches and tries to work disinterestedly. He also tries to realise the divinity in all. At the end of this stage he becomes a perfect disinterested worker. Sanyasa is the lost stage of life. Here the feeling of renunciation is much. The egosense is destroyed and the aspirant becomes a true sanyasi not in the sense of relinquishing all the duties or becoming an idle man but relinquishes the ego desires and works as a social worker. He receives both suffering and joy with equal feeling. He finds equality in all beings, in all things and in all works.

Gita's karma-yoga gives us a more detailed picture of the philosophy of karmn-yoga. Gitacharya observes that none can sit idle, the nature of the being tempts to act, due to the ignorance man falsely identifying himself with the nodes of Prakriti becomes egoistic. So long as he is egoistic he can not come out of miseries. Every body is free to act but at the same time he should not hope for results, as the hope is the main cause for suffering. As a first step Gitacharya demands us to follow svadharma dictated by the inner-svabhava. To have a clear picture of svadharma, Sri Krishna classifies the society into four social orders viz. Brahmana, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra on the basis of the theory of Gunas.

As already noted the character of the being is influenced and determined by the prakritic gunas viz. Sattva rajas and tamas and the actions which are the expressions of character are also coloured by the gunas. In Brahmanas, Sattva guna predominates and makes him to observe the duties of serenity, calm, peace, learning and preaching. Rajas the symbol of activity or emotion overwhelms in Kshatriyas and they have to observe battle craft, defending the people from internal and external dangers and governing the people-as the dictates of their own svabhava. Rajas and tamas conjointly influence the character of Vaisyas and prepare them to follow cattle rearing, agriculture and trade as their svadharma. Tamas the symbol of dullness is the chief quality of Sudra and the principle duty of Sudras is to serve or attend the needs of all others. Thus the duties prescribed are called svadharma, karma yogi in order to perfect himself has to follow the duties ordained by his station and the stage of life as a preliminary step.

The observance of Svadharma is mainly intended to check the survival of the fittest and also to substitute the division of labour. Here there is no complete check for the survival of the fittest. The ethical development of the individual progresses with the observance of svadharma and it is partial. The ego self in individual still persists due to the attachment produced by actions and their results. Hence Gita introduces the concept of Nishkama-karma into Karma yoga as the best alternative. Nishkama-karma means to perform the duties disinterestedly. Desire is the root cause for all miseries and moral degeneration. For example a poor man with a weak mind. after the observation of pleasures enjoyed by his fellow-mates for a long time desires those pleasures for himself also. To appease his desire of seeking such pleasures he tries to earn the money which is needed by a right means first, but when he could not, he adopts even the evil means and faces much troubles. The desire for pleasures make him to suffer and degrade himself morally. When there is no desire for any thing there cannot be any binding tie or misery. Disinterested action if properly understood and followed purifies the mind and heart of the aspirant, removes the ego feelings and develops universal perspective.

But it is not possible to act disinterestedly in absolute sense because there is no action which is not motivated. That is the reason why desire or kama is included in the purusharthas. Sri Aurobindo in his Essays on Gita observes that disinterested does not mean completely desireless but the replacement of lower impulses by higher impulses or a leap from individual good to social good. One has to cultivate the habit of working for the benefit of his fellow beings in order to overcome the feeling of I and mine or ego self. Here also the Karma yogi faces a difficulty, as the attachment to the good result makes him to suffer when the result is adverse though the motive is good. For example a devoted and good mannered doctor who uses all his efforts to save a patient in danger, when he fails to save that patient suffers from the mental agony which in unimaginable. His motive is good, his work is self-less but he suffers due to the attachment to the good result. The repetition of such instances may make him to relinquish his duties which in turn leads to the moral degeneration of his profession and also cause the patients to suffer who are in need of his services. Swami Vivekananda observes that the results either good or bad born of the attachment produce impressions on mind and lead to suffering. Hence every action should be performed with the feeling of detachment.

But a common aspirant cannot work detachedly as his mind is under the spell of desires, and prakritic gunas. Gitacharya in order to solve this riddle introduces Divine—determinism into Karma—yoga which demands each of us to work as the instrument of Divine, leaving the results to God. In the opinion of Krishna every work, every thing, every being—all are divine. Working as a divine instrument we are loosing nothing of our freedom. While working as the divine instrument the aspirant slowly realises the divinity every where and develops universal vision. He at the end becomes completely detached which is the highest goal of karma-yoga. Then the perfect Karma-yogin attaining the highest mental perfection sees everything with an equal feeling. A Karma-yogin is he who follows svadharma as a divine instrument disinterestedly and detachedly.

The moral significance of Karma-yoga will become clear if we compare it to the Plato's philosophy, Kants "categorical imperative" and Bradley's my station and its duties".

On observing the evils of society Plato thought of an ideal state on the basis of the nature of the individual. Plato observes that every individual has three parts viz. Rational, emotional and appetite. The influence of these parts varies in degrees in individuals. These three parts have to work in a harmonious way for the well-being of the individual. On the basis of the influence of these parts Plato classifies society into three classes viz. guardians or philosophers, soldiers and workers. In the guardians the rational element predominates and are self-less workers. They govern the state. Emotional element, predominates in Soldiers and they defend the state from internal and external dangers. Apetitise element over whelms in workers and they perform the remaining duties. All have to work in a harmonious way for the well being of the State. This conception of ideal state resembles the Gita's theory of gunas, but the difference is that Gita classifies society into four classes where as Plato into three. Kant's doctrine of categorical imperative' somewhat resembles the Svadharma and "Niskamakarma" of Karma-yogas of Gita. According to Kant moral laws are absolute and they should be followed without any hesitation. Man has to perform his duties without hoping for any result. He has no exception. Gita also speaks of desireless-action and also shows the way how to follow it but whereas Kant has not given any rational explanation. Gita does not want the doer to follow the duties blindly. F. H. Bradley dissatisfied with the existing theories formulated his own theory on the spitirual basis. According to him individual has to realise himself with a universal vision. He observes that Every individual has his own station of life and that particular station prescribes him certain duties. These duties are to be followed with a universal perspective for the harmonious functioning of the society. Following the duties of his own station individual can realise his true nature and also his proper place in the society. He can not see himself apart from the society. But Bradley fails to give an explanation as to how one has to realise his station whereas the Gita passes its theory of svadharm on guna theory.

Karma-yoga is prescribed for the moral discipline of the aspirant. Some people in their enthusiasm to achieve liberation relinquish their duties and sit idle in excluded place and fail to get liberation. But it is all due to ignorance. None can sit in-active. Besides human being is a rational and social-being. He has to work for his well-being and also for the well-being of the society. Without the Purification of mind one can not attain liberation. In order to purify his mind he has to perform actions and step by step cultivate the habit of performing disinterested actions. These disinterested actions not only purify the mind, help the aspirant to see him in all and all in him; At that stage he can attain knowledge and get liberated himself from the clutches of ignorance. Karma-yoga with its ideals of disinterested action and Svadharma develops the morality of the being which is needed for the spiritual development of the beings and the society. Thus Karma-yoga though the preparatory stage for liberation holds its moral significance and occupies a proper place in moral philosohoy.

Karma yoga with the introduction of theistic element shows how to perform disinterested action in order to overcome ego self and to develop the moral behaviour among the beings with a rational and spiritual outlooks.

6

The Beginning of Sorrows: The Ecological Crisis and the Prospects of Human Survival

Joseph Wayne Smita

> "For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom: and there shall be famines, and pestilences, and earthquakes, in divers places. All these *are* the beginning of sorrows".
> (Matthew 24 : 7-8)

1. The Crisis

It is the aim of this paper to discuss the philosophical significance of the global environmental crisis. It is not my intention to review primary scientific, empirical or physical evidence here. Rather, I wish to take as my point of departure the conclusions of a number of books and articles which indicate that our whole planet is in crisis and that human civilisation may well perish. From this starting point I will then comment upon the philosophical significance of our conjectured impending doom.

P and A Ehrlich in their book *The Population Explosion*[1] point out that the world's population was 5.3 billion (at the time that they wrote their book) and rising. Each year there are 95 million more mouths to feed, hundreds of billions fewer tons of topsoil and hundreds of trillions fewer gallons of ground water, then the world had in 1968 The slowdown of the annual growth rate of around 2.1 percent in the early 1960s to around 1.8 percent in 1990, has only meant that the doubling of world population has gone from 33 years to 39 years. If death rates don't rise from global ecological collapse, the world's population will *expand* at a *decreasing* rate for another century. This occurs in a world where eco-systems *may* be approaching ecological limits for food production, regardless of technological innovation.

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[1] P. R. Ehrlich and A. H. Ehrlich, *The Population Explosion*, (Simon and Schuster, Brookvale, NSW. 1990).

Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute is of this opinion. He notes that Japanese farmers, who are scientifically oriented and have access to the world's cheapest capital, were only able to increase rice yields by 0.9 percent per year since 1970. The ecological limits of food production are set by water and soil It is the problem of erosion, and with water it is the problem of falling water tables. Brown up sums his position as follows :

> "......at a time when demand for various biological products is rising rapidly, the earth's biological production is shrinking. The even greater annual additions to world population in prospect for the nineties will further reduce the earth's ability to supply our food and raw materials. These two trends cannot continue indefinitely. At some point, the continuing decline in the photosynthetic product will translate into a decline in the economic product."[2]

The Ehrlichs' predictably, are even more pessimistic :

> "...starvation and epidemic disease will raise death rates over most of the planet...social problems will proliferate with population growth, and that democracy as a form of government will be at risk. A recent study by former Ambassador Marshall Green and Patricia Barnett compared measures of population pressures and the political stability of nations. They found that, in general, rapid population growth, particularly in notions with sharp ethnic divisions, 'places enormous strain on political institutions.' It threatens political stability by promoting rapid urbanization, increasing the proportion of youths in the population, and expanding labor forces more rapidly than jobs are created. The study found that 'only a handful of countries with serious demographic pressures managed to maintain stable constitutional governments with good records on civil and political rights't'[3].

The socio-political consequences are also immense :

> "Even if largescale war can be avoided, it seems likely that regional conflicts will become more frequent as disputes over

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[2] L. R. Brown, "The Illusion of Progress", in L. R. Brown (et al), *State of the World 1990*, (W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1990), pp. 3-16. Citation, p. 7.

[3] Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op cit note 1, p. 138; S. Camp (ed.), *Population Pressures—Threat to Democracy*, (Population Crisis Committee, Washington D. C., 1989).

> land, dwindling water and energy sources, environmental refugees, and 'who's to blame' become more frequent......... The changes in our environment see over the last fifty years will be dwarfed by those of the next fifty, and those changes are likely to be accompanied by an enormous rise in death rates. ...... The deaths of many hundreds of millions of people in famines, for example, will present utterly unprecedented problems—especially when the nations in which they are dying have the capability of threatening nuclear terrorism. ......The Whimper thus could lead to a collapse of civilisation just as surely as the Bang. Populations of human beings could be greatly reduced, and national governments could be so weakened that they would be replaced by something resembling feudalism with a strong overlay of tribalism. Large cities with ethnically mixed populations could suffer fates similar to that of Beirut."[4]

The apocalytic view of the Ehrlichs has been more recently stated by Robert Kaplan in an article in February 1994 edition of *The Atlantic Monthly*. Kaplan's preview of the first decades of the Twenty-First Century reads like a survivalist's nightmare:

> "Nations break up under the tidal flow of refugees from environmetal and social disaster. As borders crumble, another type of boundary is erected—a wall of disease. Wars are fought over scarce resources, especially water, and war itself becomes continuous with crime, as armed bands of stateless marauders clash with the private security forces of the elites."[5]

The idea the ecological stress will contribute to social instability and civil strife is a position accepted by Homer-Dixon (et al) in their February 1993 article in *Scientific American*[6], by Paul Kennedy in *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*[7] and by Garrett Hardin in *Living Within Limits*[8].

The eco-apocalyptic view is not peculiar merely to the writers mentioned. In November 1992 1575 scientists, including 100 Nobel

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[4] ibid. pp. 179-180.

[5] Cover, *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994; R. D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1994, pp. 44-76.

[6] T. F Homer-Dixon J. H. Boutwell and G. W. Rathjens, "Environmental Change and Violent Conflict". *Scientific American*, February 1993, pp. 38-45

[7] P. Kennedy, *Preparing for the twenty-First Century*, (Random House, New York, 1993)

[8] G. Hardin, *Living Within Limits : Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos*, (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1993).

Prize winners' released a "Doomsday Alert". They warned that if exponential population growth and threats to the Earth's atmosphere, oceans and fish, water resources, soil, forests and living species did not stop, and if responsible steward ship of the Earth did not occur, then the global environment would be irretrievably mutilated by the year 2030. One of the worlds' leading soil scientists, Dr Marc Latham, director-general of the International Board for Soil Research and Management, stated in his visit to Australia in February 1994, that if the Asia-Pacific region and the world cannot overcome land and water degradation, then the decay of food supplies, pollution of city water, urban migration, goods of environmental refugees, political destabilisation and even war may occur.[9]

2. The Philosophical Dimensions

Therefore various philosophical questions raised by a confrontation with ecoapocalytic arguments. Would it in fact be a morally good thing for human kind to disappear from the face of the Earth ? What does "morally good" mean in this context ? Is there a spurt of moral value distinct from that of humans and their evaluations ? Deep ecologists believe that there is, and that traditional ethics is "speciesist" because of its discriminatory view of the value of humans over other animals and eco-systems. One could argue from a deep ecological position that the extinction of human beings would be a good thing for nature. But such a debate, although of technical interest is of little practical relevance. The scenarious contemplated above for the demise of human kind would disturb the whole biosphere exterminating many other species.[10] It is hardly likely that human kind could be utterly removed from the Earth without in turn devastating nature. So having said this, I will assume that the extinction of the human race, or even a large part of it is a bad thing. However it does not follow from this, that all of those projected to exist in the future, can or should be saved. With expanding populations and the declining quality of biophysical resources, there will exist a point of crash where human population growth outstrips existing ecological resources. This will be a time of great dying. We cannot conclude that the human species itself will be extinguished—although the evolutionary record documents that in the very long run all species are dead—but we can conclude that hundreds of millions of people will die and political instability will occur as a result of the alleged eco apocalypse.

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[9] J. Cribb, "Science Leader Warns of Disaster", *The Australian*, February 18, 1994, p. 2.

[10] B. Medlin, *Human Nature Human Survival*, (Board of Research, The Flinders University of South Australia, 1992), pp. 22-23.

I suggest that the environmental crisis illust rates the bankruptcy of a number of metaphysicl and political ideologies, some of which have been with us for a long time, and others, for not such a long time. John Carroll in his provocative book *Humanism : The Wreck of Western Culture*[11] begins his trealise with these powerful words :

> "We live amidst the ruins of the great, five-hundred-year epoch of Humanism. Around us is that 'colossal wreck'. Our culture is a flat expanse of rubble. It hardly offers shelter from a mild cosmic breeze, never mind one of those icy gales that regularly return to rip men out of the cosy intimacy of their daily lives and confront them with oblivion. Is it surprising that we are run down ? We are desperate, yet we don't care much any more. We are timid, yet we cannot be shocked. We are inert underneath our business. We are destitute in our plenty. We are homeless in our own homes
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> What should there be to hold our hands, is not. Our culture is gone. It has left us terribly alone. In its devastation it cannot even mock us any more, sneer at the lost child whimpering for its mother. That stage too is over. Our culture is past cruelty. It is wrecked. It is dead."[12]

The myth that has failed in Carroll's opinion is the humanist attempt to replace God bv man, to place man at the centre of the universe. Pico della Mirandola in 1416 expressed this belief simply as: "We can become what we will". Humans can create themselves as they choose. Carroll attempts to show in his book that the humanist program was doomed from the beginning containing within its heart the seeds of its own destruction. Carroll's approach is based on a "history of ideas" analysis, but I believe that a simpler, more conclusive refutation of humanism is delivered by eco-apocalyptic considerations.

Humanism and liberalism view human nature as not fixed, but changing and changeable, with an infinite pontial for "good" development and that there is nothing intrinsic to human nature that would prevent the achievement of the "good society". Humanism and liberalism are forms of rationalism, maintaining that reason and science without an appeal to tradition and culture are sufficient for understanding the world. Humanists and liberals are the enemies of authority: prejudice and tradition. They are believers in progress and are hisiorical optimists. As there is nothing intrinsic to human nature to prevent the achievement of the good society, the obstacles can only be ignorance or bad social institutions. There are no social or political problems for which there are no solutions at all. The humanist liberal concept of equality, with its opposition to political, economic or social distinctions based on race, colour or religion, leads to internationalism as James Burnham in his *Suicide of the West* explains :

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[11] J. Carroll, *Humanism : The Wreck of Western Culture*, (Fontana Press, London, 1993).

[12] ibid, p. 1.

> Modern liberal doctrine tends naturally toward internationalist conceptions and the idea of a democratic world order based through one mode or another on the majority will of all mankind. The logic of the liberal principle units with the normal bias of liberal temperament to incline modern libera s favourably toward ideas, movements and organisations that can be thought of as steps toward world cooperation, federalism, unification and government : world courts, world league of nations; worldwide cultural exchanges; world congresses and parliament; world conventions and committees. To the liberal it has become self-evident that 'national sovereignty is an outworn concept' that mut be drastically modified if not altogether abandoned."[13]

Ecological considerations have naturally enough led internationalists to appeal for the creation of a world government or a world federation to solve so-called environmental problems. But as Garrett Hardin has noted, there is no reason at all to believe that *globalizing* these problems will lead to their solution. He has said :

> "...let's look at the potholes in the streets. There are potholes all over the civilized world, but is that any reason for setting up a global pothole authority to fix our potholes ? Would the pothole in your street be filled sooner if we globalized the problem ?
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> The moral is surely obvious : *never globalize a problem if it can possibly be solved locally*. It may be chic but it is not wise to tack the adjective *global* onto the names of problems that are *merely widespread* -for example' 'global hungery, 'global poverty', and 'the global population problem'.
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> We will make no progress with population problems, which are a root cause of both hunger and poverty, until we deglobalize them. Populations, like potholes, are produced locally, and, unlike atmospheric pollution, remain local—unless some

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13 J. Burnham. *Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism*, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1965), p. 79.

14 G. Hardin, "There is No *Global* Population Problem", *The Humanist*, vol. 49, no. 4, July/August 1989, pp. 11-13, 32. Citation p. 32.

> people are unwise as to globalive them by permitting population excesses to migrate into the better-endowed countries; Marx's formula, 'to each according to his needs', is a recipe for national suicide..
>
> We are not faced with a *single* global populalion problem but rather, with about 180 separate national population problems. All population controls must be applied locally; local governments are the agents best prepared to chose local means. Means must fit local traditions. For one nation to attempt to impose its ethical principles on another is to violate national sovereignty and endanger international peace. The only legitimate demand that nations can make on one another is this : 'Don't try to solve your population problem by exporting your excess people to us'."

In any case, internationalism, by making things bigger and more centralized, makes things more vulnerable in themselves, because of the gigantic scale at which operations occur. The law of diminishing returns can be applied to *scale* itself by making scale the variable factor, so that increases in scale of an activity or process, will result in diseconomies of scale, past a certain threshold.[15] Internationalism contains in its heart, as well, the seeds of its own destruction.

The core view of humanism and liberalism, that all social and political problems have a (happy) solution, is also refuted by eco-apocalyptic thought. If these pessimists are right, then there is every reason to believe that the "good" socity will simply *not* be built. Indeed civilization as we know it may well be doomed. Progress will cease and lead to degeneration; peace will end in war—if not between nations—then between warring ethnic groups within nations[16] and authority, prejudice and tradition will replace the rule of reason[17] Yet this belief in the perfectibility of man has been the cornerstone of

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[15] D. Elgin, *Voluntary Simplicity*, (William Morrow and Co., New York, 1981) and T. La Porte (ed.), *Organised Social Complexity*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975).

[16] D. P. Moynihan, *Pandemonium : Ethnicity in International Politics*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993); K. M. De Silva and R. J. May (eds.), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict*, (Pinter Publihers, London, 1991).

[17] As Isaiah Berlin has noted : "In our modern age, nationalism is not resurgent; it never died. Neither did racism; They are the most powerful movements in the world today cutting across many social systems." Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Nationalism : An Interview with Isaiah Berlin", *New York Review of Books*, November 21, 1991,p. 19.

Western civilization for the last five-hundred years. Without it, our, culture is indeed an expanse of rubble John Carroll has noted.

It is tempting to offer in conclusion some words of hope and some prospects for the end of sorrows. Indeed, there is an extensive literature charting what an alternative green sustainable world would be like. Such a world would be smaller, cleaner, greener, self-reliant, decentralized, strongly democratic, just—and wise, rather than being merely technically sophisticated. But the present direction of all nations in the world is away from a "smaller is beautiful" world, towards internationalism, global integration, regional trading blocs, and ultimately a one world government backed with coercive powers to force disobedient nations to be integrated into collective global decision making at every level. This view is becoming increasingly popular with environmental leaders. Consider for example JacquesOusteau's comments made prior to the Earth Summit in his journal *Calypso Log* :

> "Here I am referring to the necessity of creating an international environmental police, 'green helmets', who would be under the direction of the United Nations. Our planet needs guardians, independent organisations, free of the constraints of profit or national sovereignty, and responsible for making up an almost daily bill of health of our common habitat, our Earth."[19]

In an interview that appeared in the November 1991 *UNESCO Courier* Cousteau said :

> "Our society is turning toward more and more needless consumption. It is a vicious circle that I compare to cancer...... Should we eliminate suffering, diseases ? The idea is beautiful, but perhaps not a benefit for the long term. We should not allow our dread of diseases to endanger the future of our species.
>
> This is terrible thing to say. *In order to stabilize world population, we must eliminate 350,0000 people Per day It is a horrible thing to say, but it's just as bad not to say it*".[20]

This, I believe is a clear example of a "cure" being worse than the disease. But we should not be surprised to find intellectuals and

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[18] For a review of. J. W. Smith, *The High Tech Fix : Sustainable Ecology or Technocratic Megaprojects for the 21st Century ?*, (Avebury, Aldershot, 1991).

[19] quoted from W. F. Jasper, "Shackling Planet Earth", *The New American*, Fall, 1993, pd. 48-54. Citation p. 49.

[20] ibid, p. 54, emphasis added.

elites willing to contemplate the genocide of the masses to champion their pet ideologies. John Carey in his *The Intellectuals and the Masses*[21] argues that early 20th Century intellectuals, the Founders of modern culture,(viewed the masses as ripe for extermination. Carey composes a surprising list of villains, including George Bernard Shaw, Ezra Pound, D.H. Lawrence, E.M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, H.G. Wells, Aldous Huxley and W. B. Yeats. For example, Shaw said in the Preface to *On the Rocks* that :

> "Extermination must be put on a scientific basis if it is ever to be carried out humanely and apologetically as well as thoroughly...if we desire a certain type of civilization and culture, we must exterminate the sort of people who do not fit into it."[22]

The "end of the masses" theme is also expressed by D. H. Lawrence as well : "To learn plainly to hate mankind, to detest the spawning human-being, that is the only cleanliness now".[23] Further appalling examples are given in John Carey's book.

One would not be paranoid to suspect that as the eccological crisis intensifies, as nations break down and the global elites protect themselves with their own high tech armies, that the majority of ordinary people, people like you and me, will be regarded as useless eaters fit only for extermination. As the blood-thirstiest century in human history comes to an end, can we have any confidence at all, that the 21st Century will not be for humanity a further march through rivers of blood ? All indications are, in my opinion, that we are entering a new dark age, the beginning of sorrows. We will be fighting for our lives as civilization crumbles.

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[21] John Carey, *The Intellectuals and the Masses*, (Faber, and Faber, London, 1992)

[22] ibid, p. 63.

[23] C. f. J. T. Boulton and A. Robertson (eds), *The Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984), vol. 3, 1916-21, p. 160. A character in D. H. Lawrence's *Kangaroo*, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1971), p. 294, also says : "The mass of mankind is soulless...... Most people are dead, and talking in the sleep of death."

7

On Wittgenstein's Way of Doing Philosophy

Narendra Nath Gupta

Wittgenstein's reflections on the nature of philosophy, as expressed in some of his aphoristic remarks in his later work, the *Philosophical Investigations*, tend to refer to two different brands of doing philosophy : one, which Wittgenstein (throughout this paper 'Wittgenstein' signifies 'later Wittgenstein') subscribes to, and another which is to be exposed by the former.

Wittgenstein's remarks in the above mentioned concern, expressed in terms of his celebrated clinical analogy or in terms of other types, of analogy,[1] are generally under-stood to suggest that the way of doing philosophy, which he subscribes to, confronting the censured one is devoted to the task of clarifying linguistic confusions. It is supposed that these confusions come into being only when one engages in philosophizing in a way typical mostly to the traditional philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy is seen in confrontation with the way philosophy was generally practised before him.

This paper intends to show that Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy is not entirely opposed to the traditional way of doing philosophy. The initial phase of philosophizing, which we propose to call 'problem-phase', is inevitably shared by both the ways of doing philosophy. If we could see unity on this point between the traditional way of doing philosophy and Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy, it would also help us in locating the general nature of their difference which further raises a number of questions. This paper does not attempt to answer those questions, though the questions are important ones.

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[1] For Wittgenstein's clinical anology see his *Philosophical Investigations* (henceforth referred to as *PI*), sectsr 133, 255 and 593; for other types of analogy see *PI*, sects. 109, 194, 309, etc.

All the references to *PI* cited in this paper are from G. E. M. Anscombe's translation (2nd ed. Oxford : Basil Blackwell), 1958.

In regard to the initial phase of philosophizing which consists in arising of a philosophical problem, Wittgenstein's view is supposed to be as follows: The philosophical problems, according to Wittgenstein, 'arise when language is misused. Conceptual confusions and metaphysical speculations are the symptoms of such misuses'.[2] For such an understanding of Wittgenstein's view about the origination of philosophical problems, some of his own remarks are responsible. "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is an engine idling, not when it is doing work".[3] "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday".[4] These remarks suggest that philosophical problems have something to do with the confusions traceable to mishandlings of language.

To have a comprehensive picture of this phase, it has to be appreciated that the confusions associated with philosophical problems are made by the philosophers *only when they do philosophy*. David Pears rightly observes that "........a person who had not reflected on the problems would not be in a position to make that kind of confusion, and a person who had reflected on them would already have made his entry into philosophy".[5] Here it may be observed that making one's entry into philosophy, i. e., one's starting with reflecting on some philosophical problem, and one's making conceptual or linguistic confusions are not disconnected phenomena. Whenever someone starts reflecting on some philosophical problem, he is in the grip of conceptual confusion. Thus, these two phenomena always seem to occur simultanleously. But more important thing about them to be noted is that they are not identical too. A philosopher intends to reflect on some philosophical problem, but no philosopher would say that he intends to make confusion or to misuse the language. It is not that it is in the power of a philosopher to intend to make confusion or to misuse the language but he refrains from them out of some good sense. The very logic of the word 'confusion' or 'misuse' prevents him from intending such things. There is a logical oddity in saying that 'I intend to make confusion' or 'I intend to misuse something'.

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[2] J. J. Katz, *The Philosophy of Language*, p. 75, (New York : Harper and Row), 1966.

[3] *PI*, sect. 132.

[4] Ibid., sect. 38.

[5] David Pears, *Wittgenstein*, p. 121, (Fontana : Collins), 1971.

It should be then clear that a philosopher intends, neither confusions nor misuses, but to reflect on something that he finds philosophically interesting. That is all. If now he is in a state of confusion of some kind or doing mistake of some kind, unbeknownst to him, it is perhaps because of the very nature of what he has undertaken to do. Wittgenstein might have very sound reasons to concentrate on the unintended side of the phenomenon of a philosophical problem, which consists according to him, in linguistic or conceptual confusions. He might be justified in locating causes of these confusions in the language we use and in certain propensities of the philosophers. So we need not disagree with his remark : :'A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."[6] Nor do we need underrate Wittgenstein's kind of philosophical endeavour of bringing 'words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use'[7] or of showing 'the fly the way out of the fly-bottle'.[8]

The crucial question relating to the intentional side of the problem- phase of philosophizing is : What it is to reflect philosophically ? It seems that philosophical reflection, at its earliest stage, is not a matter of deliberate effort. Nevertheless, it is a matter of one's having certain kind of logical and imaginative abilities, which is far from being a case of cognitive inertness. One cannot enter into this earliest stage, if he does not possess the ability to ascend to a realm where one can logically inspect the thoughts, or propostions (as many analytical philosophers would prefer to say) of certain kind. Those and only those, who have the imaginative ability of second-order thinking along with certain logical skills, may, on some occasion, feel some reaction or disagreements or simply a kind of unrest, which cannot, in anyway, be foreseen either by themselves or by others. The response felt by them is not merely a psychological response. It is in fact a logical response, however vaguely felt. For it would be impossible to describe such a response as 'philosophical' without, at the same time, taking into account certain kind of logical and imaginative abilities of the person who is feeling the response in question. This feature of the response felt at the earliest stage of philosohical reflection distinguishes it from a similar condition often felt by poets, novelists, etc., just before their act of creation. The intelligibility of a poet's response does not necessarily depend upon his having logical abilities.

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[6] *PI*, sect. 115.

[7] Ibid., sect. 116.

[8] Ibid., sect. 309.

Now the very logical and imaginative nature of a philosophical response felt by a philosopher at the earliest stage of philosophizing may lead him to a step further, that is the step of gaining clarity over his vaguely felt response. He now deliberately engages in the act of finding out what has been puzzling him so far. His imaginative ability makes him consciously reflect over the thoughts or propositions which he was vaguely feeling previously. In course of this reflective activity, his logical ability too assumes rigour, resulting in the logical inspection of the thoughts. This logical inspe tion of the thoughts of certain kind, by bringing into light inadequacy or incoherence or flaw of some kind, makes him able to see the problem clearly. That is all how a philosophical problem arises.

We have seen that logical activity and imaginative activity are the two major elements that constitute the intentional side of the problem-phase. This account of the problem phase does not oblige us to deny that the thoughts or propositions on which philosopher's logical and imaginative abilities exert may themselves be confused or mistaken. But these confusions or mistakes made in course of philosophical reflection pertain only to the unintentional side of the problem-phase of philosophizing.

Now it is not difficult to see that the problem phase as explained above, is necessarily shared by both the ways of doing philosophy, the traditional as well as the Wittgensteinian one. For philosophizing, whether it be theory-oriented kind or mere clarification—oriented kind, seems to be impossible without first perceiving a philosophical problem. Theories or systems in the history of philosophy have not been devised for their own sake; they have been devised rather to solve certain philosophical problems

It may be objected that there have been different varieties of philosophy—such as, 'realist', idealist', 'empiricist'. 'rationalist'. and above all 'analytic-clarificatory' variety—having different aims, methods, doctrines or views. In the face of such a diversification in the area of philosophy, how can it be said that all these varieties of philosophy share a common initial phase of philosophizing ?

The question may be replied in the following manner. After passing through the problem-phase, i. e , perceiving *clearly* the philosophical problem, a philosopher may go in any direction to solve his problem. Not only this, he may even decide to see *more clearly* the very philosophical problem. Thus he may proceed to clarify the linguistic or conceptual confusions involved in his perceiving of the problem, provided that he believes like Wittgenstein in certain doctrines or views regarding language, philosophy and other things. So it seems that the path adopted after perceiving of a philosophical problem depends upon one's doctrines or views regarding a host of things.[9] But passing through a problem-phase is a must for all philosophers, whatever their doctrines or views may be. If it is so, then all the varieties of philosophy must share a common initial phase of doing philosophy which consists, as we tried to show, in the exercise of logical and imaginative abilities of the philosopher. But to say this does not commit us to hold that all the varieties of philosophy must have the same sorts of particular philosophical problems. The particular sort of a philosophical problem, which happens to come into the focus of a philosopher's attention, may be due to his doctrines or views. However, the way a philosophical problem arises (as we have tried to show) is logically independent of the fact of a philosopher's having certain doctrines or views.

Now we come to the question how Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy necessarily involves the problem-phase. Wittgenstein firmly announces that the goal of his philosophy is to gain clarity, 'the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language'.[10] Some of his remarks announce that his philosophy does not attempt to devise any theory or system. "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything".[11] "It leaves everything as it is".[12] Obviously Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy claims only to dissolve or clarify conceptual confusions made in course of arising of philosophical problems. He explicitly says; "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness".[13] But, can his way of doing philosophy afford standing aloof from the conceptual confusions it attempts to treat ? A philosophical problem is not something 'given' to be treated from without. One cannot make sense of a philosophical problem without understanding it. And to understand it is to allow oneself to undergo all the intricacies lying behind the problem. Thus Wittgenstein's clarificatory philosophy is bound to pass through what we have called 'problem-phase'. It is another thing that it, instead of going further to construct any theory or system, just stops at the point where a philosophical problem is perceived, and returns back to discover 'bumps' or 'nonsenses' lying behind the problem. This brings us to the question what distinguishes Wittgen's timestine's way of doing philosophy from the traditional way of doing philosophy. These ways of doing philosophy are generally differentiated from each other by saying that in case of the former there is no occasion for arising of a philosophical problem, while in case of the latter philosophical problems always trouble the philosophers due to their conceptual confusions. But this differentiation is not acceptable to us because we believe in the necessity of passing through the problem-phase for every variety of philosophy including that of Wittgensteinian one. The distinguishing feature of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy does not consist in its standing outside of the things which give rise to confusions, nonsenses, bumps, etc., but in its stopping at the termination point of problem-phase and looking back into the phase for the confusions, bumps or mistakes involved therein. The philosophy has always been self-critical, logical and second-order enterprise, at least, in its problem phase; but Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy extends all these qualities to their heights by looking backward into the very philosophical problem already perceived or understood to some extent. The philosophers have always tried different ways to solve their problems. It is perhaps unique to Wittgenstein that he urges upon to stop at the initial stage of doing philosophy and reflect in a more searching way on what one was doing so far.

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[9] To account for a philosopher's decision concerning the mode of philosophizing after his perceiving a philosophical problem, it seems necessary to suppose that his decision, if not arbitrary, is governed by certain doctrines or views he subscribes to.

[10] *PI*, sect. 119.

[11] Ibid., Sect. 126.

[12] Ibid., sect. 124.

[13] Ibid., sect. 255.

Was it possible for traditional philosophy to be so cautious and self-critical as Wittgenstein's doing philosophy seems to be ? Perhaps not. Because, the traditional philosophers doctrines or views regarding languae, truth, etc., were entirely different from those of Wittgenstein. It was Wittgenstein's views regarding language and other things that enabled him to say that 'when we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.[14] These views made him more cautious and self-critical in his way of doing philosophy, with holding him from going beyond the point of problem-phase in the direction of theorizing which was mostly pursued by traditional philosophers. However, Wittgenstein's way of doing Philosophy could not dispense with the kind of philosophical attempt which had always occupied philosophers at the initial stage of their enterprise. This continuity of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy, at the point of the initial stage of philosophizing, with that of traditional one could be possible for the simple reason that such a point of philosophizing is logically independent of any philosophical doctrines or views. But the difference between these two ways of doing philosophy is, according to our hunch, due to their respective doctrinal commitments.

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[14] Ibid., sect. 194.

We have seen that both ways of doing philosophy start philosophical enterprise *logically* in the same manner and travel *logically* in the same direction upto a certain point, then all of a sudden, as it were, they move in quite opposite ways. How is this divergence to be explained ? Is it merely accidental, a matter of simply liking or disliking beyond any rational appraisal ? Or, can it be explained in terms of their respective doctrines or views or theses ? If possibility of explaining the divergence in terms of their doctrines, etc., is granted, then can Wittgenstein undertake the task of justifying those doctrines without engaging, at the same time, in the kind of task which he denounces in his proclamations ? Or, are Wittgenstein's those doctrines so obvious that 'it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them'. Is it really the case that Wittgenstein's those doctrines are so obvious that they do not need to be debated ?

These are some of the questions raised by the conclusion we just reached. Here, it is not possible to discuss these questions. However, it seems reasonable to believe that Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy is not entirely opposed to the traditional way of doing philosophy. Upto a certain point it has unity with the traditional way of doing philosophy, though it also differs from the latter in the respect shown above. But whether or not Wittgenstein can be forced to engage in the kind of task which is peculiar to the traditional way of doing philosophy will be determined by the way the questions raised above are answered.

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15 Ibid., sect, 128.

16 Special thanks are owed Dr. S. P. Verm (Reader, Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra University, urukshetra, Haryana); who read an earlier draft of this paper and made many constructive suggestions.

8

Mysticism and Phenomenology

William Neblett

INTRODUCTION

My aim in this essay is to set out implications anyone sympathetic to phenomenology ought to draw in regard to mysticism or mystical experience. I have selected three central subjects to discuss; (i) Intuition and Feelings of Certainty (ii) the Concept of a Person, and (iii) Materialistic Metaphysics. My intention is not to argue that certain philosophical positions are true or false, but rather that certain unusual and unpopular philosophical positions are deserving of more serious interest and attention than they presently receive. I do not believe one must be an advocate of phenomenology, or even a serious student of phenomenology, to find what I have to say interesting; how ever, I do believe that a half-way sympathetic reading of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, or Merleau-Ponty will give my arguments a pointedness not easily discerned by those unitiated to the movement of phenomenology.

By (further) way of introduction, let me say a few words about the use of fantasy in elucidating the subjects we will shortly discuss.

In philosophy we not uncommonly fantasize that something we believe to be true is not true at all, that is, we pretend that we doubt something that we really believe. This particular use of skeptical fantasy can be carried to an art, and has even been advanced by some philosophers as an epistemological methodology-witness Descartes. Of course, we sometimes forget that it is available to us not only to suspend belief in favor of pretending doubt, but also to suspend doubt in favor of pretending belief. Such sympathetic fantasy can facilitate our understanding of views that differ from our own, and certainly, sufficient experience in the pursuit of philosophy teaches us the virtues of gullibility and the vices of an inflexible scepticism.

It is especially important, it seems to me, to cultivate sympatheti fantasies for philosophical positions that take their origin in experienccs, in a background of experience, alien to our own. For example, where our own history is lacking in phenomenological or meditative experiences an effort of imagination is almost indispensable in overcoming the odd and disturbing character of phenomenological and mystical views. A genuine student of phenomenology cultivates experiences which set conscious states into sharp relief, and from this store of phenomenological experience develops a keen sensitivity to the variety and subtlety of states which human beings undergo, and to consciousness in general. Philosophers bred in traditions that encourage and develop the skills for entering into and sustaining out-of-the-ordinary meditative experiences quite naturally articulate their philosophies against the background of these experiences. Of course, any individual's experience can be limited, or if not obviously limited, misleadingly interpreted, and we can, as many philosopoers do, quickly dismiss the phenomenologist's experience as non-veridical and the mystic's experience as merely hallucinatory. But there is nothing worthwhile to gain from such hasty judgments and nothing whatsoever to lose from a deliberate attempt to self-consciously articulate the limitations, and possible misinterpretations, of our own experience. In fact, the extent to which our own store of experience circumscribes the parameters of our philosophical views is a central theme of our first topic on intuition and Feelings of Certainty, to which we can now turn.

SECTION I

INTUITION AND FEELINGS OF CERTAINTY

A familiar, and it seems to me cogent, point insisted upon by contemporary epistemologers, is that someone's having a feeling of certainty that P does not at all warrant his claiming to know that P. A feeling of certainty alone is insufficient to warrant a knowledge claim. If it were sufficient, then it would follow that certain persons have warrantedly claimed to know propositions which were not true but false-since there have been persons who have felt certain that certain false propositions were true. Now, insisting upon this point has the virtue of directing us to look beyond feelings of certainty for other pre-requisites of knowledge, however, it can also mislead us into thinking that the subject of feelings of certainty is once and forever disposed of, when, on the contrary, this subject demands to be explored. It demands to be explored, it seems to me, under the general rubric of intuition understood in a philosophical sense, as immediate, or non-mediated, knowing.

Our curiousity concerning intuition ought to be revived if only because Husserl insists that we are capable of special intuitive acts in which essences or essential traits of the being of consciousness can be immediately apprehended and known, and because Heidegger portrays knowing along the metaphor of seeing, as primarily a matter of being-in-a-certain-state in which what has formerly been concealed is now revealed. Even more importantly, the extent to which a student of phenomenology becomes intimate with the details of the vast variety of conscious experiences which human beings undergo, the more questionable becomes the assumption that normal waking sense consciousness constitutes a perfectly secure ground, and the sole ground, for an adequate epistemology. Of course, the continental phenomenological tradition does not differ in this regard from the tradition of British Empiricism. In fact, if we take the skepticism of Britism Empiricism seriously, we are forced to doubt our own feelings of certainty about the world, or at least, to throw them in sharp relief. For in addition to our feelings of certainty that the world, in general outlines, is as we experience it, we ordinarily believe that there exist reasons which are supportive of, and which warrant, these feelings. And a sincere skepticism undermines these reasons and leave us, not so happily, alone with our feelings.

Curiously, even though these feelings become suspect under the scrutiny of skepticism, most of us never cease to believe in them. In other words, our belief that the world, in general outlines, is such-and-such a way rests on repeatedly experiencing it that way and not on philosophical arguments. Moreover, even if we are ready to admit the tenuous nature of our belief assumptions about the world we are nevertheless quick to dismiss the beliefs of others that arise from a store of experience different from our own. It is on this point, this very odd point, that I wish to dwell.

Many of us believe that certain unusual individuals, e. g.. Zen Roshi, attain unusual spiritual states that markedly transform their person. We may even imagine that the day to day experiencing of such individuals is radically different from our own. And we can believe and imagine all of this without ever presupposing a particular theology or a belief in supernatural beings at all. However, we do not believe these individuals then they report that the states they attain are in part realizations or intuitions of the nature of, or some aspect of, reality. We fully believe that; (i) their reports are honest, (ii) they did experience the world in a manner quite different from ordinary experience, and (iii) they did feel certain that this quite different world was, or was some aspect of, the real world. But after saying that, we then classify the cognitive content of their experience as "hallucinatory" and observe that their sense of certainty not only fails to guarantee the veridity of their experience, but perhaps even argues against its constituting a state of, or a grounds for, knowing. For there seems to be a peculiar sense of conviction that regularly accompanies certain religious, and for that matter, certain psychotic states. But what really is the difference between their feelings of conviction and our own ? Isn't it ultimately that our ordinary experiences coincide with the experience of the majority of other ordinary persons, and that persons who experience the world in exceptional ways are suspect because they and their experiences are the exception ? Most of us, I suspect, would agree on the general character of the world, i.e. do believe that it is independent of us, roughly the same for all of us, and that it is constituted of various kind and sizes of material entities that sometimes casually affect one another, and that are aggregated in space along with, at least on this planet, persons and other living things. Perhaps we are not so exceptional in our basic views after all.

Let us suppose, however. to the contrary, that we are exceptional but in the special sense of having had exceptional intuitive experiences of our own. Employing our sympathetic fantasy, let us imagine that we have experienced at least one of the following states; (i) an idealist state in which the objects we perceive, though sustaining their relationship to one another, no longer retain their character as substantial, dense, material entities, (ii) a poetic state in which we experience the world (or nature) as a creative event of intrinsic beauty, and (iii) a oneness-with-nature state in which we lose our sense of identity and are unable to distinguish between ourselves and the world as we experience it. It is important to add to our suppositions that these states are experienced as profoundly moving and as utterly convincing, that is, that as we experience them we feel absolutely certain that; (i) Materialism is false, (ii) beauty is and inherent property of reality, and (iii) our ordinary experience of ourselves as a separate existence among many other existences together constituting the world is an illusion, or at least is metaphysically misleading.

Now, if we were to have such an "intuitive" experience, particularly if we were to have such an experience repeatedly, our ordinary feelings of certainty about the world would be subject to a challenge different in kind from the challenge of traditional skepticism. These feelings would be challenged, not by a critique of the reasons alleged to support them, but rather, on their own grounds, by other feelings, or. if one prefers, by other intuitions. The challenge would come, in other words, from our experience, from experiencing non-ordinary feelings about the world when our ordinary feelings were suspended.

Of course, having our feelings of certainty about the world challenged by other feelings of certainty would naturally confuse us as to what we ought to feel certain about. On the one hand, we would hesitate to option for those feelings that we felt in the idealist, or poetic, or one-with-nature state no matter how convincing to us they seem to be; on the other hand, we could not outrightly dismiss such feelings as hallucinatory in favor of our old and familiar feelings merely because they were old and familiar. To put this differently, we could not refuse to question whether the world really was the way we had all along felt that it was, since if we were rationally affected by our new feelings of certainty, we could no longer feel certain that it was that way.

At this point, it might seem natural to object thar our views of the world do not rest merely on our (familiar) experience of it, that we do indeed have good grounds and reasons over and above our feelings which warrant our metaphysical views, and which warrant rejecting the views of the mystic. But at least in phrasing the beginnings of an argument against the mystic we have consented to attend to his position, and have admitted that our case against him turns to some considerable degree upon our success in defending our own method of access to knowledge, and our own brand of metaphysics. Moreover, generalizing these considerations, we would naturally renew our interest in the subject of intuition as a method of non-mediated access to knowledge, and not only as it is represented in the realization experiences of Eastern Mysticism, but also as we find it articulated in the views of such insightful Occidental Philosophers as Plato, Bergson, Husserl, and Whiteheed.

A revival of the study of the subject of intuition, and in particular of the realization states of mystics, can be greatly facilitated, it seems to me, when approached from the vantage of phenomenology, construed generally as the study of experience qua experience. For (i) a phenomenologically oriented review of the panorama of ordinary states of consciousness dispells some of our misconceptions about extraordinary states of consciousness by breaking down the distinction between these two sorts of states, and (ii) phenomenology revises our conception of the real, and by so doing, suggests a method of knowing based on an empiricism grounded in immediate experience quite different from an empiricism of the external world grounded in sense experience or sense data. Let us consider each of these briefly in order.

(i) **Extraordinary and Ordinary Experiences** We are inclined to think of mystical experiences as extraordinary in the sense that they can be classified with experiences that occur only exceptionally, and perhaps only to exceptional persons. Within this class of extraordinary experiences we might include, for example; hypnotically induced experiences such as regression to early childhood, religious experiences such as having "visions" of deities, accident induced experiences such as total amnesia or severe shock, curious psychological experiences such as being-out-of-one's-body, or even psychotic experiences such as paranoia. Everything other than an extraordinary experience is an ordinary experience, that is, an experience that is non-exceptional and familiar. Ordinary experiences themselves we are inclined to think of simplistically in terms of such states as; "looking at a colored object", "tasting a Piece of steak as we eat it", "hearing a bird call", or if we are imaginative enough to venture beyond mere sense experience; worrying about being late, attempting to think through a problem, having a conversation with friends, feeling sleepy, etc. A list such as this, of course, hardly begins to dent the truly vast and varied array or ordinary experience, which, when grasped from some overview, seems to merge continuously with extraordinary experience. Certainly, we do undergo a variety of quite striking experiences that are not, however, extraordinary in the sense of being exceptional. Consider only such experiences as; picturing an image before one's mind's eye' with one's eyes closed, daydreaming, hypnagogic imaging, dreaming, feeling vertigo, feeling lonely and somewhat depressed for days, feeling very embarrassed and blushing with shame, experiencing sexual orgasm, falling in love, being (completely) surprised, solving a problem in a 'flash of insight', playing a competitive sport to the limit, concentrating our attention so that we can even hear a pin drop, experiencing a painting as beautiful, etc.

Phenomenology gives us a relief upon our conscious experience; it directs us to the detail, the varied and striking detail, and breaks down any simplistic divisions we may have drawn of our experience into the ordinary and the extraordinary. It also therefore has the consequence or ought to have the consequence, of teaching us not to play fast and loose with the (epistemological) label "merely hallucinatory." even when taking under review extraordinary mystical states which are alleged to yield genuine intuitions.

(ii) **The Real and the Not-Real.** From the point of view of phenomenology, the usual boundaries by which the real and not-real are distinguished appears arbitrary and misleading. In the usual way of marking the distinction the real is identified with: material objects of various sorts and sizes, environments of various kinds, the entire (physical) world encompassing all material objects and all environments, living organisms from the most microscopic to the most complex, events or happenings that occur within the physical world, etc. The "non-real" is identified with objects, environments, worlds, organisms, events, or entities of any sort that are or were thought to exist by someone at sometime, but which do not, In fact, exist; with the objects of illusions and hallucinations that do not delude those who undergo them, etc.

From the point of view of phenomenology, however, any and everything that constitutes the content of a human experience is, in the most primary sense of "real," real. The experience and the content of an hallucination, for example, is as real as the experience and content of an ordinary visual perception; having a belief that p where p is false is as real as having a belief that p where p is true; hearing a melody "run through one's head" is as real as hearing an orchestra play a symphony; etc. For some reason, we are inclined to treat experiential states that do not accommodate neatly whith the external world as somehow not quite real, to treat only what occurs in the external world as really real and to deny that reality to whatever occurs in the interior of our experience : Human experience is only mental and merely subjective; it lacks the objective and substantive reality of material objects, including our bodies, that exist and endure in the environment of physical space.

We might feel that we ourselves are not guilty of a conception of the real so blatantly biased against human experience. But when we list the various kinds of entities we believe finally constitute reality, even while disavowing a strict materialism, and even while remembering to include sense experiences and thoughts, we often forget altogether pains and pleasure, feelings, needs, beliefs and atttudes, illusions and hallucinations, dreams, and of course, so-called altered states of consciousness. Moreover, when we are confronted with a conflict between the reality of the external world and the reality of human experience our usual inclination is to option for the former at the expense of the latter. Imagine, for example, that a Yogi capable of entering into unusual states seats himself and meditates for a period which lasts, according to our watches, for fifteen minutes, but which he reports he experienced as lasting for many hours. We have a ready account for the discrepancy between his report and our watches : Since we know-from our watches that his experience lasted fifteen minutes, we conclude that he only imagined that his experience lasted for many hours. In other words, we classify his experience as a delusion; he falsely believed that it lasted longer than it did. To clinch our account we might even venture the hypothesis, to explain his delusion, that the content of his experience transpired or flaspəq by much faster than it does in ordinary conscious states. If he protested and said that he nevertheless experienced sitting for many hours, which is what he really did, we would still insist that his experience really only lasted for fifteen minutes. We would probably add that, in only fifteen minutes, he could not even have experienced sitting for many hours : He only thought that he did because he was deluded by his experience, that is, the experience itself was a delusion.

Now, a student of phenomenology, on the contrary, would or at least ought to give a very different account of this unusual meditative experience. For his attention is directed to describing and elucidating the world as it is lived, and he conceives of experience as it is experienced as real in the very first sense of "real." Thus' an individual may very well experience living for many hours in a period which we clock by our watches as fifteen minutes, and what is real in the foremost sense of real in the case under consideration in a many houred experience and not a short-lived and deluded one. And all of this is not too remarkable. We need not invoke some science fastasy time dimension to render this experience intelligible, for we all know that time as it is experienced, so-called "subjective time," does not always correspond to our watches, that sometimes time passes very slowly and at other times very quickly.

From the vantage of phenomenology, than, since human experience is not a shadow of the reality of the external world, but a reality unto itself that demands to be discerned, described, and perhaps known in some manner intuitively, the content of unusal mystical experiences as reported by those who undergo them is of independent interest as part of the real. And, in so far as these experiences are alleged to yield immediate knowledge or intuitions of reality that conflicts with our ordinary experience and our basic, usually materialistic, metaphysics, phenomenology advises us not to dismiss these alleged intuitions and the feelings of certainty that accompany them as obvious hallucinations, but rather to rethink our metaphysical assumptions (based on our ordinary experience) and to review, in general, the possible role of intuition as a method of access to knowledge.

I should add, that I have myself experienced what I have described as the idealist and poetic state as well as several variations of the oneness-with-nature state. I have also experienced a variety of other states in meditation as well. These experiences were temporary and I have not been convinced by them. Nor has it been my intention to argue that mysticism is, after all, true, and that intuition of some voilation or another is the ultimate method of access to the natnre of reality. However' I do not believe that I can dismiss these experiences merely on the grounds that they were temporary and that they contrast with the ordinary and the familiar.

SECTION II

THE PUBLIC ACCESSIBILITY OF HUMAN STATES

When the subject of intuition is engaged from the point of view of phenomenology it leads naturally, it seems to me, to a consideration of some more radical views of our person and our ego commonly attributed to mysticism. From the point of view of phenomenology, construed generally as the attempt to describe the world as it is lived or experienced, it follows or ought to follow that the emotional and mental states of other human beings are directly accessible to observation. This view of our observation and experience of one another's person may not seem to require a revision in our concept of persons themselves, and it may not appear to relate in any way to mysticism; Nevertheless, a central aim of my discussion will be to argue; (i) that we sometimes directly observe the mental and emotional states of other human beings, (ii) that phenomenology does incline us to accept this view of the accessibility of other persons's states, (iii) that accepting this view marks a radical departure from the prevailing philosophical conception of our experience of one another and also from the prevailing philosophical conception of a person, and (iv) that along one line of reasoning, this revised conception of a person leads to the view prevalent in Eastern Mysticism and present in the philosophies of James, Bergson, and Sartre, that the ego, conceived as a substance, is an illusion.

We make a mistake when we imagine that mental and emotional states always first occur within some inner immaterial self surrounded by the shell of an exterior material body, and then manifest themselves through bodily states which are the "effects" of which they are the cause. For suppose that I am mentally and emotionally distracted, I tell you that I am, and as I recount my difficulties, I pace nervously about, speak quickly and with emotion, end sometimes forget my train of thought. It would be terribly misleading to describe my agitatedly pacing about as an outward sign that I am experiencing a state, the state of distraction, which is otherwise hidden and incapable of being observed. No. My distracted state is there, in public view, for all to see : even I may see it by watching myself in a mirror. It is as public a property of my person as are my hands and feet. It is no more hidden than the properties of an ordinary worldly object; others can see that I am distracted as well as they can see that a desk is rectangular.

Others can see "that I am distracted" because they "see my distraction", My distraction is not a conglomerate of three (independent) states, an outward bodily state accessible to observation, and a mental and emotional state concealed within the inner recesses of my consciousness. My distraction is not divided into three parts, with the really "essential" parts, what I think and feel, forever inaccessible to the observation of others. No. I am in one state, the state of distraction, and it is this state which others may observe if they care to do so. When we see a pen we see the pen even though we do not see the backside of it, even though we only see part of it. For to see something we need not see every angle and aspect of it. And that is true of persons and their states as well. When a person comes forward to greet us, we "see that person" even though we do not see his every feature. Even if we see him only from the shoulders up, we still see him : We see him no less than we would see him declothed and surrounded by mirrors revealing every part of the surface of his body at once.

It would miss the mark at this point to object that even though a person's body may be public, his feelings, as uniquely felt by him alone, must be private. For although a person's feelings are private in the sense that only he, uniquely, feels them, it does not follow that they are always private in the sense that they cannot be observed. For your feelings to be observable to me I need not have the numerically same feeling that you have, nor even corresponding to your feeling a very similar feeling; nor need I even feel empathy for your feeling. For consider once again the case of distraction. Imagine that as I pace agitatedly about I turn to you and say, with considerable emotion in my voice and with my head twisting from left to right, "I just don't know what to do." The emotion in my voice is public, just as the sound of my voice is public. And you need not feel my feelings nor even empathize with my feelings to observe what I am feeling. Observation does not require that sort of coincidence of minds: To observe, I do not have to become, or become like, the object or property or action I observe. Obviously, someone may observe my distraction and yet not recognize the state I am in, that is, not know what they have observed. For example, a small child might observe my distraction, but lack sufficient experience to recognize it as distraction, or someone whose perceptive faculties have been dulled, say by inebriation, may mistake my distraction for something else, say elation. But such mistaken observations are not peculiar to our observations of other person's emotional states. It is not in the least uncommon to observe something without knowing what it is; "I saw it streak across the sky, but never did figure out what it was", or to think we have observed something to be a certain kind of thing, when it is not that kind of thing at all, "I thought it was a bird, but later realized it was a flying squirrel".

Now, someone might consider the case I have selected for illustration, the case of distraction, to be a most atypical instance of human feeling and emotion, and therefore, quite misleading to serve as an example. However, it is quite adequate as a challenge to the position which I am here concerned to refute, that feelings are in principle private. Moreover it is not after all unusual. For consider only the human capacily, and propensity, to speak emotionally and with feeling in audible and intelligible sentences, phrases, or words. Suppose, for example, that a father who is angry at his chid for having once again failed to close the door, shouts, Dammit ! Shut the door !" His emotion (and his thought) are exposed to public view; that is his very intention. This fact, that we can and do "speak out with emotion" incontrovertibly proves the publicity of both feeling and thought, and undermines any bias we might have for relegating either one but not the other to the inaccessible interior of a private consciousness : We might have assumed that because thought is communicated through the vehicle of language, it can be public, whereas feeling, bacause it is peculiarly intimate, can only be private. Or we might have assumed that because feeling is sometimes expressed through the medium of the body, it can be public: whereas thought, because it occurs "in our mind," can only be private. But when someone shouts angrily, "Dammit ! Shut the door ! " his anger and his thought, his angry thought, is no less observable then his hands, his pajamas, or the alarm of the alarm clock ringing next to the bed. The phenomenon of his shout is not two separate phenomena, his angry feeling and his thought. His thought, "Shut the door", is not a public effect of his having felt a private angry feeling, nor is his feeling angry a public effect of his having had the private thought, "He's left the door open again".

Of course, when we shout with emotion we may be feeling feelings or thinking thoughts which we do not expose to public view, and in fact, on a variety of occasions we keep some, or even all, of our feelings and thoughts concealed from others. But we should not be tempted, as I think we often are, to extend this fact about our capacity for concealment into the philosphical thesis that feelings and thoughts are intrinsically private, i. e., in principle inaccessible except indirectly. No. Sometimes they are private and sometimes they are public. And, to say that they are sometimes private is not to pinpoint a mysterious property peculiar to feeling or to thought. For I can keep scars on my backside and letters in my desk concealed from the observation of others too.

In opposition to the entire line of discussion up to this point, someone might still protest, even angrily, that my choice of examples prejudices the argument, and that other more fitting examples would prove once and for all that feelings are intrinsically private, that they are accessible to others they are so only indirectly. A paradigm counter-example that comes to mind here is the experience of pain. For when we feel pain, e. g. feel a pain in our stomach, it seems we do so in the enclosed interior of our own consciousness, and that although others may warrantedly "conclude" that we are in pain, they can do so only through a practiced interpretation of bodily gestures and bodily produced sounds. But I have not denied that there are instances in which the states,feelings, and thoughts of others are known only indirectly; I have only wanted to argue that there are instances in which they are know directly. Moreover, I must confess uneasiness over the analysis of even this presumably paradigm case. It may be a satisfactory analysis of some species of painful experiences, e. g. I feel a sudden slight pain in my foot and my mouth twitches in a responding grimace. But what about others ? Suppose, for example, that I suddenly experience a severe pain in my stomach, that I double over in a violent wrench of my body, grasp my stomach with my hands, and "yell out in pain." How do we carve up the phenomenon, "my being in pain?" And what is it that someone observing me observes ? I hesitate to say that he observes only effects of my pain or only signs of my pain. I hesitate to describe my pain as an inner phenomenon separate and distinct from my anguished bodily gestures and anguished yell. In regard to this case at least, it seems as reasonable to say that others can "observe my pain," since my bodily behaviour is part of what constitutes my being in pain, as it is to say that others can infer from my bodily behaviour that I am in pain." The trick here is to see that other persons can observe my pain without feeling it, without feeling anything like it, and without observing all and every aspect of it. Others can observe my pain, just as they can observe my sadness or my happiness, or my surprise, or my shame, or my fear, etc.

To put this point differently, others can observe my feelings "from one perspective" just as they observe ordinary material objects from one perspective. If I feel sad, and do not try to conceal but rather express my sadness, others can observe my sadness "in my sad face" or "in my crying," or "in my voice." These features of my bodily behaviour constitute part of my sadness. Others need not infer from observing tears in my eyes that I am sad. No. They observe me, from one perspective, "weeping sadly".

Of course, we sometimes believe that another person is feeling something that he is not; we sometimes make guesses, both accurate and inaccurate, about another person's feelings on the basis of behavioural clues; and we sometimes cannot tell at all what a person is "really" feeling. Nevertheless, these various facts represent only one facet of the complex character of the nature of the communication of human feeling, and, we are considerably more exposed to one another than many philosophers would have us believe.

Indeed, in my judgment, it is more instructive to conceive of our feelings and our thoughts as first of all public, and as only secondarily private, and to emphasize how we generally, though not always, succeed in communicating the feelings and thoughts we wish to convey. The most common technique we employ to communicate feeling and thought, of course, is by emitting patterned sequences of sounds of conventionalized meanings in various emotional entonations and intensities, accompanied by facial and bodily gestures.

SECTION III

PHENOMENOLOGY AND PERSONS' EXPERIENCE OF ONE ANOTHER

The view that human states, feelings, and thoughts are publicly accessible is indeed controversial. Personally, I suspect that it is controversial because we have a deeply ingrained materialistic-physicalistic conception of reality which colors our conception of the relation of our person to our body and to other persons. But whether or not that suspicion is correct, it is a curious fact that if we view the over-riding aim of phenomenology to be the description of experience as experience, and in that spirit attend to the details of our experience of others as we experience them, we will naturally arrive at some such account as I have set forth above. For what we have as given in our experience of others as we experience them is just persons of different sizes, shapes, sexes, and personalities. along with a considerable variety of states, feelings, and, of course, thoughts.

A sense data theorist will, of course; insist that persons and their states are not present immediately in our experience, and that we have, as given in our experience of other persons and their states, only sense data. (It is for this reason that we my have grounds for challenging our knowledge not only of the states of, but even of the existence of, other minds.) But none of this agrees with our experience of other persons in so far as we undergo that experience. If we take as our guide the classical account set forth by Husserl in Ideas : An Introduction to Phenomenology, a description of our experience of walking around a desk while looking at it must record not only a series of immanently given and momentarily concrete visual shapes of varying hues, but also a single (non-immanent) entity that we apprehend as continuous through out the experience—the entity which, within the perspective of the natural standpoint, we would label "the desk."[1] All one has to do is to walk around a desk while looking at it to verify that what Husserl reports is true.

Persons are apprehended as single and continuous in a similar way. In fact, from the point of view of phenomenology persons can be present as an item of our experience without being visually observed : We hear them moving about in the next room. In fact, they can even be present as an item of our experience when they are in no way present to our senses : We left them sleeping in the upstairs bedroom and remain aware that we do not inhabit the house alone. We apprehend persons, as it were, from one perspective just as we apprehend desks. We apprehend other persons' states, feelings and thoughts from one "perspective" too. I observe your sadness first "in your sad face" from one angle, then "in your sad face" from another angle. I also observe your sadness "in your crying" or "in your voice" (or in all of these together.) Your bodily behaviour constitutes part of your sadness. I do not infer from observing tears in your eyes that you are sad. No. I observe you, from one perspective, "weeping sadly".

When you and I sit and chat, your states, and your feelings and thoughts, become part of the content of, and constitute significant items within, my experience. Naturally, your states enter in as items of my experience in a very different way than do my own. If you feel sad, I experience that sadness as someone else's sadness, as lacking in that intimate ownership relation in which I stand to my own emotional and mental states. Despite their differences in character, however, your states, as I observe and experience them, are just as much a part of the content of my experience as are my own.

You as a person enter in as an immediate item of my experience, as part of the content of my experience, as well. Obviously, if persons are conceived (under some variation of materialism) as consciousness enclosed in physical bodies, this way of describing the relation between persons will conjure pictures of bodies within bodies. But if we assume the phenomenologist's perspective and conscientiously attempt to describe our life as it is lived and our experience of other persons as we do experience them, we will be led to conceive of persons as the sum of the content of all the experience they undergo, including, as they enter into this content, the states, feelings and thoughts of other persons, as well as other persons themselves. In other words, our revising our conception of how persons stand in relation to one another requires a revision in our very conception of a person. If we resist any view in which persons experience one another only indirectly through cues from the exoskeletons of their souls called "bodies," and accept the line of thinking argued above that persons must be described as directly entering into and becoming part of the experience of one another, then, in order to made such a description intelligible, we will be forced to conceive of persons as constituted of the sum of the history of their experience, and to speak even more starkly of one person becoming part of the composite of another person.

SECTION IV

THE EGO IS A FICTION

I have attempted to keep the view that as experiencing beings we mutually participate in the composites of one another's person clearly distinguished from any position that suggests a coincidence of consciousness and a collapse of the distinction between persons- For the first view only seems plausible if this distinction is kept in mind, and if we continue to record that I experience my states in a very different way than I experience your. However, even while retaining these distinctions, it is quite natural to wonder how intimate the relationship between persons can become, and how far this mutual participating in the experience of one another, in the person of one another, can go. What ought we to say, for axample, about a very sensitive person feeling empathy for the felling of someone else ?

We find ourselves at this juncture brought abruptly to a consideration of mysticism. For we are reminded that within some traditions of mysticism the distinction between persons is judged an illusion, and that even though a sense of our own persons, is ordinarily part of our experience of other persons, a recurring theme of the experience of the mystic is just the loss of this sense. Let us therefore press on in the direction of mysticism utilizing our revised conception of a person, along with the vantage of phenomenology, to examine the experience of "losing the sense of one's person."

If we persist in conceiving of persons as the sum of the content their experience, it will seem natural to record the outstanding, though indeed obvious, fact that we have a sense of ourselves as an individual agent, self-consciously separate and distinct from other agencies in the world. It is just this primitive sense of our self as a self that for Husserl constitutes definitive evidence of our existence as an independent and enduring being-as a "transcendental pure ego."[2] Husserl thus remains with a view of our person, which though in many respects radical, traces its history back through Kant to the Greeks. In a different development, and a sharp divergence within the movement of phenomenology itself, Sartre concludes that the ego viewed as a substance is a fiction. Sartre therefore aligns himself with Bergson and James, two philosophers particularly concerned, each in his own way, to study human experience. He also finds himself in a curious agreement with the view, prevalent in various traditions of (Eastern) mysticism, that the personal ego is an illusion.

But suppose that we do agree that we have an ego because we experience ourselves as having one. If we stay within the spirit of phenomenology striving to be sensitive to the variety in our experience, and we also do not prejudiciously rule out from consideration unusual experiences that human beings do indeed undergo, we will be forced to wonder how we should construe our evidence for the ego—the sense of ourselves as having one—when that sense is no longer present in "loss-of-ego" states. Clearly, if we had thought that our experience of our self as a self constituted our ego, that the reality of our ego consisted in that special self-consciousness, it would follow that there must be time when our ego does not exist at all. Of course, the ego's coming and going is not a notion unfamiliar to Sartre. He argues that the "ego"—in his sense of the ego—is absent during those periods when we are "lost in what we are doing", for example, when we are lost in looking through the keyhole at someone undressing. And he also observes that the ego when acsent may once again become present, for example, when we hear someone's footsteps down the hall.

We may wish to insist, to the contrary, that a sense of our-selves as a person is always present in our experience, that even where we are "lost in what we are doing" we still retain some, at least implicit, sense of ourselves as an individual agency. But even if that position can be made intelligible, which those inclined to describe our experience exactly as it is experienced may disagree, we cannot neglect to take into consideration those experiences, reported in the tradition of mysticism, in which the sense of one-self as a distinct person or agency is totally absent.

The problems which such "loss-of-ego" experiences raise for the concept of personal identity cannot be lightly dismissed. We cannot simply insist, in the face of such experiences, that a person is an enduring ego, a "substance" which undergoes modifications of its "accidental" properties while remaining in its "essential" nature continuous in time. Perhaps Sartre's view that the ego is a fiction demands a serious review: Perhaps our conception of our person and personality does lack a correlate substance in reality, and perhaps our conception of our person does not necessarily reflect the facts of the history of our experience better than the conception of our person fabricated by someone else—no matter that we are intimately involved with that experience in a way which no one else is or can be.

After observing that loss-of-ego mystical experiences ought to prompt us to reconsider the view that the ego, as a substance, is a fiction, we ought to observe further that this view is a recurring theme within the tradition of mysticism itself. Of course, we would expect it to be, since we earlier emphasized how critically our experience, both ordinary and extraordinary, influences our philosophical conceptions. Perhaps we can even imagine how our own conception of our own ego might undergo a radical change if we were to experience a loss-of-ego state ourselves.

Certainly, there are some striking similarities between; (i) the Buddhist doctrine of Anatta (of the non-reality of the ego) and Sartre's rejection of "the psychologist's ego", (ii) Sartre's analysis and the Buddhist (or Hindu) analysis of the nature of desire and of emotion, and (iii) the mystic's conception and Sartre's conception of the mutable, and to some degree, perfectable nature of our person. Sartre even confronts mystical states themselves, of at least one variation, when he comments sympathetically upon Russeau's experience of being "one-with-all".[3] Sartre refers to this kind of experience as a "pantheistic intuition", and in the context of discussing intuition in general, characterizes it as having "nothing", no "mediator" (no ego), between the knower and the known. He does, however, resist Rousseau's literal account of his experience, and by implication any similar account of such an experience, as a fusion of consciousness with the world. For this possibility is antithetical to Sartre's fundamental conception of consciousness, which in the tradition from Brentano through Husserl, treats consciousness in its intrinsic nature as a two-sided intentionality: If consciousness were to "fuse" with the world on this conception, it would follow that it had collapsed.

No matter how interesting the fact that Sartre, a phenomenologist, shares with many mystics the view that we have no enduring egos, such a view does present serious problems if we conceive all reality *other than* persons or consciousnesses to be composed of enduring, and probably material, substances. For then we are forced to embrace a fundamental metaphysical dualism of streams of experience—or something of the sort—on one side and substances on the other. Of course, if we are impressed by the uniqueness of persons, or more generally consciousness, we may find such a dualism not only palatable but necessary—as does Sartre when he distinguishes being-for-itself from being-in-itself. However, there does exist an alternative in which we can retain the view that a person is a history of experience and not a substance ego, while yet avoiding a dualistic matsphysics : We can give us substance metaphysics altogether and take experiences, or perhaps preferably events, as the ultimately real constituents not only of persons, but of all reality. If we do choose this alternative, with a consequent emphasis upon time, change and process, rather than space, permanence, and substance, we will find ourselves much closer in spirit to the metaphysics and psychology of the philosophical traditions of Eastern Mysticism. And, of course, we will need to return once again to a study of the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead.

SECTION V

A CONCLUDING REMARK

I would like to bring the discussion to a close by making the following summary observation : The study of phenomenology ought to make us receptive to mystical experiences by; (i) removing the stigma of their extraordinary character by treating many ordinary states and capacities of consciousness as already striking and in their own way extraordinary, and (ii) by treating conscious experience as fully real, as having at least as much ontological significance as anything else. The more intensively we engage the subject of consciousness qua consciousness, the more consciousness begins to take on a life of its own, to become distinctive and important in its own right. And the more familiar and intimate we become with the *phenomenon* of consciousness, the better are we able to appreciate a parallel development of familiarity and intimacy which naturally accompanies the special states of consciousness sustained by certain mystics in daily meditation practices repeated over many years.

Moreover, the more we set-off-in-relief the variety and detail of the capacities of consciousness, the more readily are we able to grasp and render intelligible particular accounts of mystical experiences. For we can imagine how someone might manipulate consciousness by a practiced concentration or by a shattering of such concentration to bring about such an exprinece Mystical experience, therefore, becomes for us merely another mode in which consciousness manifests itself. And we are no longer inclined to quickly pass over such experiences and the philosophies associated with them as, by their own-pronouncement, ineffabte, that is, as lacking in any philosophical import that could ever be stated or put into words.

Index-Author-Wise of Volume—XXXII, 1992

January 1992 Number 1

Editorial :
For Darshana International — John O. Nelson
1 Preparing for the 21st century : A Philosophy for new thinking — Howard L. Parsons
2 Hume's view on External Object : A Critical Analysis — Indu Pandey
3 The Relativity of Scientific Views of Reality — R. Puligandla
4 Transmigration Without A Self — Rona Datta
5 Swami Vivekananda's Gospel of Universal Religion : A Reconceptualisation of Global Spiritual Unity — Kiran Ramachandran Nair
6 Can the Existence of God be Found Revealed By Way of the Common Capabilities Given us, Those of Experience And Reason ? — Poul Vijecsner
7 Ibn Sina's Contributon to Philosophy — Mobammad Anwar Saleem
8 Ricoeur on Metaphor and Idology — William C. Gay
9 Rawl's Conception of a Person — M. Muquim
10 Freedom and Faith in Kierkegaard's Philosophy — Dipti Shukla
Book Reviews :

April 1992 Number 2

Editorial :
Buddhism : Gotamavada Versus Theravada — Archie J. Bahm
1 Personal Identity : In Buddhist and Whiteheadian Thought — Anil K. Sarkar
2 Religious Belief and Philosophical Inquiry — M. Prasad
3 Plato and the Scientific Spirit — B. Mollenhauer
4 The Existential Perspective of Language and Meaning — Santosh Kumar Pal
5 From the Chariot : The Katha and the Phaedrus — Lawrence E Johnson
6 Rajneesh : The Rebel — A. P. Sharma
7 Syllogistic Reasoning Pattern in Turkish Adolescent — Nermin Celen
8 Aggressiveness, Competition and Human Unity — Amitava Chatterjee
9 On Enemy and Gandhi's Legacy — John Somerville

July 1992 Number 3

1	Bells Tin-Teen Nebulation	*Panos D. Bardis*
2	Philosophy and the Self-Determination of Nation and Person Today	*Dejan Pavlov*
3	The Confederation of Religion and Society	*S. Sreeram Murthy*
4	Knowledge of One-Self and Other-Self	*Charles P. Alexander*
5	The Hyperegame Paradox : Smullyan's Version	*S K Wertz*
6	The Concept of Rasa according to Abhinavgupta	*Raghnnath Ghosh*
7	The Concept of Morality	*Ija Lazori Pawlowsk*
8	Gandhian conception of Brahmacharya	*N. P. Tiwary*
9	For a Better Understanding of Philosophy, For A Better Philosophical Method	*Sanjeev M. P.*
10	The Virgin Paradigm	*Christopher Hils &* *Ayman Vawaf*
11	Self and Ontology in Descartes and Upanishads	*V. Gopala Krishnaiah*
12	A debate on African Philosophy	*Chhaya Rai*
13	Human Value of Sustainable Society	*M. L. Dewan*
		M. L. Diwan
	Book Reviews :	*B. D. Joshi*

October 1992 Number 4

	Editorial : The Discontinuity of Space and Time	*Miodrag Cekic*
1	Chronic Ego is Curable (Sikh Religion Perspective)	*Samsher Singh*
2	Survival or Super-Psi ?	*Stephen E. Braude*
3	The Philosophy of Samuel Fredrick Hahnemann—A Perspective	*Shyam Deo Kumar Sinha*
4	Springe's Argument For Absolute Idealism	*A. D. Naik*
5	The Place of Morality in Karma Yoga	*P. Srinivasa Rao*
6	The Beginning of Sorrows: The Ecological Crisis and the Prospects of Human Survival	*Joseph Wayne Smith*
7	On Wittgenstein's Way of Doing Philosoppy	*Narendra Nath Gupta*
8	Mysticism and Phenomenology	*William Neblett*

Next International ISNS Congress

All members of the society in oll countries are invited to attend ond submit papers for the eleventh international conferences of this society to be held in Vanderbilt University, Nashville; Tennessee. May 25-28, 1995 on the theme "Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought." The conference is sponsored by our Center for Neoplatonic Studies, located in Vanderbilt University. R. Baine Harris and John Lachs will serve as co-directors. Essentially, the conference is to be a critique of Neoplatonism from a contemporary perspective, namely, what part of it is (or should be) dead and what element of it is still relevant in our age. A few notable Neoplatonic scholars and/or highly qualified critics of Neoplatonism will be invited to give special lectures during plenary sessions of the conference. Each day will have a basic theme around which papers in the various sections will be organized, namely,

Thursday the 25th : "Contemporary Science"
Friday the 26th : "Contemporary Social and Moral Theory'
Saturday the 27th : "Contemporary Fine Arts" and
Sunday the 28th : "Contemporary Spirituality."

A six member program committee has been formed Proposals for papers should include a brief abstract of the proposed paper and should be sent as soon as possible to Prof. R. Baine Harris, Department of Philosophy, Old Dominion University, Hampton Blvd., Norfolk, Virginia, 22529, USA. Purely historical studies of Neoplatonism will not be scheduled unless they are studies of the Neoplatonic element in the thought of someone who lived some of his or her life in the Twentieth Century; and hopefully such studies will still fit under one of the generic themes for the day.

The conference will begin at 9:00 A.M. on Thursday, May 25th and end about 4:30 P.M. on Sunday, May 28th. Nashville is a large enough city to have numerous planes leaving for major U.S. cities on Sunday evening, but it is anticipated that many of the participants may wish to stay over Sunday night as well in order to have time to tour the city on Monday the 29th. (No scholar should come to Nashville without spending a few hours visiting the full scale replica of the parthenon with its giant stature of Athena, located in a park adjacent to the Vanderbilt cam[illegible]) All inquiries concerning housing travel, etc. should be addre[illegible] the conference host, Prof. John Lachs, Department of Philo[illegible], Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, 37235—tel: 61[illegible]2637, FAX 615-343-7259.

THE DHARMA

May all beings who see, heat, or read this book
In this life and all successive lives
Obtain the precious human body and meet with
Friends of Virtue.
Having completely perfected the paths and stages
of Bodhisattva conduct,
May they complete the Two Objectives: benefitting
themselves and others.

Kalu Rinpoche

... ...

The Bodhisattva is like
the mightiest of warriors;
But the enemies are not
common foes of flesh and bone.
His fight is with the inner delusions,
the afflictions of self-cherishing
and ego-grasping,
Those most terrible of demons
That catch living beings in the
snare of confusion
And cause them forever to wonder
in pain, frustration and sorrow.
His mission is to harm ignorance and delusion,
never living beings.
These he looks upon with kindness,
patience and empathy,
Cherishing them like a mother cherishes
her only child.
He is the real hero,
calmly facing any hardship
In order to bring peace, happiness
and liberation to the world.

—The Thirteenth Dalai Lama
from his "Discourse on the Great *Lam Rim*"

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Signature with Date

8/5/08